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PROPERTY AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE II

THOMAS W. MERRILL*
In 1998 I published a short essay entitled Property and the Right
to Exclude.1 It appeared in an issue of the Nebraska Law Review honoring Lawrence Berger, a long-time property professor at Nebraska.
The essay has been rather widely cited, but I have my doubts as to
whether it has been widely read. A review of citations in Westlaw
suggests that the essay is commonly identified as arguing that the
right to exclude is the “sine qua non” of property, a statement that
appears in the opening paragraph.2 The typical citing author takes
this to mean that the essay argues the right to exclude is the only
relevant attribute of property, or that the right to exclude is the social
goal to which the institution of property is dedicated—two propositions disavowed in the essay. The author then uses this caricatured
view of the exclusion thesis as a foil against which to develop his or
her more nuanced or ethically satisfying view of property.
I stand by most of what I said in the Nebraska essay, including the
statement in the opening paragraph. Sine qua non is a Latin legal
term meaning “without which it could not be.” In other words, without the right to exclude, there can be no property. None of the attacks on the right to exclude using the Nebraska essay as a foil has
convinced me that this is wrong. Does the right to exclude capture
every relevant attribute of the institution of property? No, but I did
not argue that. I said only that it was a foundational attribute of
property. Is the right to exclude the end or the ultimate value to
which the institution of property aspires, a vision caricatured in one
article as a society of hermits?3 Obviously not. Giving individuals
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. A condensed version of this
Article was presented at the 2013 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at William
and Mary Law School. I thank the Conference organizers for the honor of naming me the
Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Prize recipient for 2013, and the panelists and conference
attendees for their many insightful responses and comments.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998)
[hereinafter Nebraska Essay].
2. Id. at 730.
3. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1841 (2006) (claiming “[t]he traditional account of the property right to
exclude emphasizes a solitary, isolated individual who excludes everyone from his land,” and
labeling this “The Hermit’s Right”).
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the right to exclude others from particular resources is a way of organizing the management and control of resources in society. As such,
it is a means to promoting a variety of ends, including, I will argue,
a willingness to share resources. It also has a number of drawbacks,
which means there will inevitably be exceptions and qualifications
to the right to exclude. But I also said this explicitly in Nebraska essay.
The present Article revisits and expands upon the Nebraska essay.
I will begin by restating the argument of the Nebraska essay, which
I will call the exclusion thesis. After that, I will offer some clarifications, inspired by some of the critiques as well as my own reflections
in the time that has passed since the Nebraska essay was published.
Building on the clarified thesis, I will highlight some of the normative pros and cons of property that flow from the right to exclude. I
will then offer something new: an explanation for how the right to
exclude came to be the critical attribute differentiating property from
other social institutions. The explanation is grounded in the concept
of possession and the information cost advantages of using possession to differentiate between things that are mine and not mine as we
navigate through everyday life. Possession is based on a perception
of a capacity or intention to exclude others from a thing, and insofar
as the institution of property is built on or evolves from a foundation
of possession, I will argue that this accounts for why property always
entails a right to exclude. I will wrap up by offering a few observations about what has emerged as the dominant critique of the
exclusion thesis: that it promotes an excessively individualistic
conception of property and downplays the communitarian or social
obligation perspective on ownership.
I. THE EXCLUSION THESIS
The exclusion thesis, as set forth in the Nebraska essay, is analytical or interpretative. It is an attempt to advance our understanding
of what property means, by identifying a common thread among all
the interests we call property. Although the exclusion thesis has
normative implications, as I will discuss, it is not itself a normative
vision. Nor does it purport to exhaust the understanding of what is
entailed by the institution of property. The law of property, to state
the obvious, is quite complicated, and includes much besides the right
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to exclude others. What the exclusion thesis maintains is that if and
when we recognize something as property, we will invariably find the
right to exclude others.
Property, according to the exclusion thesis, is characterized by a
triadic relationship.4 The triad consists of an owner, a thing, and the
right of the owner to exclude others from the thing. Provided the
three elements are satisfied, the owner has property in the thing. If
any of the elements is missing, there is no property in the thing. The
Nebraska essay said that the right to exclude is a necessary and sufficient condition of identifying something as property.5 A more accurate statement, although I think this was implicit in the essay, is
that all three elements of the triadic relationship are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient to make something property. But the
critical point is that the right to exclude others from the thing is
essential. Indeed, the scope of the owner’s property rights is defined
by the extent of the owner’s right to exclude. For example, if someone
has leased a car for a term of one year, and if being a leaseholder
gives one the right to exclude others from the thing that is leased,
then one has a property right in the car for one year.
The right to exclude is a right, not a duty; as such, the right to exclude can be waived. When I wrote the Nebraska essay, I assumed
that the right to exclude entails the right to include, by simple operation of waiving the exclusion right. I described exclusion as a
“gatekeeper” right,6 that is, the right to determine who can or cannot enter or touch a particular thing. For this reason, I have been
surprised by articles that argue in favor of a “right to include” or
“right of entrance” and juxtapose this to the exclusion thesis.7 Given
the nature of the right, the right to exclude and the right to include
are effectively the same thing. Admittedly, the only interest created
by a simple waiver of the right to exclude is a license, and as Dan
Kelly highlights, the law of property has given us a variety of more
permanent inclusionary devices, such as easements and leases, for
dividing up or sharing property.8 I do not dispute this, but the point
4. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 2061, 2063 (2012)
[hereinafter Property Strategy].
5. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 740.
6. Id. at 740.
7. E.g., Eduardo M. Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005).
8. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857 (2014).
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is not inconsistent with the exclusion thesis. To the extent the law
permits fragmentation of undivided property into lesser property
rights, each of the fragments entails a right to exclude.
Another important attribute commonly associated with property
is the right to use the thing. Undoubtedly a primary reason for creating and maintaining a system of property is to promote the effective
use of things. But the way we do this is by giving owners the right to
exclude others from the thing. In the Nebraska essay, I argued that
the right to exclude (and include) leads naturally to the right to use
a thing.9 By giving the owner the right to determine who can enter
or touch a thing, we effectively give the owner the power to determine
the use of the thing. The right to exclude allows the owner to bar access to those who would interfere with the owner’s desired use, and
the right to include allows the owner to call on the services of various
agents and contractors who can assist in developing particular uses
of the thing.
James Penner has argued that the right to exclude is grounded in
our interest in the use of things.10 If by this he means that the exclusion right will only attach to things that have some use value, in the
sense that they are scarce relative to demand for them, this is surely
correct. The “things” to which the exclusion right attaches must be
resources that have value, meaning they have potential use. This
was mentioned in passing in the Nebraska essay,11 and I have made
it more explicit in subsequent writing.12 The “things” to which property attaches are scarce resources that humans find valuable, and
they are valuable because they are things people want. Property does
not attach to things that are so plenteous they are not scarce, or to
things that no one wants.
If we go further, however, and maintain that the right to use is
the defining feature of property, as opposed to the right to exclude,
then I think the argument breaks down. For one thing, those who
argue for the primacy of the right to use, like Eric Claeys, stipulate
that this is a right of exclusive use.13 But how do we get to exclusive
9. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 741.
10. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 71 (1997).
11. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 733.
12. Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 2063–64.
13. E.g., Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as
the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 143 (2012); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is
Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 633–34 (2009).
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use, without a right to exclude? At the very least, those who would
make a right to use an essential condition of property must also add
the right to exclude. For another, not everything we call property entails a right to use. Pharmaceutical companies can obtain patents to
new drugs, and can thereby block others from making the drug, but
may have no right to use these patents without FDA approval. The
Penn Central Company had air rights above the Penn Central terminal, and could exclude others from entering this airspace, but it
had no right to use this space because of a preservation order.14 If
the government bars the owners of a wetland from draining or filling the land, the owner still has the right to exclude others from the
wetland, but the government edict may mean that there is little or
nothing in the way of effective use to which the land may be put. In
each of these cases—the drug patent, the air rights, the wetland—
the owner still has the right to exclude others, even if the owner has
no right to use the resource. Significantly, however, we still speak
of the owner as having property in the resource.
Still other important attributes of property involve the right to
transfer, whether by gift, sale, or inheritance. Here too we can say
that the right to transfer is a primary reason for establishing a system of property. Some property, money being the clearest case, has
little or no value other than serving as a medium of exchange. But
again, the right to exclude is the means by which we make possible
the transfer of rights in things. We need to know which objects are
mine and which are yours before any transfer of rights to things can
take place. This division of the world is accomplished by giving each
of us rights to exclude others with respect to particular things. Without property, that is, without the right to exclude, there can be no giftgiving, no contractual exchange, or no inheritance.
As in the case of the right to use, we can see how the right to exclude easily morphs into a right to transfer.15 Perhaps the place to
start is with abandonment of property. This can be regarded as a generalized waiver of any right to exclude, typically signaled by relinquishing possession of the object. By waiving all rights to exclude, the
owner signals that the object has been returned to the common pool,
and is open for claiming by others. In effect, the object has been transferred from A to an unknown future B, that is, the person who takes
14. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
15. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 742–44.
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up possession and now exercises the right to exclude. It is but a small
step from abandonment to gifts, which combine a relinquishing of any
right to exclude by the owner with an intention to designate a specific other as the new owner of the thing. A gift is typically signaled
by a transfer of possession from the giver to the recipient. It differs
from abandonment only in that we have a transfer of the object from
A to a known B. Once we recognize transfer by gift, it is yet another
small step to bargained-for exchange, for example by barter. Obviously, at some point the law kicks in, dictating various formalities that
must be observed to make an enforceable contract for the exchange
of rights or a valid will that provides for a transfer of property on
death. Nevertheless, the right to exclude is the major step that gets
us started down this path.
As in the case of the right to use, one can also have property
without having the right to transfer. The classic usufruct, which Bob
Ellickson has described as the earliest form of property in land,16
gave the holder the right to exclude others while the land was in active use. Nevertheless, the right was neither alienable nor inheritable. In the modern world, we also find instances where property is
declared inalienable for policy reasons, such as the ban on transfer
of eagle feathers, made to discourage the killing of eagles for commercial gain.17 After the ban, we continue to regard eagle feathers
as being owned objects, because the owner has the right to exclude
others, even though the right to transfer has been taken away.
What then is the relationship between the right of persons to exclude others from particular things and the other attributes commonly associated with property, such as the right to use and the right
to transfer? The right to exclude is a necessary condition, and together with the other legs of the triadic stool, the presence of a particular person and a particular thing of value, is jointly sufficient to
establish something as property. The right to use is obviously very
important and is nearly always associated with property, but it is
not a necessary condition. It is possible to have property without
having the right to use. The same holds for the right to transfer. The
right to transfer increases the value of property tremendously and
is nearly always associated with property, but again it is not a
16. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L. J. 1315, 1364–68 (1993).
17. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).

2014]

PROPERTY AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE II

7

necessary condition. It is possible to have property without having
the right to transfer.
The Nebraska essay argued that the primacy of the right to exclude
finds empirical support because it is a characteristic of virtually everything that is commonly regarded as property.18 This includes not just
tangible property like land and chattels, but also intangible rights
like future interests, security interests, and stocks and bonds. In each
case, the holder of the intangible right can exclude others from interfering with the right, for example by preventing others from interfering with a future interest once the condition is satisfied that allows
it to become possessory. The interests we call intellectual property,
including patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, are also
characterized by the right to exclude others from certain types of
production, copying, or use of demarcated intellectual goods.19 The
fact that the exclusion thesis correctly identifies as property such a
broad array of interests commonly regarded as property is a strong
point in its favor.
The exclusion thesis does not maintain that everything of value
is property. Rights of bodily integrity and personal autonomy are,
like property, good against the world, but such rights do not pertain
to any particular thing separate and apart from the person. Contractual obligations that bind only the parties fall outside the thesis, since
they do not create rights against the world. The same can be said of
statutory entitlement programs that create a government obligation
to make payments to designated beneficiaries. These confer no right
to exclude others, at least not in the ordinary meaning of the term.
The fact that the Supreme Court has characterized some government
entitlements as “property” for procedural due process purposes reveals that there are some uses of the term property in law that deviate from the exclusion thesis.20 I regard these decisions as being
driven by an instrumental desire to strengthen the procedural rights
of entitlement holders, with the concept of property being stretched
beyond its ordinary meaning to achieve this goal. My claim is that
virtually everything commonly regarded as property is characterized
18. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 747–52.
19. In the case of trade secrets, this consists of a Hohfeldian power to prevent others from
disclosing the secret.
20. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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by the right to exclude, not that the Supreme Court has correctly used
the concept of property in all its decisions.
II. CLARIFICATIONS AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Let me turn now to some clarifications of the exclusion thesis,
and, building on the clarifications, offer an outline of the normative
implications, pro and con, of giving individuals the right to exclude
others from things.
One important clarification about the exclusion thesis is that exclusion is not absolute. This was made explicit in the concluding section of the Nebraska essay.21 The common law recognized exceptions
to the right to exclude, such as the defense of necessity to an action
for trespass, and the public privilege to use navigable waters that
overflow private land. The immunity of landowners for committing
low-level nuisances (“live and let live”) also necessarily qualifies the
exclusion rights of other owners. The modern regulatory state imposes many more restrictions, such as anti-discrimination laws.
If the right to exclude is a necessary condition of property, as the
exclusion thesis maintains, how can there be exceptions to the right
to exclude? These propositions can be reconciled once we recognize
that the right to exclude is a residual right. Property entails having
a general right to exclude after certain exceptions grounded in common law and statutes have been subtracted. There must be enough
residual exclusion to be able to say that the owner exercises significant discretion about who can come and go and who can touch or use
the thing. But as long as we leave enough residual discretion in the
owner, we still regard the owner as having property. For example,
public utility companies may be highly constrained in terms of who
they must serve and at what prices. Yet they typically retain enough
discretionary authority over the selection, maintenance, and operation of their equipment and transmission lines that we readily identify these things as their property. Similarly, landlords in New York
City may be highly constrained in terms of what they can charge in
rent and when they may terminate a tenancy. Nevertheless, they
retain enough control over the selection of new tenants, determining
21. Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 753.
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how to maintain the property, and establishing rules for the use of
the rental property, that we regard them as owners.
At some point, if the discretion of a person relative to a resource
becomes too constrained, we stop referring to the interest of the person as property. Consider a security guard at a factory or an attendant in a parking garage. Each of these persons has some authority
to exclude others from the things in question. Yet whatever authority they have is very tightly circumscribed. The security guard, for
example, is authorized only to exclude trespassers from the factory.
He has no authority to determine what the factory will produce, when
it will be engaged in production, who shall be included as an employee
or supplier to implement these decisions, when it will be sold or leased,
and so forth. The parking garage attendant is authorized to deter persons from stealing or vandalizing autos. But he has no authority to
sell a car, sit in it on his lunch break, or to let anyone but the owner
take the car for a joyride. We could say these persons are simply
agents or bailees of owners and, in so doing sidestep any issue about
ownership. But even aside from the law of agency, these sorts of
“excluders” do not have enough discretionary authority over how they
exercise the right to exclude to qualify as persons who exercise a residual right to exclude, that is, to qualify as owners.
Because the exclusion thesis is analytical or interpretative, it is
not a normative argument about the ends of property. In other words,
the thesis is not a claim that we have property because it is desirable
to exclude others from things. As my frequent co-author Henry Smith
has emphasized, the right to exclude is a means toward various ends,
not an end in and of itself.22 There are numerous points that bear on
a normative assessment of the institution of property, both good and
bad. I believe that the exclusion feature is responsible for many if not
most of these features. Thus, it is important to understand the exclusion thesis before rendering judgment about the normative end
or ends of property as an institution.
In clarifying the role of the exclusion thesis in rendering normative judgments about property, it is helpful to consider further why the
right to exclude leads to various attributes of property that are normatively relevant. Simplifying somewhat, the right to exclude confers
22. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Means and Ends in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009).
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two general powers on owners. First, it gives them managerial authority over the thing. It does this for the reasons previously noted with
respect to the right to use things. If someone has the right to exclude
(and include), they have the ability to control who enters or touches
the thing. And by controlling who enters or touches the thing, this
person, whom we call the owner, secures managerial control over the
thing. Larissa Katz has captured this understanding in arguing that
property entails the power to determine “the agenda” of the thing.23
Jeremy Waldron has said something similar. As he puts it, an owner
of property is someone who has the final decision “how the object
shall be used and by whom.”24 What neither has noted is that this
agenda-setting or use-determining power derives from a more fundamental attribute, the right to exclude.
Second, the right to exclude gives owners accessionary rights with
respect to the thing. In other words, the owner automatically captures
changes in the value of the thing over time, including the fruits immediately produced by the thing. Thus, the owner of land captures
the value of crops that grow on the land, the owner of a share of stock
captures the dividends and any appreciation in the value of the stock
due to retained earnings, and the owner of a patent captures the
monopoly rents that can be generated through commercial development of the patent. These accessionary rights are again a function
of the right to exclude. The owner of land can exercise the right to exclude not only to plant and till but also to harvest the crop. The same
point can be made about other property rights. This feature of property requires that we develop understandings about what objects are
sufficiently prominently connected with the thing to constitute a
derivative or accessionary right to the original thing.25 For the most
part these understandings operate intuitively and without controversy, such as the understanding that the tomato that sprouts on a
plant in a garden belongs to the owner of the garden. These understandings have been supplemented by a variety of legal doctrines,
such as the understanding that baby animals belong to the owner of
the mother (the doctrine of increase) and minerals under the ground
belong to the surface owner (the ad coelum rule).
23. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L. J. 275, 278
(2008).
24. Jeremy Waldron, What Is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 327 (1985).
25. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009).
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Both managerial control and accessionary rights, consistent with
the earlier clarification about the exclusion right, are residual. Thus,
the right to manage a thing will be subject to various regulatory constraints imposed by common law and positive regulation. Similarly,
accessionary rights to a thing are subject to various contractual obligations and taxes imposed by the state. Accessionary rights are thus
also residual rights, roughly equivalent to what economists have
called residual claims.
Let me briefly list some of the normative arguments that have
been advanced for and against property as an institution.26 In virtually every case, these arguments flow either from the exclusion
right or from one or both of its derivative implications, residual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights. First, on the positive side:
• Giving owners residual managerial authority over things establishes a highly decentralized mode of resource management. This draws on local knowledge, which permits a more
efficient use of resources than would likely prevail if more
centralized or bureaucratic modes of resource management
were utilized.
• Combining residual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights creates a powerful incentive for owners to
invest effort and ingenuity in the use of resources so as to
maximize their value. Property, as the old saying goes, rewards labor by allowing the owner to reap what she has sown.
• Endowing owners with exclusionary rights over all things they
own allows owners easily to scale up and scale down their
business or residence, all the while maintaining the same
degree of control and accessionary rights over the combination of things they own.
• Establishing exclusionary rights to things eliminates the problems associated with open access resources like fisheries, such
as wasteful racing to grab resources, premature consumption
of resources, or inadequate restocking of resources.
• Creating exclusionary rights in things establishes the precondition for engaging in exchanges of resources. Free exchange
26. The list is drawn from Property Strategy, supra note 4, at 2081–94, where the reader
will find appropriate citations.
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of resources allows those who value particular resources most
highly to end up with those resources, enhancing the general
welfare.
Allowing individuals to exercise control over resources diffuses power in society, thereby improving the prospects for
individual liberty, free expression of ideas, free association,
and democratic government.
Permitting individuals to exercise exclusionary rights over
things facilitates the realization of personal goals and aspirations, and hence promotes individual flourishing.
Let us now turn to the negative side of the ledger:
Dividing up the world into separate units of discrete exclusionary rights creates incentives to foist costs onto other units
of discrete exclusionary rights. Thus, although the exclusion
strategy solves some externalities—those associated with open
access regimes—it simultaneously creates the condition for
other externalities in the form of spillovers.
Because of the exclusion feature, all property rights are
monopoly rights. When particular property rights have no
good substitutes, this allows owners to charge monopoly prices
for access to the resource they control, to the detriment of
consumers.27
Property rights are of little value unless interlaced with networks of roads, markets, recreational areas and other public
rights. Paradoxically, therefore, private exclusion rights are
dependent on public rights to realize their potential. Too much
exclusion, in the wrong places, can choke off the positive benefits of property rights.
Exclusion rights not only magnify incentives but also enhance
risks. Natural disasters, criminal predation, and illness pose
grave threats to those whose property is highly concentrated
in one form and place. Where insurance markets and social
safety nets are poorly developed, some form of communal sharing may be necessary to reduce the risks of private ownership.

27. See Katarina Miriam Wyman, Problematic Private Property: The Case of New York
Taxicab Medallions, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2013) (recounting history of restrictions on the
number of taxi medallions in New York City and the monopoly rents this generates for
medallion owners).
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• Because of the accession feature, those who have property
tend to get more property, often without regard to their ingenuity or effort. Insofar as the positive effects of exclusion
rights are dependent on a broad diffusion of property rights,
some form of redistribution may be necessary to counteract
the inherent tendency of property to beget more property.
Notice that one normative implication I have not listed is the promotion of communitarian values: an impulse to share resources with
others, or a sense of obligation to others. This is a rather startling
omission, since the central critique of the exclusion thesis by those
who wish to promote more sharing, obligation to others, or community values is that the exclusion feature works against these ends.
I have my doubts about this claim, but the issue is sufficiently important that I will defer it to Part IV of the Article.
Putting aside communitarian values, the current normative debate over property largely turns on whether one is more impressed
with the list of benefits or the list of costs. Those who are more impressed with the benefits would like to see exceptions to the right to
exclude held in check, in order to preserve the benefits of a robust
system of private property. The pro-property faction, if that is the
right term, would dial up the degree of exclusion associated with ownership in different contexts, in order to secure more of the benefits
of exclusion rights. Those who dwell on the costs would like to would
like to see more restrictions on the exclusion right, in order to advance competing social goals, such as environmental protection, restrictions on monopoly pricing, and a more egalitarian distribution
of wealth. They would dial down the level of exclusion, in order to
minimize the costs of property systems.
The exclusion thesis, as I see it, frames the debate but cannot resolve it. It all depends on what weight one attaches to the benefits
as opposed to the costs of private property. My own normative preferences fall on the side of strong property rights in most contexts. But
the normative case for this must be made independently of whether
the exclusion thesis is correct or not.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF POSSESSION
The Nebraska essay did not address the question of causation.
How did exclusion come to be the sine qua non of property, rather
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than something else, like the right to use or the promotion of human
flourishing or what have you? I will take a stab at answering that
question here. This is the short version: Exclusion lies at the root of
property because the institution of property is dependent on possession, and exclusion lies at the root of possession.
Possession plays a rather odd role in American property scholarship. Every teacher of property law spends significant time dealing
with possession. The first possession cases, starring that perennial
favorite, Pierson v. Post,28 are invariably granted significant class
time. Adverse possession, whereby possession is transformed by the
passage of time into ownership, is routinely covered. Finders cases,
which confer special rights on possessors, are popular; bailments,
which entail a transfer of possession but not ownership, may also
make an appearance; and so forth. At some point there will almost
certainly be a reference to the old saw that possession is rather more
than nine points of the law.29
Yet, given all this attention to possession, there is surprisingly
little analysis of possession in the recent scholarly literature. Possession is clearly different than property. Possession is often said to
be a fact; property is a legal right.30 This may be correct as a first approximation, but what is more telling, in terms of understanding the
nature of property systems, is respect for possession established by
others. Respect for possession of others is a social norm, or, as I will
argue momentarily, an ingrained human instinct shaped by social
norms. This phenomenon—respect for possession—is I believe the
foundation of the legal institution of property.
What does it mean to possess a thing? Everyone agrees possession
refers in some sense to control over a thing. There are longstanding
debates among civil law scholars about whether the required element
of control refers to actual control, an intention to control, or some of
both.31 It may be that actual control is necessary in order to establish
an initial claim of possession. In first possession cases, some courts
have held that even the clearest manifestation of an intention to
28. 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1805).
29. Corporation of Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner (1774) (Mansfield, J.).
30. Indeed, this truism is repeated in the Nebraska Essay, supra note 1, at 732–33.
31. Yun-chien Chang, The Economy of Concept and Possession, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF POSSESSION (Yun-Chien Chang ed.) (forthcoming 2014) (reviewing different positions among
civilians about actual controls versus intent to control).
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control will not suffice to establish possession, unless and until actual
control has been established. Once actual control has been established,
however, an intention to maintain control will often suffice, even if
there are lapses in actual control. In the famous case of Haslem v.
Lockwood,32 the plaintiff gathered droppings of manure on the road
into piles, left them for a day, and returned to find them gone; the
court held he had established possession because the gathering into
piles signaled an intention to control the manure. In the law of larceny, some courts have gone even further and have held that a clear
manifestation of an intention to deprive someone of control is enough
to establish criminal liability, even if the thief does no more than
touch the object.33
But let us put aside questions about the relative proportions of
actual control and intention to control in determining when someone
is in possession of a thing. What does control mean in this context?
It means, quite simply, that a person is in a position to exclude
others from a thing. Thus, in Eads v. Brazelton,34 the initial finder,
Brazelton, was deemed not to be in possession of a sunken vessel,
because he had not placed his salvage operation over the site in such
a way as to exclude Eads from gaining access to the wreck. When
speaking of an intention to maintain control, what we mean is that
the person has signaled an intention to exclude others from taking
the thing. In Haslem, putting the manure into piles signaled an intention to exclude others from the manure, even if the plaintiff lost
the capacity to do so temporarily. Thus control of a thing, actual or
intended, means excluding others from the thing.35
What is missing from property scholarship is the recognition that
possession plays a ubiquitous role in everyday life. Ask yourself this:
How is it possible that people can navigate through everyday life
without getting into constant disputes over who has the right to
exploit different objects of value? The answer, I submit, is a nearuniversal respect for possession established by others. We ascertain
whether something is possessed based on physical cues about the
32. 37 Conn. 500 (1871).
33. People v. Olivo, 420 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1981).
34. 22 Ark. 499, 79 Am. Dec. 88 (Ark. 1861).
35. See Richard A. Posner, Savigny, Holmes, and the Law and Economics of Possession,
86 VA. L. REV. 535, 547 (2000) (characterizing Holmes as understanding possession to entail
an intent to exclude others from interfering with one’s own use of a thing).
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relationship between persons and tangible things. We process this
information instantaneously and unconsciously. When something is
perceived to be possessed, we steer clear of it, just as we expect others
to steer clear of things in our possession. The process works the same
in both intimate and anonymous social settings. Even thieves are
highly selective about which objects in possession of others they target for appropriation. In most of their interactions with others, even
thieves respect possession established by others.
Take a scene with which you are all no doubt highly familiar: an
airport passenger terminal. Dozens, sometimes hundreds or even
thousands, of people are walking, standing or sitting in the terminal.
Nearly all of them are pulling some suitcase on wheels or carrying
a backpack or some other kind of satchel. Why are these people not
engaged in a constant struggle to seize control of the choicest-looking
suitcases or satchels? Is it because they fear the police would arrest
them? Maybe, but outside the security gate, there may not be very
many police around. In a busy airport it would be fairly easy to snatch
a suitcase from a dozing passenger and disappear into the crowd. No
doubt this happens, but it seems to be a rare occurrence. And think
of the curious scene in the arrivals area, where elaborate conveyor
belts spew forth dozens of suitcases to waiting passengers, and many
more suitcases are often lined up on the side, awaiting the arrival of
some claimant on an earlier or later flight. Remarkably, individuals
arriving on flights carefully scrutinize each bag as it comes off the
conveyor, taking care to claim only their own, often marked by some
colored ribbon or tape, and not someone else’s. Here it would seem to
be even easier to grab a choice-looking suitcase belonging to someone
else and jump in a cab before being detected. Again I assume this happens, but not very often—certainly not often enough to generate a
demand for systematic inspection of claim tickets by security guards.
Nor do I think we can ascribe the respect for suitcases of others to
a social norm, at least not the kind of norm developed through repeated interactions of persons living in close-knit communities.36
When I pass through O’Hare Airport I rarely encounter another person I know, even though I lived in Chicago for most of my adult life.
Nearly everyone is a stranger to everyone else, and yet the respect
for possession seems secure. More strikingly still, consider that the
36. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 177–78 (1991).
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scene I have described is virtually the same the world over. It is no
different in Richmond, Virginia, than it is in Moscow, or Taipei, or
Nairobi. How is it possible that expensive-looking suitcases belonging to anonymous travelers remain undisturbed, for the most part,
in all the corners of the world?
The reason there is no free-for-all over suitcases in airports is that
people instinctively respect possession established by others. I say
instinctively advisedly. Respect for possession established by others
is likely something that is hardwired in human psychology. It is a
species of what Daniel Kahneman calls “thinking fast” or System 1
cognition.37 It occurs automatically and unconsciously, without any
effort at deliberate reasoning on our part. As Jim Krier has suggested,
the roots of this instinct may lie in our evolutionary past.38 Biologists
have identified an evolutionarily stable “bourgeois game,” in which
animals aggressively defend their territory from attack but retreat
in the face of a defense of territory by another. The possession instinct may derive from a similar innate proclivity. In other words it is
in our genes, having been selected out for its superior survival value
over the millennia. Be that as it may, a virtually automatic respect
for possession established by others appears to be the best explanation for how human beings navigate, without confusion or turmoil,
through the everyday world filled with valuable objects.
Although the possession instinct appears to be universal throughout human societies, the particular signs used to communicate an intention to possess undoubtedly have a social element.39 Bob Ellickson’s
well-known study of the different social norms for establishing possession among different whaling communities is an example.40 Depending
on the species of whale pursued and its behavior, there were variations in what communicative acts were required to establish possession, for example in terms of whether a line must be maintained
between the harpoon and the whaling vessel. This was clearly part
37. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
38. James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 139 (2009).
39. On the communicative aspect of possession, see Carol M. Rose, Possession as the
Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 78 (1985); Henry E. Smith, The Language of
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
40. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry, 5 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989).
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of the cultural knowledge transmitted within each whaling community. The more important point, for present purposes, is that all whaling communities followed a rule of first possession in allocating rights
to particular whales among whaling vessels. The variations involved
the communicative acts that signaled possession, not the basic principle of respect for possession established by others. With respect to
suitcases in airports, the use of luggage tags and colored ribbons to
identify suitcases possessed by others is undoubtedly learned behavior.
In this case, the learning appears to have spread rapidly throughout
the world and is so obvious it requires no explicit instruction. People
quickly pick it up observing what other people do. The rapid diffusion of common signs is made possible, I would suggest, because the
instinct for respecting possession is universally shared.
Why does possession perform the task of differentiating among
objects in the everyday world rather than ownership? The reason,
I believe, is that ascertaining possession, in most situations, entails
very low information costs. Information about possession can be gathered at a glance and processed by our brain automatically and instantaneously. Possession is based on physically observable facts about
the relationship between persons and tangible objects. Significantly,
possession applies only to tangible things like land and chattels. One
can possess land, cars, clothing, laptop computers, and suitcases; one
cannot possess an invisible right, such as a future interest, a security interest or an intellectual property right. The evidence used to
establish possession consists of physical facts about the relationship
between natural persons and tangible objects. The relevant facts are
those that indicate that particular persons have established control
over particular objects and/or are signaling an intention to maintain
control over the object. Our brain uses this evidence, quickly and reflexively, to raise inferences about whether objects are possessed or
unclaimed. If possessed, we avoid interfering with the object. Others
do the same. The result is that airport terminals exhibit very little
discord in matching thousands of objects with thousands of persons,
many of whom come from foreign cultures and nearly all of who are
complete strangers to each other.
Establishing ownership, in contrast, entails much higher information costs. Establishing ownership entails ruling out any superior
right in third parties, which means tracing the chain of title back in
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time. Thus, ownership is established primarily by documentary evidence, such as bills of sale, deeds, certificates of title, and registries
of rights. It takes time and some sophistication to uncover and interpret these documents. Ownership is often qualified by invisible rights,
such as security interests and future interests, which are even more
difficult to establish and interpret. And owners include not just natural persons, but also artificial entities like corporations that act
through natural persons, which raises potential questions of authority and agency.41 It is conceivable that in some futuristic world persons could navigate through valuable objects using the concept of
ownership. They could wear some new generation of Google glasses
that would scan small bar codes on objects that embody the relevant
documentary information about ownership, which information would
then be processed by a computer, which would then send a verbal message to the person wearing the glasses about the ownership status
of each object encountered. But think back to the airport terminal.
The number of messages would be overwhelming, not to say irritating.
Far better to rely on the computer that has evolved in our brains,
which sends silent messages like “not yours,” “not yours,” “not yours,”
“yours!”—messages that allow us to navigate successfully through
the world of objects without thinking about it.
Even if possession is critical to everyday interactions among people and their objects, and perceptions of possession entail some combination of capacity to exclude and intention to exclude, why does it
follow that property should similarly be anchored in a right to exclude? The answer has already been intimated. Because possession,
for information-cost reasons, is the concept that dominates world of
objects in everyday life, it is critical that property and possession
remain synchronized. If possession were grounded in one concept
(exclusion), and property in another (need, promotion of human flourishing, whatever), there would be too much incompatibility for the
system to bear. This is because the system of property rights—a legal
institution—presents an enormous information-cost problem, given
the very large number of persons and objects covered by the system.
The only way to overcome this information-cost problem is to borrow
from the information-saving attributes of possession.
41. BENITO ARRUNADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE 76–85
(2012) (making the point that questions of agency authority in corporations parallel questions
of title in property transfers).

20

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:001

Consider, as one striking example of the dependence of property
on possession, the use of possession as a proxy for ownership in virtually all low-valued transfers of property rights. If you buy a bottle
of water from a street vendor, for example, you do not demand documentary evidence that the vendor has good title to the bottle of water
sitting in his cooler. The fact that the vendor is in possession of the
water bottle is taken as sufficient evidence of the vendor’s capacity
to transfer title. We accept possession as evidence of title in these
circumstances for the obvious reason that the transaction costs of
doing a “title search” of the water bottle would be prohibitive, relative
to the value of the object being exchanged. As objects become more
valuable and durable, the calculus changes. Thus, we do title searches
before transferring ownership of land or airplanes, and sophisticated purchasers of artwork will demand evidence of the provenance
of the work before they buy. But for consumables like food and beverages, articles of clothing, and most other forms of personal property,
possession functions as a stand-in for ownership. Notice that there
is no bright line separating this possession proxy from title-searching
as modes of establishing ownership. Purchasers of land nearly always
do a title search and inspect the property for evidence of undisclosed
possession. And the transfer of some expensive personal property,
like antique jewelry, may also entail an investigation of provenance.
Clearly, it would be awkward and confusing rigorously to separate
possession and title as modes of determining ownership. Far better
to synchronize the concept of ownership with possession, which
means in effect that ownership, like possession, must be grounded
in exclusion.
Further illustrations of dependence arise in resolving disputes between possessors and owners. Ownership trumps possession, but as
previously indicated the costs of establishing ownership are much
higher than the costs of ascertaining possession. Not surprisingly,
therefore, when disputes break out between possessors and wouldbe owners, the first step in resolving the dispute is to enforce the right
of possession. When the police are called to mediate a fight between
a repo man and the owner of an auto, or to determine whether a landlord is entitled to evict a tenant, the police generally allow possession
to remain undisturbed pending a more formalized resolution of the
respective rights of the parties. Again, one can say that the concept
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of possession is being deployed as a surrogate for title, given that
the urgency of the situation does not permit any kind of investigation of the chain of the title before deciding who is entitled to the
thing in question.
The general point is this. Respect for possession established by
others is a universal attribute of human societies. Call it a social
norm or an instinct shaped by social norms or whatever you want.
Respect for possession operates through perceptions that individuals
have either established the capacity to exclude others from things
or have an intention to exclude others from things. Property is a legal
institution, one that exists only in societies that have some formalized
method of adjudicating rival claims to particular resources. Property, as a legal institution, is dependent upon respect for possession,
and interacts with possession in many critical ways. There are probably multiple reasons for this, but a basic one is information costs:
information about possession is much cheaper and quicker to process than is information about ownership. In order for this interaction to work, however, property—the legal institution—must mimic
or be synchronized with the basic features of possession. This means
the right to property must always include, as one critical element, the
right to exclude.
IV. SHARING PROPERTY
Let me close with some brief comments about the burgeoning literature that attacks the right to exclude on the ground that it devalues the importance of community, social cooperation, and sharing
of resources. Preliminarily, I would distinguish two positions.
One, which is a variant on conventional egalitarianism, wants
more people to participate in the benefits of owning property. Those
who espouse this view look at the list of benefits of property set forth
in Part II, especially the benefits of prosperity, security, liberty and
the development of personhood, and say: If property does these good
things, then everyone should have some property! This was essentially
the argument of Charles Reich, in The New Property,42 who worried
about the proliferation of licenses, jobs, and benefits dependent on the
discretion of the state. He wanted to redefine these entitlements as
42. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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“property,” in order to provide those whose livelihood was dependent
on them the benefits associated with property. Another prominent
voice sounding this theme is Hernando de Soto,43 who wants to transform informal occupancy rights in developing countries into formal
property rights, in order to provide greater access to credit markets
by the poor.
I think Reich was in error in thinking that discretionary government benefits can be reconceived as property. The entitlements he
considered are more like revocable licenses or contracts. Otherwise,
I have no particular quarrel with “more property” proposals. Indeed,
there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that widespread distribution of conventional property maximizes both the economic and the social and political advantages of a private property
system. There are of course serious questions about how to generate
or sustain a more egalitarian distribution of property. I regard expropriation as a bad idea, and pushing people to buy homes using subprime loans is not much better. Making education widely available
and reducing the regulatory impediments to starting new business
ventures are better ideas. In any event, I see nothing in the “more
property” version of the argument for greater sharing incompatible
with the exclusion thesis. The disadvantaged and disfavored who
previously have had little or no property will want to be able to exercise the exclusion right once they get their hands on some property,
in order to capitalize fully on the advantages of ownership.
A second variant on the need for more sharing is more problematic. This is the idea that the government should enforce greater
sharing of existing property rights, by mandating access to valuable
resources, restricting changes in use, imposing rent controls, compelling mediation before co-owners can seek partition, and the like.
I will call this the “forced sharing” argument.44 Forced sharing differs
43. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).
44. I cannot provide a complete bibliography of works that espouse some variant on what
I have characterized as the “forced sharing” position. Prominent works that I have in mind
include Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011);
Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009); and JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000). Obviously, I cannot do justice
to the many subtleties in argument or variations in approach reflected in these and other
related works. What generally unites them in my mind is a critique of the exclusion thesis
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from the standard arguments for restricting exclusion rights in order
to limit externalities, control abuses of monopoly, or to provide public
goods like roads. These standard arguments are designed to restrict
the exercise of exclusion rights by some in order to enhance the value
of property rights more generally. Forced sharing also differs from
proposals for government insurance or social safety nets, in order to
reduce the risks of private ownership, or arguments for progressive
taxation, in order to mitigate the tendency of property systems to
produce increasing inequalities. These programs generally proceed
by taxing fungible income or wealth and do not necessarily entail
modifying the traditional prerogatives of ownership. Forced sharing,
in contrast, advocates tinkering with the mechanics of the institution of property itself, in order to open the gates to more widespread
participation in the use and enjoyment of discrete resources. The
battle stanchion of the forced sharing proponents is the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Shack,45 which suggested the
right to exclude is subject to override by courts based on an ex post
balancing of the interests of the owner and the parties seeking access. The ultimate vision here is imposing some kind of “just cause”
limitation on the right to exclude, with courts or some other agency
of government passing judgment on whether owners have sufficiently good reasons for managing their property the way they do.
One obvious concern is that too much dilution of the exclusion
right will sap the engine of property of much of its vitality. Forced
sharing would inevitably result in more complicated management
problems, with more people demanding access to resources and
more conflicts among competing claimants to sort out. Owners
would worry about what the “Sharing Commission” will say about
their resolution of these conflicts and consequently would have less
time and energy to devote to managing the resources themselves.
Larger owners would hire “sharing compliance officers,” giving corporations a comparative advantage relative to small proprietors. In
order to avoid litigation, owners would tend to steer clear of decisions that might be questioned as violating the sharing principle.
coupled with an endorsement of significant governmental restrictions on the prerogatives of
ownership in order to promote distributive justice goals.
45. 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
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Overall, greater timidity would creep into the management of property. Innovation and experimentation would decline. Idiosyncratic
uses of property, including perhaps uses by dissenting religious sects
or political groups, would be discouraged.
Less obviously, it is not clear to me that forced sharing would lead
to more sharing. It all depends on whether people are more likely to
share resources voluntarily or if sharing will be better promoted by
government compulsion. It is plausible, to me at least, that people
have a natural impulse toward communal engagement and that there
is an “altruism instinct” to go along with the possession instinct.46
Secure and relatively unqualified property rights may increase the
willingness of owners to share with neighbors and friends, if only
because they are confident that if the sharing does not work out,
they can terminate the sharing by reasserting their right to exclude.
If forced to share, the natural impulse toward sociability and altruistic sharing may be extinguished. Owners may do as little as possible
to comply with regulatory mandates, or may exchange their property
for other resources that are easier to conceal or that can be moved
to jurisdictions where sharing is not compelled.
There are unquestionably counterarguments. Regulatory mandates
can change preferences. Seat belt laws have changed people’s attitudes about using seat belts; laws against smoking inside public
buildings have presumably discouraged some people from smoking.
Perhaps forced sharing of property would eventually shape preferences by developing a taste for sharing. I have my doubts. It would be
hard to argue that there is more sharing between landlords and tenants in jurisdictions like Berkeley and New York that have rent and
eviction controls than there is in jurisdictions without such controls.
And I am skeptical that colleges in New Jersey are more hospitable to
outsiders demonstrating on campus, where such access is mandated,47
than are schools in other states where access is left to the discretion
of the college. But it is ultimately an empirical question.
What can hardly be doubted is that if there is no “altruism instinct,”
in other words, if people are entirely self-centered and selfish, then
forced sharing is unlikely to yield more sharing. Instead, questions
46. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Eaton et al., Is Altruism a Genetic Trait?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Sept. 30, 2010).
47. Princeton University v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980).
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about sharing of resources would be transferred from the realm of
individual discretion to the political realm. And if people are selfcentered and selfish, then the outcome in the political realm will be
a function of the relative power and capacity for political organization of those who have resources as opposed to those who do not. Here
there can be little doubt that those who have, being a relatively
more concentrated interest, will as a general matter out-organize
and out-lobby the relatively unorganized set of persons who prefer
more sharing. Forced sharing, on these assumptions, would simply
sap the institution of property of much of its vitality with little gain,
other than an increase in the size and complexity of government.
CONCLUSION
The right to exclude, I continue to believe, is an essential condition
of identifying something as property. Exclusion is not the only important attribute of property. The right to include, to use, and to transfer
are all obviously important, but they are dependent upon and derive
from the right to exclude, which is indispensable. Exclusion is not
a goal or valuable end of the institution of property. It is a critical
feature that produces a variety of ends, many good, some bad. The
normative evaluation of property as an institution depends on how
we weigh the goods versus the bads. I have argued here that the
right to exclude is an essential feature of property because exclusion
of others is an essential feature of possession, and property builds
on and relies continually on possession in many of its operations. As
for those who argue that the right to exclude should be compromised
in order to promote forced sharing of resources, I think the consequences of moving too far in this direction would be undesirable, and
I am skeptical that in the final analysis forced sharing would increase
the total amount of sharing we witness.

PROPERTY’S STRUCTURAL PLURALISM:
ON AUTONOMY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND
THE ROLE OF BLACKSTONIAN OWNERSHIP

HANOCH DAGAN*
It is a real privilege for me to participate in the celebration of
Thomas Merrill’s enormous contribution to the scholarship and
jurisprudence on property, which has enhanced our understanding
of property in numerous ways. His work has elucidated the rationale of seemingly puzzling doctrines,1 illuminated the significance
of hitherto marginalized ones,2 and introduced a new theoretical
perspective—the focus on information costs—that by now dominates
much of property theory.3 At the center of the first panel of the
Tenth Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference, to which this
Essay belongs, is yet another of Tom’s seminal contributions: his
challenge to our understanding of the essence of property.
After the bundle-of-sticks picture of property endorsed by the
Restatement of Property had been regarded for decades as conventional wisdom,4 Tom was one of the first scholars to forcefully insist
that the right to exclude—in line with Blackstone’s conception of
property as “sole and despotic dominion”5—is the most defining feature of property.6 While property does not always and necessarily
entail unqualified dominion, “the right of the owner to act as the
exclusive gatekeeper of the owned thing” is, in this view, “the differentiating feature of a system of property.”7
* Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation, Tel-Aviv
University Buchmann Faculty of Law.
1. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
2. In addition to his well-known discussion of numerus clausus principle, see also, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009).
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
4. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, §§ 1–5 (1936).
5. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (Univ. of Chi.
ed. 1979) (1765–69).
6. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730
(1998). See also, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997).
7. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1850 (2007).
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This short Essay is part of my ongoing conversation with Tom on
these matters. I was asked to present to this panel a structurally
pluralistic perspective on property, different from both the view of
property as a singular right and from its conception as a bundle of
rights, and I will devote most of my efforts to this task. But I will
also seek to allude to some points of (perhaps surprising) convergence between this view and at least some aspects of the way Tom
conceptualizes property.
***
The structurally pluralistic account of property I have developed
in recent years8 begins with a straightforward descriptive observation. Rather than a uniform bulwark of independence, property
manifests itself in law in a much more nuanced, contextualized, and
multifaceted fashion. Property law, as both lawyers and citizens experience it, is rather complex, and this complexity is at odds with
the attempt to formulate broad and unified theories suggesting that
one animating principle, such as exclusion, shapes the entire terrain
or at least the core of property.
Indeed, property law tends to set up distinct institutions, each of
which covers a specific category of human situations and is governed
by a distinct set of rules expressing differing underlying normative
commitments. Thus, we can find side-by-side doctrines that, by and
large, comply with a libertarian commitment to independence (for
example, fee simple absolute) alongside other doctrines in which ownership is a locus of communitarian sharing (such as marital property) or of utilitarian welfare maximization (as with patents), as
well as many other doctrines vindicating various types of balances
among these (and other) property values (for example, copyright or
common interest communities).
Structural pluralism takes this heterogeneity of our existing
property doctrines seriously. While conceding that there is some
value in looking for a rather thin common denominator in the wide
terrain of legal doctrine covered by wholesale legal categories such
as property, it insists that such a common denominator is not robust
enough to illuminate the existing doctrines or determinative enough
8. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011).
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to provide significant guidance as per their evaluation or development. Thus, as Felix Cohen demonstrated, every property right involves some power to exclude others from doing something.9 But as
Cohen further emphasized, this is a rather modest truism, which
hardly yields any practical implications.10 Private property is also
always subject to limitations and obligations, and “the real problems
we have to deal with are problems of degree, problems too infinitely
intricate for simple panacea solutions.”11
Conceptualizing the right to exclude as the core of property marginalizes or possibly even undermines two significant constitutive
characteristics of property: governance and inclusion. The internal
life of property law is often structured by a wide range of sophisticated
governance regimes aiming to facilitate various forms of interpersonal relationships (consider, for example, the law of waste, landlordtenant law, trust law, and the law of common-interest communities).
Moreover, examining the more precise scope of owners’ right to exclude shows that inclusion is sometimes inherent in property; nonowners’ rights to entry in important categories of property cases
(think, for example, about the law of public accommodations; the
copyright doctrine of fair use; and the law of fair housing, notably
in the contexts of common-interest communities law and landlordtenant law) are indispensable characteristics of the property institution under examination.12
Accordingly, a structurally pluralistic conception of property understands it as an umbrella for a limited and standardized set of
property institutions that serve as important default frameworks of
interpersonal interaction. All these property institutions mediate
the relationship between owners and non-owners regarding a resource, and, in all property institutions, owners have some rights to
exclude others. This common denominator derives from the role of
property in vindicating people’s independence. Alongside this important property value, however, other values also play crucial roles in
shaping property institutions. Property also can and does serve our
commitments to personhood, desert, aggregate welfare, social responsibility, and distributive justice. Different property institutions
9.
10.
11.
12.

Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370–71 (1954).
Id.
Id. at 357, 362, 370–74, 379.
See Hanoch Dagan, Inside Property, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2013).
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offer differing configurations of entitlements that constitute the contents of an owner’s rights vis-à-vis others, or a certain type of others,
with respect to a given resource.
The particular configuration of these entitlements is by no means
arbitrary or random. Rather, it is (at least at its best) determined by
the character of the property institution at issue: namely, by the
unique balance of property values characterizing it. These values
both construct and reflect the ideal ways in which people interact in
a given category of social contexts, such as market, community, and
family, and with respect to a given category of resources, such as
land, chattels, copyright, and patents. The ongoing process of reshaping property as institutions is often rule-based and usually
addressed with an appropriate degree of caution. And yet, the possibility of repackaging, highlighted by Hohfeld,13 makes it (at least
potentially) an exercise in legal optimism, with lawyers and judges
attempting to explicate and develop existing property forms by
accentuating their normative desirability while remaining attuned
to their social context.
Some property institutions are structured along the lines of the
Blackstonian view of property as sole despotic dominion. These
market-oriented property institutions are atomistic and competitive. They constitute a “sphere of freedom from personal ties and
obligations,”14 thus vindicating people’s independence (or negative
liberty). But property law does not allow these norms to override
those of the other spheres of society. Property relations mediate
some of our most cooperative human interactions as spouses, partners, members of local communities, and so forth. Rather than imposing the impersonal norms of the market governing the fee simple
absolute on these divergent spheres, property law, at least at its
best, facilitates their flourishing by supplying robust default mechanisms (particularly anti-opportunistic devices) befitting their animating underlying principles.
Property institutions vary not only according to the social context
but also according to the nature of the resource at stake. The resource is significant because its physical characteristics crucially
13. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710, 720, 733–34, 746–47 (1917). By invoking Hohfeld, I do not
imply to invoke, let alone endorse, the dubious conception of property as bundles.
14. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 145 (1993).
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affect its productive use. Thus, for example, the fact that information consumption is generally non-rivalrous implies that, when the
resource at hand is information, use may not always necessitate
exclusion. The nature of the resource is also significant in that society approaches different resources as variously constitutive of
their possessors’ identity. Accordingly, resources are subject to different property configurations; whereas the law vigorously vindicates
people’s control of their constitutive resources, the more fungible an
interest, the less emphasis property law will need to place on its
owner’s control.
Indeed, unlike the Blackstonian view, the structurally pluralistic
construct recognizes the significant role that our social values play
in our conception of property. Each of our property institutions, as
noted, targets a specific set of values to be promoted by its constitutive rules in one subset of social life. Both the existing categories and
their underlying animating principles are always subject to debate
and reform, so that some institutions may fade away while new ones
emerge and yet others change their character or split.15 But at any
given moment, each such institution consolidates people’s expectations regarding a core type of human relationships so that they can
anticipate developments when entering, for instance, a common interest community, or marriage, or invading other people’s rights in
a specific form of intellectual property. Thus, a set of fairly precise
rules governs each of these types of property institutions, enabling
people to predict the consequences of future contingencies and to plan
and structure their lives accordingly. Furthermore, our property institutions also serve as means for expressing normative ideals of law
for these types of human interaction.
Both roles—consolidating expectations and expressing law’s
ideals—require some measure of stability. To form effective frameworks of social interaction and cooperation, law can recognize a necessarily limited and relatively stable number of categories whose
content must be relatively standardized. The standardization prescription is particularly stringent regarding the expressive role,
which mandates limiting the number of legal categories since law
15. This dynamic feature of property assures that understanding property as encapsulating ideals of interpersonal interaction is a source of critical engagement and reform.
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can effectively express only a given number of ideal types of interpersonal relationships. Indeed, the structurally pluralistic conception of property justifies property’s standardization by reference to
the role of our property institutions as default frameworks of interpersonal interaction, frameworks that serve to consolidate expectations and to express law’s normative ideals for core types of human
relationships. This justification of the numerus clausus principle coexists with a rather broad realm of freedom of contract regarding property rules (subject, of course, to the legitimate verification interest of
third parties insofar as they are affected by such opt-outs).16
On its face, such a pluralistic understanding of property may
seem problematic, both normatively and jurisprudentially. Normatively, one may wonder whether it pays sufficient attention to
personal autonomy, the value with which property is often (rightly)
associated.17 Jurisprudentially, one may question whether structural pluralism is sufficiently attentive to the rule of law prescriptions that, again, are particularly important to property.18 These are
significant concerns, but neither undermines property’s structural
pluralism. In fact, they help to clarify the normative and jurisprudential underpinnings of structural pluralism and to demonstrate
that, properly interpreted and refined, structural pluralism ends up
superior to any alternative position on property on both fronts.
***
Consider first the normative virtue of property’s structural pluralism. I argue that the multiplicity typical of property’s landscape is
indispensable for people’s autonomy, at least insofar as autonomy
stands for our right to self-determination: our right to be to some
degree the authors of our lives, choosing among worthwhile life plans
and being able to pursue our own choices.

16. See DAGAN, supra note 8, at ch. 1.
17. This concern seems to explain Tom’s (mis)characterization of my position as one of
“forced sharing.” See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAMKANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 22–24 & n.44 (2014).
18. This concern seems to underline Henry Smith’s claim that my pluralist conception of
property can hardly be distinguished from the bundle understanding of property. See Henry
E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1705–06 (2012).
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As Joseph Raz explains, autonomy requires not only appropriate
mental abilities and independence but also “an adequate range of
options.”19 While a wide range of valuable sets of social forms is available to societies pursuing the ideal of autonomy, autonomy “cannot
be obtained within societies which support social forms which do not
leave enough room for individual choice.”20 For choice to be effective,
for autonomy to be meaningful, there must be, other things being
equal, “more valuable options than can be chosen, and they must be
significantly different,” so that choices involve “tradeoffs, which
require relinquishing one good for the sake of another.”21 Indeed,
given the diversity of acceptable human goods from which autonomous people should be able to choose and their distinct constitutive
values, the state must recognize a sufficiently diverse set of robust
frameworks for people to organize their life.
Ostensibly, this commitment does not require the elaborate apparatus of property’s structural pluralism. As long as property is
understood as “sole and despotic dominion” and contracts are conceptualized around people’s consent, so the argument goes, free individuals can use these fundamental building blocks of private law
and tailor their interpersonal arrangements so that they best serve
their own utilitarian, communitarian, or other purposes.22 In fact,
however, many of these frameworks cannot be realistically actualized
without the active support of viable legal institutions (or law-like
social conventions). To see why this is the case, we need to appreciate
the insights of both lawyer economists and critical scholars.23
Economic analysis of private law, which investigates its incentive
effects, forcefully demonstrates how many of our existing practices
rely on legal devices serving to overcome numerous types of transaction costs—information costs (symmetric and asymmetric), bilateral
monopolies, cognitive biases, and heightened risks of opportunistic
behavior that generate participants’ endemic vulnerabilities in most
19. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373 (1986).
20. See id. at 406.
21. See id. at 372, 395, 398. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 309–12
(1974).
22. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property as Modularity, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 151, 157–58 (2012).
23. For more a detailed analysis on which the following paragraphs draw, see Hanoch
Dagan & Michael A. Heller, Freedom of Contracts Pt. III.A (Columbia Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 458, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325254.
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cooperative interpersonal interactions.24 Merely enforcing the parties’
expressed intentions would not be sufficient to overcome the inherent risks of such endeavors. If many (most?) of them are to become
or remain viable alternatives, law must provide the background reassurances that help to catalyze the trust so crucial for success.
Even where parties are guided by their own social norms, law often
plays an important role in providing them background safeguards,
a safety net for a rainy day that can help to establish trust in their
routine, happier interactions.25
But law’s effects are not only material. Because our private law
tends to blend into our natural environment, its categories play a
crucial role in structuring our daily interactions.26 Thus, alongside
these material effects, many of our conventions—including many
social practices we take for granted—become available to us only
due to cultural conventions that often, especially in modern times,
are legally constructed.27 Hence, even before we consider the transaction costs of constructing these arrangements from scratch, people
in a society where these notions have not been legally coined would
have faced “obstacles of the imagination” that might have precluded
these options. Indeed, our private law institutions play an important cultural role; like other social conventions, they serve a crucial
function in consolidating people’s expectations and in expressing
normative ideals regarding the core categories of interpersonal relationships they participate in constructing.28
Both the material and the expressive functions of property imply
that freedom of contract, though significant, cannot possibly replace
active legal facilitation. Lack of legal support is often tantamount to
undermining—maybe even obliterating—many cooperative types of
interpersonal relationships and thus people’s ability to seek their
conception of the good. Therefore, a commitment to personal autonomy by fostering diversity and multiplicity cannot be properly
24. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
25. Cf. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,
578–79 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 212–14 (1987).
27. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8 (2006).
28. See generally DAGAN, supra note 8, at chs. 1 & 4.
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accomplished through a hands-off policy and a hospitable attitude
to freedom of contract. The liberal state should “enable individuals
to pursue valid conceptions of the good” by proactively providing “a
multiplicity of valuable options.”29
Accordingly, a structurally pluralistic property law—the conception of property which best accounts for the property law we actually
have—follows this prescription by including diverse types of property institutions, each incorporating a different value or different
balance of values. This variety is rich, both between and within
contexts: it provides more than one option for people who want, for
example, to become homeowners, engage in business, or enter into
intimate relationships. The boundaries between these property institutions are open, enabling people to freely choose their own ends,
principles, forms of life, and associations by navigating their way
among them. While at a certain point the marginal value of adding
another distinct institution is likely to be nominal in terms of autonomy, pluralism implies that property law’s supply of these multiple
institutions should not be guided only by demand. Demand for certain institutions generally justifies their legal facilitation, but absence of demand should not necessarily foreclose it insofar as these
institutions add valuable options for human flourishing that significantly broaden people’s choices. Only in this way can law recognize
and promote the individuality-enhancing role of multiplicity.
Because only the conception of property as institutions—alongside
its attendant commitment to a broad realm of freedom of contract
regarding property rules—follows these prescriptions, this is the
only truly autonomy-enhancing conception of property. Indeed, as
long as the boundaries between the multiple property institutions
are open, the liberal commitment to autonomy neither necessitates
the hegemony of the Blackstonian form of property—otherwise known
as the fee simple absolute—nor undermines the value of other, more
communitarian or utilitarian property institutions. On the contrary,
the availability of several different but equally valuable and obtainable frameworks of interpersonal interaction makes autonomy more
meaningful by facilitating people’s ability to choose and revise their

29. Cf. RAZ, supra note 19, at 133, 162, 265.
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forms of interaction with other individuals respecting diverse types
of resources.30
***
Consider now the rule of law, which I understand to stand for two
important prescriptions: that law provides effective guidance to its
addressees, and that it does not confer on officials the right to exercise unconstrained power.
The first aspect starts with the proposition that the law should
provide people effective guidance. Though seemingly thin, this conception of the rule of law is intimately connected with people’s autonomy (understood as self-authorship). By requiring that “government
in all its actions [be] bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand,” the rule of law enables people “to foresee with fair certainty
how the authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances,
and to plan [their] affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”31 Only a
relatively stable and predictable law can serve as a “safe basis for
individual planning,” which is a prerequisite of people’s ability to
“form definite expectations” and plan for the future.32 Law’s participation in securing stable “frameworks for one’s life and action” increases “[p]redictability in one’s environment,” and therefore “one’s
power of action,” thus facilitating people’s “ability to choose styles
and forms of life, to fix long-term goals, and effectively direct one’s
life towards them.”33
The second aspect of the rule of law perceives it as the other side
of the rule of man. The rule of law stands here for “the absence of
arbitrary power on part of the government,”34 through the imposition of “effective inhibitions upon power and the defense of the
citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims.”35 Unrestrained power is
30. See generally Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 1409 (2012).
31. F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54 (1944).
32. JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND MORALITY 220 (1979).
33. Id. at 210, 220, 222.
34. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188, 196
(10th ed. 1959).
35. E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975).
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objectionable, both because of its potential devastating burdens and
because it renders us mere objects, dominated by the power-wielder.36
The rule of law addresses these grave concerns by prescribing “a particular mode of the exercise of political power: governance through
law.”37 More specifically, the rule of law requires that “people in positions of authority should exercise their power within a constraining
framework of public norms, rather than on the basis of their own
preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of
right and wrong.”38
Both aspects of the rule of law imply the significance of predictability and stability, which property lawyers typically (and justifiably) embrace. Both aspects resist open-ended standards allowing
judges to consult, for each individual case, the law’s underlying commitments, preferring instead clear rules that translate “the implications of normative values into concrete prescriptions,” “sufficiently
determinate” to be followed by their appliers.39 To be sure, the rule of
law does not always prescribe the use of bright-line rules.40 At times—
especially where the alternative would be a complex set of technical
and non-intuitive rules41—commitment to the rule of law implies
allowing, or even preferring, that the social practice of a legal topic
be formed around a vague but informative standard. The reason for
this preference is that a standard which is guidance-friendly and
constraining-friendly enables its addressees (or their lawyers) to
figure out its intended content and thus to predict its future unfolding and realm of application, monitoring or modifying their behavior
accordingly.42 Standards that refine the regulative principle governing
36. See Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? and Who
Cares?, in NOMOS L: GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 64, 79–80 (2011).
37. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2008).
38. Id. at 6, 31.
39. Emily Sherwin, Rule-Oriented Realism, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1589–91 (2005). See
generally LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW (2001); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991).
40. Contra Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
41. See Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14, 23, 28, 30 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990).
42. See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, supra note 41, at 58, 65–66, 69.
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a specific area of law along these lines—informative standards, as
I call them—are therefore generally unobjectionable.43 By contrast,
open-ended references to justice, fairness, good faith, or reasonableness, as these are interpreted by the presiding law applier given the
specific circumstances of the case at hand, fail to ensure predictability or properly constrain law appliers. They should therefore be
objected to as an invitation to ad hoc discretion, which affronts the
rule of law.44
Structural pluralism is not only following suit. Its adherence to
the rule of law, just like its compatibility with our commitment to
personal autonomy, is inherent in its most foundational features.45
The first reason for this happy proposition is already implicit in
my presentation of the main tenets of structural pluralism. For
structural pluralism to perform its autonomy-enhancing role properly, it must be able to consolidate people’s expectations regarding
the various property institutions, conveying in credible terms the
ideals of interpersonal relationships represented by each of them.
Both requirements, as noted, imply some prescription of stability
and predictability.46
The second reason refers to types of cases (just noted) in which
bright-line rules cannot adequately serve as a guide for action, requiring law to resort to informative standards. In these problematic
contexts, structural pluralism is likely to be more predictable than its
monistic counterpart due to its use of multiple and relatively small
categories. These categories are sufficiently distinct from one another and internally coherent, meaning each one is generally guided
by one animating principle, one value, or a balance of values. Only
such small categories, in sharp contrast with the broad category of
property used in monist theories, can rely on animating principles
sufficiently determinate to function as informative standards. As
long as these animating principles are properly articulated and not
43. See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING
PRIVATE LAW THEORY 208–10 (2013).
44. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 12–18 (2004). There may
be one exception to this rule: when broad social agreement prevails on the pertinent matter.
See also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 50, 92 (rev. ed. 1964). In contemporary societies, however, this condition applies to very few issues.
45. The following paragraphs draw on DAGAN, supra note 43, at ch.9.
46. See supra text accompanying note 16.

2014]

PROPERTY’S STRUCTURAL PLURALISM

39

too frequently revised so that they are sufficiently stable,47 legal
subjects or their lawyers remain aware of the “character” of these
property institutions and can form their expectations accordingly.
Finally, the commitment to multiplicity of the structurally pluralistic conception of property is particularly important for the rule of
law prescription of constraining the power of lawmakers who, as
fallible human beings, may make mistakes and, at times, even prefer their self-interest to the public good. I do not deny that, at moments of legal pathology—namely, litigation—the power over the
litigants that a pluralistic regime assigns decision-makers is no different from that allocated by a monist system. But these endgame
dramas should not obscure the significance of the ex ante choices
available to people.48 From this perspective, a structurally pluralistic
property law is again superior to its monist counterpart, because it
opens up options for choice rather than channeling everyone to the
one possibility privileged by law.49 It allows individuals to navigate
their course so that they bypass certain legal prescriptions, avoiding
their potential implications and hence the power of the people who
have issued them.50
***
I have discussed the commitments of property’s structural pluralism to autonomy and to the rule of law partly because Merrill’s
scholarship appears to me to be largely driven by these two commitments. But recall that Tom is known for the proposition that, his
many critics notwithstanding, Blackstone was essentially correct:
the right to exclude is the core of property. So let me conclude with
47. Recall that “the rule of law does not require that law’s guidance never change. It
requires that the prospect of change should not make it impossible to use the existing law as
a guide.” TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, in VAGUENESS IN LAW
185, 193 (2000).
48. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–88 (1961).
49. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 223, 233 (2011) (arguing “it is the unitary conception of property rights that is in fact vulnerable to creeping statism”).
50. This is why I believe that Nozick’s inspiring account of utopia as a “framework for
utopias” implies the endorsement of a structurally pluralistic conception of private law. See
Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian Promise of Private Law (Feb. 17, 2014), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397395.
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some observations on the role of Blackstonian ownership within the
structurally pluralist conception of property.
To begin with, my claim on the significance of multiplicity for selfauthorship implies rejecting the proposition that exclusion is the
essence of property. An autonomy-based understanding of property
should not privilege the fee simple absolute by treating its characteristics as fundamental features of property as a whole, thus suppressing other property institutions as variations on a common
theme or marginalizing them as peripheral exceptions to a robust
core. Blackstonian ownership should not be conceptualized as the
“core” or the “default” of our understanding of property.51
Objecting to these excesses, however, does not mean that Blackstonian ownership has no significant role. Quite the contrary: the
inclusion of Blackstonian ownership in the repertoire of property
law adds a crucial option, which contributes to self-authorship. Moreover, Blackstonian ownership is singular among property institutions
in its zealous protection of our independence. By shielding individuals
from the claims of others and from the power of the public authority,
unqualified ownership guarantees the untouchable private sphere
that is a prerequisite of personal development and autonomy.52
Though independence is not our ultimate value, since real autonomy requires self-authorship rather than merely independence, it
is still a constitutive component of self-authorship and thus intrinsically, rather than merely instrumentally, valuable.53 Independence,
then, explains the unique place of Blackstonian ownership, implying
that a liberal polity must offer its members the realm of solitude that
such unqualified ownership represents. This is, I argue, what makes
Blackstonian ownership a particularly important property institution.
Three conclusions follow from the unique role of Blackstonian ownership. The first conclusion is that although indeed singular in its
51. Contra Merrill & Smith, supra note 7, at 1851–52, 1891–92; Smith, supra note 18,
at 1705. Indeed, even Merrill’s concession that property entails exclusion only vis-à-vis
“strangers”—as opposed to “potential transactors,” “persons within the zone of privity,” and
“neighbors”—does not go far enough. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON. J.
WATCH 247, 250 (2011).
52. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 71–76
(1977); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 298 (1993).
53. See Hanoch Dagan, Liberalism and the Private Law of Property, 1(2) CRIT. ANALYSIS
L. (forthcoming 2014).

2014]

PROPERTY’S STRUCTURAL PLURALISM

41

indispensability, Blackstonian ownership should not aspire to exclusivity. Indeed, it functions best as part of a liberal repertoire of
property institutions conducive to self-authorship. A second, related
conclusion touches on the legitimate scope of Blackstonian ownership. Insofar as the role of this property institution is to ensure individuals private sovereignty over the external resources necessary for
their independence and self-determination, it can cover only the type
and scope of resources needed to secure that purpose. Beyond such
property-for-safe-haven rights—think about property law’s privilege
of homeownership, for example54—other (notably utilitarian) justifications are obviously adduced for property rights. But property rights
that rely on those justifications need not, and often should not, be absolute. In these cases, and especially where the claim of non-owners to
access the resource at hand is important for their own self-authorship,
owners’ dominion should be subject, as it often is, to other people’s
right to entry or to inclusion.55 Finally, grounding Blackstonian ownership on personal autonomy means that the legitimacy of this property institution does not rely on a specific event (as in Locke’s claims
of labor or Hegel’s claims of occupation), but on its importance as
such. This general right-based justification implies that every human
being is entitled to some such property rights or, more precisely, entitled to as much Blackstonian ownership as needed to sustain human
dignity. The enforcement of Blackstonian owners’ rights in property
law, then, cannot be justified if the law does not simultaneously
guarantee similar resources to non-owners.56

54. For this privilege and the academic controversy over its justification, see generally
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY 309–20 (2012).
55. See DAGAN, supra note 8, at ch. 2.
56. See JEREMY WALDRON, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 309
(1993); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 115–17, 423, 425–27, 430–39,
444–45 (1988); Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6
CAN. J.L. & JURISP. 217, 228, 242–45 (1993). See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2094 (2012) (arguing “the tendency toward inequality should be disturbing to the friends of property,” because “[e]xtreme inequality in the distribution of property undermines all the [sources of] strength of the property strategy,” namely: “tapping into
dispersed local knowledge[,] incentives to be productive[,] reduction in external transaction
costs[, and] checks and balances against concentrated power”).

THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES OF PROPERTY OWNERS:
AN ESSAY FOR TOM MERRILL

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON*
ABSTRACT
As a result of his ownership of property, Rip Van Winkle might
have incurred a variety of criminal and civil liabilities during the
course of his twenty-year sleep. Possibilities are a conviction for neglecting care of his livestock, civil liability to a neighbor for having
failed to contribute to the costs of a fence along a common boundary,
and forfeiture of his lands for having failed to pay local property
taxes. This essay investigates the nature of these affirmative obligations of owners. Concerns about curbing information costs, a central
theme in Tom Merrill’s scholarly works, underlie the structure of
many of these duties, and help explain their relative paucity. The
analysis illuminates several recent strands of property theory, including Larissa Katz’s notion that a state may choose to “govern
through owners.” It reveals major defects in Gregory Alexander’s
argument that owners should bear a generalized obligation to share
their wealth. Alexander’s proposed duty would greatly increase the
information costs that individuals would bear in navigating daily life,
and would embroil property adjudicators in tasks far better handled
by drafters of tax and welfare legislation.
INTRODUCTION
A statue of Thomas Drummond, British Under-Secretary for Ireland
from 1835 to 1840, stands in Dublin’s City Hall. Inscribed on its base
is a quotation from a letter that Drummond wrote to landlords vexed
by agrarian uprisings: “Property has its duties as well as its rights.”1
Drummond was prescient. Especially since 2000, North American
property scholars have been putting forth rival theories of the overarching nature and normative purposes of property institutions. The
* Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. This essay
expands on remarks presented on October 18, 2013, at the 10th Annual Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Conference, William & Mary Law School, Williamsburg, Virginia.
1. R. BARRY O’BRIEN, THOMAS DRUMMOND, LIFE AND LETTERS 284 (1889) (Letter to the
Tipperary Magistrates).
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issue that Drummond highlighted—the duties of property owners—
is central in three emerging clusters of property theory.
This essay is written in honor of Tom Merrill, the imminently
deserving recipient of the most recent Brigham-Kanner Prize for
property scholarship. Influenced by the law-and-economics approach,
Merrill, both by himself and in works co-authored with Henry Smith,
has emphasized the merits of arranging property institutions with
an eye to reducing the informational burdens and other transaction
costs of resource management. Merrill, however, has yet to systematically address issues of owners’ duties. I contend that Merrill’s
information-cost perspective helps illuminate the nature of the duties that legal systems impose on owners of property. For example,
when an owner has pertinent “local knowledge”—a favorite phrase
of Tom’s2—lawmakers are more likely to impose a duty that exploits
that comparative advantage.
Larissa Katz, a participant in this conference, is a pioneering
member of what might be called the Canadian school, currently a
smallish cluster of theorists. Katz contends that an owner commonly
should be conceived as holding an “office” that carries with it certain
affirmative responsibilities to provide services to the state.3 Katz
and kindred analysts thereby feature an aspect of property law that
law-and-economics scholars have seldom explored.
Gregory Alexander is perhaps the most conspicuous member of
the self-styled Progressives, a third pertinent cluster of property law
scholars. Alexander contends that an owner of large amounts of property is obligated, or at least should be, to share that wealth to enhance the capabilities of others who are less well-endowed.4 I argue,
contrary to Alexander, that property law seldom in fact imposes this
duty, and indeed should not. My claim is not that redistribution from
rich to poor is inappropriate, but that it is better pursued by means
of broad tax and welfare programs, as opposed to tinkering with the
rules of property law. Merrill’s emphasis on information costs supports
this view. To help individuals navigate the world, the law should
2. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2081 (2012).
3. Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners: How and Why Formal Private Property
Rights Enhance State Power, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2029 (2012); see also Christopher Essert, The
Office of Ownership, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 418 (2013).
4. Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009).
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define entitlements in particular assets as simply as possible.5 Redistribtive efforts require determinations of the wealth and capabilities
of specific individuals. To make these determinations, tax officials
and welfare workers are better situated than judges, not to mention
people navigating everyday life.
I. TOM MERRILL: THE NATURAL
I first met Tom Merrill when he was a student in one of my courses.
I wish I could say that the course was Property, but actually it was
Torts. Tom has deep roots in Iowa, and law school enrollments have
a regional tilt. After a stint in Oxford on a Rhodes scholarship, in
fall 1974 Tom chose to matriculate at the University of Chicago Law
School. As it happens, during the 1974–1975 academic year I was a
visiting professor at Chicago. During the winter and spring quarters,
I was originally scheduled to teach Property to half the first-year students. In October, however, Harry Kalven unexpectedly died of a heart
attack at age 60. Kalven had traditionally taught Torts to Chicago’s
entire first-year class. At Dean Phil Neal’s request, I agreed to switch
from Property to Torts, a course that I had taught several times.
The Torts class included about 170 students. Tom was a bit older
than most, and one of the most memorable members of an exceptional
group that included a half-dozen budding talents who would later win
acclaim in legal academia. I included in my assignments and lectures
large doses of Calabresian analysis, the cutting edge of Torts theory
at the time.6 Calabresi stressed the relevance to law of asymmetries
in actors’ information, a theme that Tom likely found congenial.
After Tom entered teaching, we gradually rekindled our relationship. Particularly memorable was a 2001 conference on “The Evolution
of Property Rights” that Henry Smith and Tom organized at Northwestern Law School. During 2008–10, Tom’s overly brief stint on the
Yale Law faculty, we enjoyed regular Friday lunches. It of course
helped that our wives, Kim and Lynn, hit it off.
5. Merrill’s contribution to this volume stresses the benefits of enabling individuals to
quickly “differentiate between things that are mine and not mine as we navigate through
everyday life.” Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER
PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 2 (2014).
6. See especially GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
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Tom is, without question, one of the leading property theorists of
our era. He works ceaselessly and produces more high-quality work
in an hour than many of us can produce in three. And he possesses
exceptional analytic abilities and expository skills. Aware of these
comparative advantages, Tom, when turning to a fresh topic of law,
typically starts by laying out, with enviable clarity, both the issues
and the landscape of the current scholarly debate. These attributes
have enabled him to become a central figure in two relatively disparate fields—property law and federal administrative law.
Carol Rose and I twice co-edited editions of a reader entitled
Perspectives on Property Law.7 These editions included excerpts from
about 50 articles and books, each followed by our own notes and questions. Partly to control a shameful tendency to include our own writings in the reader, Carol and I imposed a ceiling of three on the works
of any individual author. The primary author to bump up against this
ceiling was Tom Merrill. In the second edition, published in 1995,
Carol and I included excerpts from Tom’s articles on adverse possession and the trespass/nuisance distinction.8 When preparing the third
edition, which appeared in 2002, Carol and I were committed to including lengthy sections of two articles that Tom had published in
2000. One addressed the political economy of tradable emissions
permits.9 The other was the classic article on the Numerus Clausus
principle, the maiden effort of the team of Merrill and Smith.10 To enforce our ceiling of three, Carol and I had to excise from the reader
one of Tom’s worthy earlier works.
Few legal casebooks achieve major conceptual advances. In the
field of property, an exception was the Dukeminier and Krier casebook of 1980. In 2005, Merrill teamed with Smith to produce a casebook that represented another quantum leap in property theory.11
7. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, CAROL M. ROSE, & BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW (2d ed. 1995; 3d ed. 2002). The second edition was a successor to BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975). Henry Smith took command
of the fourth edition, published in 2014.
8. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW.
U. L. REV. 1122 (1984–1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).
9. Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275.
10. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
11. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1st ed.
2007). The second edition was published in 2012.
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Among their many innovations, Merrill and Smith folded landlordtenant law and trust law into an overarching conception of “entity
property,” and placed the takings issue under the broad heading of
“government forbearance” in the altering of property rules.
Unlike many awardees of the Brigham-Kanner prize, Tom also is
a master lawyer. His name has appeared on 91 briefs filed in cases
before the United States Supreme Court.12 While his three-year
stint as Deputy Solicitor General accounted for most of these, 24 of
the 91 either preceded, or followed his work in that role.13 In the
famous Kelo v. City of New London,14 Merrill’s brief, written with
John Echeverria to defend the constitutionality of the city’s condemnation, was one of 42 submitted on the merits. Tea leaves suggest
that it was influential. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion cites an obscure Supreme Court precedent, O’Neill v. Leamer,15 a case mentioned
in only 2 of the 42 briefs: Merrill and Echeverria’s and one other.16
Besides analyzing law, Tom has directly contributed to its making.
II. OWNERS’ DUTIES, NEGATIVE AND AFFIRMATIVE
As Thomas Drummond contended, property owners indeed have
both entitlements and obligations. When examining obligations,
legal analysts conventionally distinguish between negative duties—
that is, obligations to refrain from certain behaviors—and affirmative
duties—that is, obligations to act.17 This distinction appears, for example, in the law of covenants, which traditionally has been particularly hostile to requiring a transferee of land to assume the burdens
of an affirmative covenant.18
12. This number was the product of a search, conducted on November 11, 2013, of Westlaw’s
SCT-BRIEF-ALL database.
13. Tom signed 8 of the 24 in his capacity as a supervisor of Yale Law School’s Supreme
Court Clinic.
14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
15. 239 U.S. 244 (1915).
16. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 n.11.
17. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 509–89 (10th ed. 2012) (chapter on “Affirmative Duties”).
18. See, e.g., Eagle Enterprises, Inc. v. Gross, 349 N.E.2d 816, 820 (N.Y. 1976) (stating
that an “affirmative covenant is disfavored in the law because of the fear that this type of
obligation imposes an ‘undue restriction on alienation or an onerous burden in perpetuity’”
(quoting Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 164 N.E.2d 832, 835 (N.Y. 1959))). Roman
jurists similarly were averse to the running of burdens of affirmative covenants. See BARRY
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 142–43 (2008).
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The distinction between negative and affirmative duties is slippery,
and partly for that reason, controversial. The duty of the owner of
a cement plant to control the emission of particulates, for example,
could be characterized as a negative duty to avoid acts of pollution,
or as an affirmative duty to install abatement technologies. Because
both tort and criminal liabilities are presumptively thought to be
imposed for wrongful acts, as opposed to failures to act, scholars in
those two fields have been the primary analysts of the propriety of
liabilities for omissions.19
A. The Negative Duties of Owners
Although the bulk of this essay focuses on owners’ affirmative duties, a preliminary summary of their negative duties is appropriate.
In a society with private property, the owner of a resource typically
has broad powers to: (1) determine its use; (2) transfer it by sale, gift,
or otherwise; and (3) exclude others from it.20 Nonetheless, it is old
hat that the law circumscribes in many ways an owner’s exercise of
these three powers. In an introductory course on property law, a student encounters an array of doctrines and statutes that impose civil
and criminal penalties on owners who misbehave. Nuisance doctrines
and zoning ordinances, for example, limit a landowner’s choices of
uses, and traffic laws constrain the choices of the owner of a motor
vehicle. Limits on owners’ powers of alienation also are common.21
And, as Merrill himself has stressed, an owner’s right to exclude is
19. See, e.g., Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV.
547, 559–61 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
Weinrib offers a distinction between a “real nonfeasance” and a “pseudo-nonfeasance.” In an instance of the latter type, the duty-bearer would have participated in some fashion in creating
the risk that performance of the duty would have mitigated. Id. at 254–58. Christopher Serkin,
Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), provides a valuable review of sources that explore the act/omission distinction.
20. Compare Merrill, supra note 2, at 2068:
[W]hat is often loosely described as the “right to exclude” can be characterized
with greater precision as twin rights of residual managerial authority and residual accessionary rights. Give someone the right to exclude the world from some
thing, and, almost without exception, that person will have residual managerial
authority and residual accessionary rights over the thing. The right to exclude
is critical not for its own sake, but because it yields these two further attributes.
21. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1375–80; Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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hardly unfettered.22 For instance, a stranger may have a right to enter
private land for reasons of private or public necessity, and the owner
of a public accommodation presumptively must serve all comers.
Property scholars have devoted little attention to a particular
set of negative duties that are pertinent to my later discussion of
Gregory Alexander’s claim that property law inherently has a redistributive thrust.23 Some legal systems have directed an owner of
rural lands to refrain from impeding entries by individuals searching for food. Among the relevant passages in the Hebrew Bible is
LEVITICUS 19:9–10:
When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap to the
very edges of your field, or gather the gleanings of your harvest.
You shall not strip your vineyard bare, or gather fallen grapes
of your vineyard; you shall leave them for the poor and the alien.

The Deuteronomic Code employs more sharply edged categories—
“the alien, the orphan, and the widow”—to identify the beneficiaries
of rights to enter fields.24 In ancient China, a similar crop-sharing
norm seems to have been honored.25 In Europe during the Middle
Ages, poor residents of open-field villages customarily were entitled
to glean crop remnants after a harvest.26 Venerable American decisional law similarly recognized the rights of hunters and fishers to
enter unenclosed and uncultivated private rural lands to search for
22. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 5, at 8–9; see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E.
SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 399–449 (2d ed. 2012) (on “exceptions to the right
to exclude”).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 81–113.
24. DEUT. 24:19–21.
25. The classic collection of ancient Chinese poetry, comprising works dating from the 11th
to 7th centuries B.C., includes the following verse:
There stand some backward blades that were not reaped,
Here some corn that was not garnered,
There an unremembered sheaf,
Here some littered grain,
Gleanings for the widowed wife.
THE BOOK OF SONGS 171 (Arthur Waley trans., 1937). I thank Shitong Qiao for providing this
source.
26. See David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 111–12, 118–19 (2009) (discussing Steel v. Houghton, 126 Eng. Rep. 32 (C.P.
1788), a decision that controversially refused to acknowledge legal rights to glean).
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quarry.27 With the rise of the welfare state, these legal rights to enter
private lands to obtain food have mostly been eliminated.28
B. The Affirmative Duties of Owners
Property scholars, although conscious of many of the negative
limits on an owner’s use, transfer, and exclusion rights, have devoted
little systematic attention to owners’ affirmative duties.29 Most of
what follows is a foray into this underexplored terrain. Because the
negative/affirmative distinction potentially is elusive, for clarity I
invoke the legal situation of a property-owning Rip Van Winkle who
has fallen into a 20-year slumber.30 The affirmative duties of owners
are revealed by the civil and criminal liabilities that Van Winkle
might incur while asleep.31 As we shall see, these might include a
criminal conviction for neglecting care of livestock, civil liability to
a neighbor for having failed to contribute to the neighbor’s costs of
fencing a common boundary, and forfeiture of Van Winkle lands for
failure to pay local property taxes.
Although affirmative duties of this sort are hardly unknown, for
three reasons lawmakers tend to be reluctant to impose them. First
and foremost, an affirmative duty typically impinges on an individual’s
freedom and self-actualization more than a negative duty does.32 A
homeowner is apt to resent a city ordinance that orders a homeowner
to keep an abutting public sidewalk in good repair more than an
27. See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. II, § 67 (entitling hunters to enter unenclosed lands); McKee
v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922) (Holmes, J.) (recognizing customary rights to enter unenclosed
and uncultivated land to hunt or fish, until the owner sees fit to prohibit entries); McConico v.
Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818) (affirming a right to hunt on unenclosed and uncultivated private land).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 110–12.
29. But cf. Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 962 n.18 (2009) (briefly discussing affirmative duties).
30. In 1819, Washington Irving first published the short story that featured this character.
31. By this test, the duty of a rural landowner to allow entries by hunters and gleaners
is negative, not affirmative, because those entrants would be able to walk past a sleeping Van
Winkle.
32. See Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in Property and Patent
Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1466–67 (2013); Weinrib, supra note 19, at 268. A lyric from Me
and Bobby McGee, a Kris Kristofferson song most famously sung by Janis Joplin, expresses
an owner’s possible reaction to the legal imposition of excessive affirmative duties: “Freedom
is just another word for nothing left to lose.”
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ordinance prohibiting raucous late-night parties. A government that
compels an owner to act takes command of a portion of the owner’s
resources, and, when duties are non-delegable, time. By contrast, a
negative duty limits an owner’s set of choices but does not impinge
on the freedom to select from the options that remain.
Second, affirmative duties have a disproportionate tendency to add
complexity to property law.33 Two owners of abutting lots can readily
understand a rule negating any legal duty to contribute to the costs
of a unilaterally built party wall. By contrast, if the law were to impose a duty to contribute, the owners would be more likely to consult
attorneys and become embroiled in litigation.
Third, the legal imposition of an affirmative duty is particularly
likely to diminish intrinsic motivations to act in the same manner.34
Compared to a person who has altruistically refrained from acting, a
person who has committed a helpful act is more likely to feel a warm
glow of self-satisfaction and to anticipate status rewards from others.
Because the legal compulsion of an act typically diminishes these
intrinsic rewards, the creation of a new affirmative legal duty tends
to be less successful in altering behavior than would otherwise be
expected. There is little evidence, for example, that a law mandating
rescues by bystanders actually increases the incidence of bystander
rescues.35 Similarly, a law requiring an abutting owner to contribute
to the costs of a party wall might do little to increase cost-sharing
between neighbors.
33. See Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69,
106 (2005) (asserting that property law seldom imposes affirmative duties on owners in order
to avoid increasing transaction costs).
34. On the devaluation of intrinsic motivation, see, e.g., Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed
for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic
Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605 (2008); Edward Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard Ryan, A
Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic
Motivation, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 627 (1999); Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Matter: Reframing
the Crowding Out Effect of Legal Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070 (2014) (arguing that the erosion
of intrinsic motivation is undesirable in itself, regardless of effects on behavior).
35. Few American states impose a duty on a bystander to rescue a stranger even if the
rescue would be virtually costless. See EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 17, at 511–23. In these
situations, the bystander has superior information and superior ability to act, conditions commonly found in contexts where affirmative duties are imposed. The results of an empirical study
of rescue situations, however, suggest that creation of a duty to rescue would not noticeably
increase the incidence of Good Samaritan behavior. David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law:
An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 712 (2006).
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III. THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES OF AN OWNER WHO
IS A CHEAPEST SERVICE PROVIDER
I now offer a selective overview of the affirmative legal duties of
owners. This Part reviews owners’ obligations to provide in-kind services. Parts IV and V turn to the obligations of owners to contribute
funds to help finance the provision of public goods.
A. Governing Through Owners Who Have Special Information
Owners and other decentralized actors commonly have fine-grained
information that a government agent could not readily obtain. As
Merrill has emphasized, a system of private property takes advantage of this local knowledge by, for example, giving an owner wide
latitude to choose among alternative uses of a resource.36 Many of the
affirmative duties of owners are similarly based on the likelihood that
they have special knowledge. In contexts where they do, a government
may decline to engage staff or contractors to provide a particular service but instead call on owners to provide it.
This possibility brings to mind Guido Calabresi’s pioneering emphasis on the relevance, in tort law, of asymmetries in information
and ability to act. Calabresi urged the imposition of tort liabilities on
“cheapest cost avoiders.”37 Property law, for its part, tends to require
an owner to affirmatively provide a service only when the owner is
the “cheapest service provider,” that is, the party most likely to both
possess pertinent information and be in the best position to act on
that knowledge. To borrow Larissa Katz’s locution, when these conditions are met, a state understandably may choose to govern through
owners.38 Examples follow.
B. Duties of Owners of Animals and Custodians of Children
Responding to people’s altruistic feelings about some members of
the animal kingdom, governments seek to protect domestic animals
36. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 2081.
37. Writing with Hirschoff, Calabresi urged lawmakers to allocate the risks of accidents
to the party “in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made.” Guido Calabresi & Jon T.
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–61 (1972).
38. See Katz, supra note 3.
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from abuse and neglect. To accomplish this goal, governments conscript the services of animals’ owners and custodians. An owner who
has failed to feed or otherwise care for a pet or farm animal risks a
criminal conviction,39 forfeiture of the neglected animal,40 and perhaps
an injunction against future possession of similar animals.41 Transaction cost considerations underlie this assignment of responsibility.
The owner of a domestic animal typically is physically proximate to it
and has special knowledge of both its condition and its likely response
to various forms of care. The provision of care to an animal also tends
to enhance its value, a fact that enhances the political legitimacy of
a legal obligation of animal care.
Few of us will assume an affirmative legal duty more momentous
than that of care for a child. A child, of course, is not conventionally
considered a proper object of ownership. Indeed, to refer to a child as
someone’s “property” is to dehumanize the child. Nonetheless, the
considerations just identified help illuminate why legal systems impose duties of child care on parents and custodians and also why
these obligations enjoy virtually universal political support.42 Love
impels much of the care that parents and other custodians bestow
on children. But family law serves as a backstop. Failure to provide
care to a child may give rise to a variety of state interventions. These
39. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-14(a)(2) (2014) (criminalizing the “cruel neglect” of an animal in custody); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-3-7(a) (West 2014) (criminalizing the reckless, knowing,
or intentional abandonment or neglect of a vertebrate animal in custody); People v. Riazati,
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 152 (Cal. App. 2011) (affirming convictions for neglect of various animals);
Andrew N. Ireland Moore, Defining Animals as Crime Victims, 1 J. ANIMAL L. 91 (2005).
40. See, e.g., State v. Sheets, 677 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (affirming orders that defendant surrender neglected horses and not own horses in county during probationary period).
In a number of other contexts, legal rules incentivize owner care by authorizing forfeiture of the
neglected asset. A landowner who fails to police against entrants, for example, may forfeit ownership to a long-term adverse possessor. And the owner of a trademark who has failed to detect
and prevent misleading uses of the mark may be held to have forfeited it to the public domain.
See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
41. See, e.g., Stulp v. Schuman, 2012 WL 3755617 (Colo. App. 2012) (enjoining, at the behest
of the state Commissioner of Agriculture, a rancher who had neglected cattle from future possession of livestock in county). See generally Cheryl L. Leahy, Large-Scale Farmed Animal
Abuse and Neglect: Law and Its Enforcement, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63 (2011).
42. Merrill and Smith are willing to apply property concepts to claims to things, but not
persons. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 22, at 19. I take a more expansive view of the
potential applications of property theory. See Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundleof-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and Smith, 8(3) ECON. J. WATCH 215, 219 (Sept.
2011); cf. JOHN LOCKE, 2 TWO TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 27 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988 (1690)) (famously asserting that “every man has a property in
his own person”).
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range from the mild, such as a visit by a representative of a child protection services agency, to the major, such as loss of custody of the
child.43 Less commonly, a guardian’s neglect of duty to a child might
trigger prosecution for a crime44 and, conceivably, tort liability to the
child.45 The typical superiority of both a guardian’s knowledge of a
child’s condition and special capacity to act on that knowledge makes
these sanctions uncontroversial.
C. Affirmative Duties to Neighbors in Time
An owner of a time-limited interest in a tangible asset typically
has a variety of affirmative obligations to provide services to owners
of prior and subsequent interests. Consider a residential tenant who
has leased a top-floor apartment for a term of years. The tenant has
a present interest in the leased premises, and the landlord, a reversion. Broadly accepted legal rules impose affirmative duties, perhaps
unalterable by contract, on both parties to the lease. The rules of permissive waste require the tenant to affirmatively care for the apartment, for example, by closing windows during a violent rainstorm.46
Again, this rule rests on asymmetries in information and capacity
to act. The tenant typically would have unrivaled knowledge of what
windows are open, and would be in the best position to close them.
A landlord’s duties to a residential tenant under the implied
warranty of habitability rest on a similar transaction-cost asymmetry. Adopted most famously in Javins v. First National Realty
Corporation,47 this immutable warranty compels a landlord to repair
43. See, e.g., In re Rhonda “KK,” 620 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (affirming termination of custodial rights of parents who had failed to protect their daughters from their son’s sexual abuses); see generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); Michael S. Wald, State Intervention
on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes,
Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976).
44. See, e.g., People v. Scully, 513 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1987) (affirming conviction of father who allowed his spouse to abuse his child); David Pimentel, Criminal Child
Neglect and the “Free Range Kid,” 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947.
45. See Benjamin Shmueli, Love and the Law, Children Against Mothers and Fathers, 17
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 131 (2010) (discussing tort liability for child neglect); but see
Burnette v. Wahl, 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978) (rejecting action by children against mother for
damages stemming from emotional neglect).
46. See Liivak & Peñalver, supra note 32, at 1461–62.
47. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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certain defects in a leased abode, such as a roof leak. Although Judge
Skelly Wright’s opinion in Javins includes passages that suggest
that distributive-justice considerations influenced his thinking,48 the
opinion stresses transaction-cost considerations. Judge Wright observes that landlords typically have better knowledge than tenants
about how to repair building defects, better access to repair sites, and
better incentives to consider the long-run benefits of repair options.49
In these instances they are, in short, cheapest service providers.
D. Affirmative Duties to Neighbors in Space
According to Mancur Olson, even a state functioning as a “stationary bandit” would choose to provide public goods that its citizens
would value.50 Economists define a public good as a service that is
either non-rivalrously consumed, such as national defense, or a service, such a local playground, for which a provider could not readily
collect fees from entrants. Because a private entrepreneur typically
cannot make a profit when providing a public good, these services are
natural candidates for governmental undertakings.
Although a government commonly provides public goods through
its own employees or those of private contractors, in some contexts
it may conscript property owners, particularly landowners, to labor
for public ends.51 Katz, a pioneering analyst of these practices, invokes
as her central example the affirmative obligation, in some cities, of
a landowner to clear snow from an abutting public sidewalk.52 Some
cities have ordinances that subject an owner who has failed to shovel
48. Judge Wright quotes a New York decision that asserts that landlords are wealthier
than tenants and have superior bargaining power. Id. at 1079–80. Other passages in Javins,
however, downplay poverty as a factor. See, e.g., id. at 1074: “[w]hen American city dwellers,
both rich and poor, seek ‘shelter’ today . . . .”
49. Id. at 1078.
50. MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY 6–12 (2000). In Governing Through Owners,
supra note 3, at 2030–35, Katz envisions state leaders and landowners as rivals for power, as
they indeed may be. But in many contexts, a government may be more plausibly viewed as an
institution that residents and owners voluntarily establish to provide public goods that they
would not otherwise enjoy.
51. See Katz, supra note 3, at 2031, 2048–51 (observing that the benefits of many government services are territorially limited).
52. Id. at 2031–32, 2051. Katz stresses the affirmative duties of landowners to provide inkind services to neighbors, not their duties to contribute to the funding of services that others
provide (the subject of Parts IV and V of this Essay).
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to a fine or other criminal sanction.53 Tort law also may serve as a
prod. At least one state supreme court has held that an owner of a
commercial property has a duty of care to pedestrians who might slip
on ice on an abutting public sidewalk.54
A municipality that orders landowners to shovel snow from abutting sidewalks takes advantage of their local knowledge. Katz quotes
an excerpt from an opinion of the New York Court of Appeals: “It is
not expected, and cannot be required, that the [city] shall itself forthwith employ laborers to clean all the walks, and so accomplish the object by a slow and expensive process, when the result may be effected
more swiftly and easily by imposing that duty upon the citizens.”55 It
is significant that a shoveling ordinance imposes on a landowner the
duty to shovel an abutting sidewalk, and not, for example, an equivalent stretch located directly across the street. A shovel-your-ownsidewalk policy eliminates a variety of transaction costs. The distance
of a shoveler’s walk to the task is slightly reduced. Far more important, a shovel-your-own-sidewalk policy takes advantage of local
knowledge.56 The owner of a lot knows best, for example, which of
its shrubs can best withstand a pile of deposited snow. In addition,
because an owner uses an abutting sidewalk more often than the
sidewalk across the street, the owner is more sharply incentivized
to perform the task well. This increases the likelihood of voluntary
compliance with an imposed duty to shovel. And again, when the performers of a duty reap some benefits from performance, political opposition to imposition of the duty is lessened.
A frontier issue is the legal duty of an owner of land to affirmatively groom the premises for the benefit of neighbors. An owner
who fails to attend to the appearance of an abandoned building increasingly risks nuisance liability to neighbors, imposition of a municipal fine, and government condemnation of the structure.57 Some
53. See id. at 2032 n.7 (citing various ordinances, some of them likely imposing criminal
sanctions).
54. See Mirza v. Filmore Corp., 456 A.2d 518, 521 (N.J. 1983). This decision is an outlier.
Most state courts adhere to the traditional common-law rule that an abutting owner has no such
duty. See, e.g., Wiseman v. Hallahan, 945 P.2d 945 (Nev. 1997) (reviewing decisional law).
55. Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 11 N.E. 642, 642 (N. Y. 1887).
56. Katz’s discussion of the allocation of responsibilities for suppressing a fire in a theater
implicitly recognizes the importance of economizing on information costs. See Katz, supra note 3,
at 2041–43.
57. See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Dallas, 242 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2001) (rebuffing owner’s constitutional challenge to city’s demolition of two vacant and deteriorated apartment buildings);
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legislatures and courts similarly have overturned the traditional rule
that a landowner has no duty to abate hazards posed by the growth
of natural vegetation.58
In exceptional circumstances, a government may require a landowner to erect a structure on a vacant parcel. In ancient Rome, an
owner who had demolished an apartment building (insula) had a duty
to immediately replace it, a policy likely motivated in part to assure
lateral support of adjoining structures.59 Some governments in early
Colonial America required landowners, at pain of forfeiture to the collectivity, to improve lots that had been allocated to them.60 To perfect
claims under the Homestead Act of 1862, owners similarly had to improve their lands.61
All of the affirmative duties discussed in this section are far more
politically contested than, say, the affirmative duty of a guardian to
care for an animal or a child. Many cities, for example, do not require an abutting owner to clear snow from a public sidewalk, and
some state legislatures and local governing bodies have enacted laws
that limit the tort liability of an abutter to a sidewalk pedestrian.62
In addition, in most jurisdictions, a landowner has no affirmative
duty to control natural conditions or build a structure.63 And, to the
City of Chicago v. Nielsen, 349 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (authorizing city to demolish
abandoned building that owner had refused to refurbish); Kenneth Canfield, Note, A Nuisance
Law Approach to the Problem of Housing Abandonment, 85 YALE L.J. 1130 (1976); Angela
Hart, In Crackdown, SF Abandoned Building Fee Hiked Ninefold, SF PUBLIC PRESS (Feb. 12,
2010), available at http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2010-02/in-crackdown-sf-abandoned-building
-fee-hiked-900 (describing San Francisco ordinance imposing annual $6,885 “registration fee”
on owner of abandoned building).
58. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Norman, 816 So. 2d 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (rejecting
landowner’s constitutional challenges to ordinance criminalizing overgrowth of vegetation);
James T. R. Jones, Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegetation and
a Landowner’s Duty to Those Off the Premises, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1263 (2009).
59. See Peter Garnsey, Urban Property Investment, in STUDIES IN ROMAN PROPERTY 123,
133–36 (M.I. Finley ed., 1976).
60. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259–63 (1996).
61. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 392, 392 (repealed 1976).
62. See, e.g., Cuapio v. Skrodzki, 966 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (construing regulation to exempt owner of two-family home from duty of care); Divis v. Woods Edge Homeowners’
Ass’n, 897 N.E.2d 375 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (construing Illinois statute that requires abutter’s
misconduct to be willful or wanton).
63. See Jones, supra note 58, at 1270–77; Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of
Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1319–24 (2014) (describing negative impacts of empty lot in
downtown Boston).
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consternation of some observers, the owner of a patent has no duty
to use it.64 Affirmative legal duties have downsides—in particular,
loss of liberty, added legal complexity, and the devaluation of intrinsic motivation.65 In some contexts, lawmakers seem to consider
these decisive.66
IV. THE DUTIES OF AN OWNER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
COSTS OF PUBLIC GOODS
A government, instead of commanding an owner to render a valued
service, may order the owner to pay money to compensate another
party that has rendered the service. A landowner thus might be legally
required to bear a portion of the costs of a party wall that a neighbor
has built or the costs that a municipality has incurred to repave a
street. Because a duty to contribute funds does not commandeer an
owner’s time, an affirmative duty of this sort impinges less on liberty
interests than does a non-delegable duty to perform a service.
Legal duties to contribute to project costs vary, primarily according
to the number of parties benefiting from the project. To distinguish the
range of contexts, I employ three adjectives. When the beneficiaries
of a project are few, as in the case a party wall, the unilateral builder
of the wall is conferring private benefits. In contexts where beneficiaries are more numerous, the law of special assessments provides
pertinent adjectives. In special assessment law, the repaving of a
minor street or other improvement that benefits a few dozen or hundred landowners is said to confer special benefits on them. By
contrast, the building of a new city hall or other broadly beneficial
project is said to confer general benefits. A local government traditionally has been entitled to impose special assessments on landowners
to recoup special benefits, but not general benefits.67
64. See Liivak & Peñalver, supra note 32 (asserting that a duty to use a patent would deter
creation of blocking patents).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 32–35.
66. The owner of a patent typically has special information about the patent and is best
situated to provide it. One commentator therefore has proposed that a patent holder have a duty
to disclose patent information to other researchers. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents
Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 586–96 (2012). When considering
this proposal, lawmakers should also give weight to the downsides of affirmative duties.
67. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS 654–62 (4th ed. 2013).
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A. Restitutionary Obligations to Private Benefactors
Owners of land and other resources of course may succeed in contracting with one another to finance a boundary fence or other mutually beneficial private project. Even when parties are few, however,
transaction costs may thwart contracting. In such an instance, the
legal imposition of an affirmative duty to contribute is a possible
alternative. Perhaps to deter free-riding, in some instances judges
have held that the law of restitution requires an urban landowner to
defray part of the costs that a neighbor incurred to improve a party
wall.68 And a few state statutes require, in some situations, a rural
landowner to partially reimburse an immediate neighbor for costs
incurred to fence a common boundary.69
In small-number contexts, however, this legal approach is unusual. In the absence of a contract, in most jurisdictions there is no
common-law duty to share the costs of a party wall.70 The co-owner
of a condominium unit similarly is not unilaterally entitled to redo
the kitchen and force the other co-owners to contribute to the costs
of the renovation.71 Some state courts have even held that a statute
mandating the sharing of fence costs between abutting neighbors
violates constitutionally protected property rights.72 In contexts where
benefits are private, lawmakers typically conclude, on balance, that
it is better to force the potential beneficiaries of a project to contract
ex ante. They may sense that this approach not only is less legally
68. See, e.g., Campbell v. Mesier, 74 Johns. Ch. 333 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (Kent, Ch.).
69. See, e.g., Kingman v. Williams, 36 N.E. 667 (Ohio 1893). See generally Annotation,
Constitutionality of Fencing and Stock Laws, 6 A.L.R. 212 (1920). In practice, in these contexts owners of rural land are more likely to apply informal norms than formal legal rules. See
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 65–81 (1991).
70. See Note, Party Walls—Compensation for Use in the Absence of Agreement, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 222 (1908) (citing sources). There is a lack of scholarly consensus on what the common-law
rule should be. Compare Daniel Friedmann, Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self-Interest, and
the Limits of Free Riding, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 831, 849–52 (2003) (favoring restitution in a context of this sort) and Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009) (urging expansion of restitutionary obligations), with
Doug Rendleman, When Is Enrichment Unjust? Restitution Visits an Onyx Bathroom, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 991, 1009–11 (2003) (disfavoring restitution).
71. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 22, at 640. In the co-ownership context as well, parties
are highly unlikely to turn to formal law when resolving disputes. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 120–23 (2008).
72. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Murphy, 334 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (holding that
statute that required owner who had no livestock to share fencing costs was unconstitutionally
“oppressive”); Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d. 455 (Vt. 1989) (endorsing Sweeney outcome).
But see, e.g., In re Petition of Bailey, 626 N.W.2d 190 (Minn. App. 2001).
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complex than a rule that compels cost-sharing ex post but also is less
likely to sap intrinsic motivations to cooperate.
B. Restitutionary Obligations to Governments or Associations
That Confer Special Benefits
Especially between 1850 and 1930, local governments in the United
States commonly imposed mandatory special assessments on private
landowners to help finance street and utility improvements. Special
assessment law permitted this practice only when the improvement
in question could be characterized as a “local” one that would confer
“special benefits.” Whatever its shortcomings, this financing system
created political pressure against the installation of wasteful local
improvements.
Special services to discrete territories commonly continue to be
financed in similar fashion. In the twenty-first century, numerous
special government districts, such as business improvement districts,
provide ongoing services to discrete territories and primarily finance
their operations by taxing owners of benefited lands. A developer who
requires land purchasers to become members of common interest community, such as a condominium association, uses an analogous institutional arrangement. A member who fails to pay the community’s
periodic assessments typically risks loss of the unit through a foreclosure proceeding. When a developer has neglected to empower the
association’s governing board to impose mandatory assessments, some
courts have held that this power is inherent.73 These rulings recognize
that, as the beneficiaries of a project or service grow in number, the
necessity of deterring free-riding swamps the downsides of imposing
affirmative legal duties.
C. Duties to Pay General Taxes to Finance General
Governmental Operations
A municipality cannot feasibly finance all of its operations by means
of special charges on benefited landowners. To defray the local share
of the costs of, for example, policing services, building a new city hall,
and providing services to the homeless, a municipality tends instead
to levy general taxes, most pertinently, ad valorem taxes on owners
of real and (perhaps) personal property.
73. See, e.g., Sullivan v. O’Connor, 961 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); Perry v.
Bridgetown Cmty. Ass’n, 486 So.2d 1230 (Miss. 1986).
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In the distant past, a government instead might require a landowner to contribute specific tangible inputs, not money, to the general
public fisc. In the ancient Near East, the owners of large estates commonly were obligated to provide soldiers to the monarch.74 In early
feudal England, an owner who held land by military tenure similarly
was compelled to provide knights to the king.75 Compared to a monetary obligation, a duty to contribute a good or service in-kind is costly
to administer and also intrudes more on taxpayer autonomy. As time
has passed, these obligations therefore have mostly been cashed out.
In England, for example, the feudal duties of landowners to provide
knights to the king typically were eventually converted into obligations to pay money.76
In the twenty-first century, a landowner’s most financially burdensome affirmative obligation typically is the duty to pay general property taxes to units of local government.77 These taxes have become
major sources of local revenue, partly because the immobility of land
makes them hard to evade.78 On awakening, Van Winkle likely would
find that he had forfeited ownership of all his lands to the highest
bidders at government tax sales.
V. AN OWNER’S DUTIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE
COSTS OF SOCIAL INSURANCE
Progressive theorists of property law stress the importance of distributive justice and would employ doctrines of property law to advance that objective. In this Part, I contest not the Progressives’ goal,
74. See Raymond Westbrook, Introduction: The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,
in 1 A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW (Raymond Westbrook ed., 2003) 1, 54–55
(describing kings’ grants of land in return for certain services or payments).
75. See Mark A. Senn, Shakespeare and the Land Law in His Life and Works, 48 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 111, 156–57 (2013); cf. Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property
Rights; Or, “How the West Was Really Won,” 34 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1991) (describing the federal
government’s promotion of homesteading to quell Native American opposition); Katz, supra
note 3, at 2054–55 (providing historical examples of a state’s use of owners to defend frontiers
and maintain peace).
76. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 22, at 502–03.
77. Governments also commonly tax property transfers and income that owners receive
from property.
78. The benefits of a local government’s general activities within its boundaries tend to be
positively capitalized into value of land. The property tax thus can be conceptualized as a lumpy
benefits charge that a municipality imposes in return for conferring general local services. See
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5–8 (2001).
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but rather their choice of instrument. The provision of social insurance rightly has become one of the central functions of governments.
Property doctrine, however, is an ill-suited means to that end.
A. The Inevitability of a System of Social Insurance
Virtually every human society develops institutions to transfer resources to those who have unusual difficulty in providing for themselves. In a hunter-gatherer band, for example, a successful hunter
typically has a duty to share the carcass of a large animal with other
band members.79 Some doctrines of property law have had a similar
thrust. As noted, especially prior to the twentieth century, many societies have required owners of rural land to allow entry by hunters,
gleaners, and others likely to be short of food.80 Over many millennia,
hierarchical institutions typically have evolved to supplement, and
perhaps even supplant, these more decentralized systems of social
insurance. Prior to the twentieth century, the roles of religious and
fraternal organizations commonly rivaled those of governments.
During the twentieth century, of course, governments in the United
States, like those in other developed nations, greatly expanded their
efforts to provide a safety net to those who might fall on hard times.
Partly because a household can more easily move to a new locality or
new state than to a new nation, the federal government has financed
most of these efforts, primarily by drawing on revenues raised by
means of payroll taxes and the progressive income tax. In many contexts, these welfare-state programs have crowded out more traditional methods of social insurance.
B. Gregory Alexander’s Conception of the Duty of a Property
Owner to Share
A self-conscious school of Progressive property scholarship first surfaced in 2009.81 Merrill has plausibly identified “forced-sharing” as the
79. See Alan Barnard & James Woodburn, Property, Power and Ideology in Hunting and
Gathering Societies: An Introduction, in HUNTERS AND GATHERERS 2: PROPERTY, POWER, AND
IDEOLOGY 4, 17 (Tim Ingold, David Riches & James Woodburn eds., 1988).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27.
81. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S.
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009).
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core principle that unites this scholarly cluster.82 The Progressives
plainly vary in their views. To simplify, I focus on the work of Gregory
Alexander, one of the most visible members of this loose alliance.
Alexander asserts that an overarching “social-obligation norm” should
govern, and to some extent already does govern, legal definitions of
property rights.83 In Alexander’s words, “the state should be empowered and may even be obligated to step in to compel the wealthy to
share their surplus with the poor.”84
Alexander’s analysis of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.85 suggests
that he regards a routine property dispute to be an appropriate setting
for the application of this sharing principle. Merrill and Smith start
their casebook with Jacque, a controversy that arose out of events
in a snowy field in rural Wisconsin.86 In that instance, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reinstated a jury’s award of $100,000 punitive
damages against a small corporation whose employees had failed to
honor a retired farmer’s insistence that they not transport a mobile
home across a field that he co-owned with his wife. Because the mobile home company had no plausible claim of necessity, Merrill, who
favors a robust right to exclude, endorses the outcome in Jacque.87
Alexander ultimately agrees that Jacque was correctly decided.88
But his approach requires him to determine whether his forcedsharing principle would justify a trespass in this instance. Alexander
thus is compelled to assess the worthiness, as a matter of distributive justice, of the parties involved in the dispute. This requires him
to determine how alternative outcomes would have affected the parties’ relative “capabilities” to achieve “human flourishing.”89 Because
the Jacques’ home was located near the field where the trespass
82. Merrill, supra note 5, at 23–24.
83. Alexander, supra note 4; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and Obligations:
The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, 43 HONG KONG L.J. 451 (2013).
84. Alexander, supra note 83, at 458. See also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:
THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 17–18 (2000) (“Some obligations legitimately rest on owners to
share their wealth to enable nonowners to have an opportunity to become owners.”); Eduardo
M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 882 (2009) (“. . . [R]edistribution of land
rights via in-kind transfers of ownership or occupancy will, at times, be the only appropriate
way of fostering human flourishing.”).
85. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
86. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 22, at 1–7.
87. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1849, 1871–74 (2007).
88. Alexander, supra note 4, at 815–17.
89. Alexander derives these conceptions from the works of Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum,
and Aristotle. Id. at 749–51, 760–72.
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occurred, he concludes that the trespass had jeopardized the Jacques’
“capability of sociality.” Turning to the mobile home company and
its shareholders, Alexander declines to adopt a rule that corporations and shareholders inherently lack interests in human flourishing. He implies that their stakes instead are fact-sensitive. If denial
of entry across the Jacques’ field would have affected the “economic
viability” of Steenberg, the case might be difficult to resolve.90 But the
interests of Steenberg and its shareholders were minor and “purely
economic.” Alexander concludes, “Whatever flourishing interest of
either Steenberg or its shareholders was implicated, then, paled in
comparison with the Jacques’ interest in maintaining the security
and safety of their family home.”91
This approach places significant additional informational burdens
on actors. Imagine that the Jacques, upon learning of Steenberg’s
intentions, had telephoned an attorney for advice. A responsible attorney would then have had to anticipate how a judge ultimately
would decide the matter if litigation were to ensue. If Alexander’s
principles were to have been in effect, the attorney, among other
tasks, would have had to quiz Harvey and Lois Jacques about their
current levels of capability, determine the effects of an entry on their
sense of security in their home, and assess the financial viability of
the Steenberg firm.
Some devotees of the sharing principle might be willing to make
lumpier decisions about the relative merits of distributive claims. The
Deuteronomic Code entitled “aliens, orphans, and widows” to enter
fields for food, even though some aliens, for example, certainly would
not have been impecunious.92 This sort of class-based approach to the
making of redistributive judgments likely would reduce informational
burdens, but at the sacrifice of precision.93 Alexander, when analyzing Jacque, shows some willingness to generalize, for example, about
homeowners’ needs for security. But, as noted, he is unwilling to conclude that a corporation and its shareholders inherently lack protectable capabilities.94 His sharing principle apparently requires parties
90. Id. at 816–17.
91. Id. at 817.
92. See supra text at note 24.
93. See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal
Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 174–76 (2003) (distinguishing between individual
and class-based determinations of distributive merit).
94. If property law were to systemically discriminate against corporations, the creator of
a small business would have an additional incentive to select another business form.
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to a property dispute to make individualized assessments of their
respective circumstances.95
To Merrill and other scholars intent on limiting the information
costs of property rules, Alexander’s legal approach is, to put it gently,
a non-starter. Many everyday property disputes involve strangers
thrown together in brief encounters. A Starbucks patron doing work
on a laptop benefits from the existence of a rule that entitles a laptop
owner flatly to refuse, without further discussion, a stranger’s request to borrow the device. Would it be better to require the laptop
owner and its would-be borrower to enter into a discussion about
their relative wealth and capabilities?
C. The Advantages of Redistribution by Means of Broad Welfare
Programs Financed Through General Taxes
Virtually all legal commentators regard the pursuit of distributive justice to be a legitimate concern of lawmakers. This generalization applies not only to Progressives, but also to law-and-economics
scholars. Tom Merrill, who plainly gives weight to considerations of
economic efficiency, has repeatedly urged lawmakers to attend to a
variety of other values, including distributive justice, individual freedom, personhood, and communitarianism.96 Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell have prominently acknowledged that policies that maximize
welfare may fail to satisfy concerns about distribution.97 And so have
Richard Posner and many others.98
95. Singer states that Alexander would not treat “each property case as one of first impression.” Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1307
& n.66 (2014). But Alexander’s discussion of Jacque does reveal a strong aversion to categorical rules.
96. Merrill, supra note 2, at 2081–94; see also Merrill, supra note 5, at 11–13, 23–24;
Merrill & Smith, supra note 87, at 1850, 1857. For doubts that any version of utilitarianism
can capture the moral basis of private property, see id. at 1850–51, 1867.
97. The opening paragraph of Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare,
114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (2001), reads:
The thesis of this Article is that the assessment of legal policies should depend
exclusively on their effects on individuals’ welfare. In particular, in the evaluation of legal policies, no independent weight should be accorded to conceptions
of fairness, such as corrective justice and desert in punishment. (However, the
logic leading to this conclusion does not apply to concern about equity in the distribution of income, which is often discussed under the rubric of fairness.)
98. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 344 (8th ed. 2011) (recognizing distributive justice as a distinct concern); see also ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY:
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But most law-and-economics scholars, including Merrill,99 conclude
that distributive goals are better pursued by means of broad tax and
welfare programs than by the introduction of distributive considerations into the rules for resolving ordinary private law disputes.100
Considerations of efficiency, horizontal equity, and relative institutional competence all support this stance.
First, as noted, the harnessing of private law doctrine to the cause
of redistribution would greatly increase the amount of information
individuals would need to navigate the world.101 Determinations of
the relative neediness, or capabilities, of parties to a property dispute
commonly are complex. In a welfare state such as the United States,
the staffs of tax and welfare agencies and private charities typically
have better information pertinent to the pursuit of distributive justice than do ordinary citizens, attorneys, and judges.102
THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
7–10 (2d. ed. 1989).
99. Merrill, supra note 5, at 24; Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an
Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. REG. 1,
38 (2010).
100. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 98, at 124–27; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should
Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000). But cf. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic
Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) (asserting that, on account of individuals’ excessive optimism, contingent civil liabilities might have less effect on
incentives to work than income taxes would); but see Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing
the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) (asserting that the mainstream
position is logically flawed and premised on untenable assumptions). See generally Logue &
Avraham, supra note 93 (providing an incisive overview of competing considerations). Some
Progressives, perhaps most, are aware that law-and-economics scholars typically favor using
taxation and welfare policies as the chief instruments of distributive justice. See, e.g., Peñalver,
supra note 84, at 880.
101. With Merrill’s stress on simplicity, compare the views of Hanoch Dagan, an energetic
scholar with a distinctive voice. At times Dagan seems to value legal complexity for its own sake.
The abstract of one of his articles reads in part:
[T]his Essay calls for a pluralist turn in private law theory and argues that a
structurally pluralist and moderately perfectionist understanding provides a
better account of private law generally and of property law more particularly.
The multiplicity and complexity implied in such an understanding are also normatively valuable for liberal private law and should facilitate a variety of social
spheres embodying different modes of valuation.
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1409
(2012). But see, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 1255, 1269 n.96 (2007) (recognizing advantages of simplicity).
102. See, e.g., Logue & Avraham, supra note 93, at 173–74 (noting that taxing authorities
have superior information about individuals’ income and wealth). In 2009, governments in the
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Second, the principle of horizontal equity—that is, the like treatment of persons situated alike—typically supports placing burdens of
providing aid to the poor on taxpayers generally, as opposed to concentrating those burdens on members of smaller subgroups, such property
owners involved in private-law disputes.103 Alexander and Peñalver
themselves recognize the importance of horizontal equity. They highlight a decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa that dealt
with a corporation’s petition to evict tens of thousands of squatters
from its lands.104 Alexander and Peñalver applaud the court’s decision not only to delay the eviction but also to order the government
of South Africa to compensate the corporation for damages arising
out of the squatting.105 Why this expression of concern for a corporation, an unlikely object of Progressive sympathy? Alexander and
Peñalver conclude that, at least in this instance, the duty to share
surplus property was “an obligation that falls on all property owners,
and therefore should not be imposed on just one property owner.”106
In this particular case there also was a horizontal equity issue on
the receiving side. The court’s decision transferred resources to the
squatters involved in the litigation, ultimately at the expense of the
government of South Africa. Might not other poor and landless households in South Africa have been just as deserving of aid? Because tax
and welfare programs typically have broader reaches, their effects
tend to be more even-handed than the effects of judicial rulings in
particular property disputes.
Third, in developing his conception of a duty to share property,
Alexander gives little weight to the relative legitimacy and competence of alternative institutions. His lengthy discussions of judicial
decisions such as Jacque and the New Jersey beach access cases
imply that he sees state judges as major architects of redistributive
efforts.107 Virtually all citizens, however, have a stake in redistributive
United States spent $2.1 trillion on transfer payments to individuals. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 351 tbl.539 (2012). Taken together, federal taxation and expenditure policies have a sharply progressive tilt. See Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution
of Federal Spending and Taxes in 2006, 37 exh. 24 (Nov. 2013).
103. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 100, at 823.
104. Modderklip East Squatters v. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd., 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC).
105. Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 127, 159–60 (2009). As it happens, I agree with both prongs of the court’s decision
in Modderklip.
106. Id. at 160.
107. Alexander, supra note 4, at 815–17 (discussing Jacque); id. at 801–07 (discussing
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questions, and these issues are deeply contested. In a democracy,
legislators, not judges, typically are the more legitimate framers of
social-insurance policy.108 Moreover, Alexander implicitly would enhance the relative prominence of states, the primary makers of property law in the United States, in redistributive policy. This also is
dubious. As noted, because households are mobile, redistributive
policy generally is best fashioned at the national level.109
D. The Waning of Rural Landowners’ Obligations to the Poor
Alexander asserts that the legal duties of owners generally have
been proliferating.110 In important respects, however, the trend is
otherwise. The duties of an owner of an orchard or farm to provide
access to the needy have ebbed. In the United States, rights to enter
private lands to hunt, fish, or glean received greater legal protection in 1800 than in 2014.111 When Britain enacted a “right to roam”
statute in 2000, it forbade a roamer from hunting on private land
and refused to authorize roaming on plowed land.112 With the growth
of the welfare state, lawmakers have largely cashed out the socialinsurance duties of rural landowners—that is, converted them into
obligations to pay general taxes to the state.
It is notable that in pocket after pocket of property law, including,
for example, adverse possession, inheritance, nuisance, and takings,
formal legal doctrine does not ask a judge to give weight to the relative deepness of the pockets—or, to use Alexander’s preferred term,
capabilities—of the contesting parties.113
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) and Raleigh Avenue
Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005)).
108. Cf. Logue & Avraham, supra note 93, at 253–57 (analyzing, but not endorsing, this
argument).
109. See supra text following note 80. A case for some involvement of local governments in
redistribution is made in Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J.
PUB. ECON. 35 (1973).
110. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 83, at 453: “As society has grown more complex and more
interdependent, the obligations [of owners] have thickened.”
111. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27; see also Brian Sawers, The Right to Exclude
from Unimproved Land, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 665, 677–84 (2011).
112. See Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle
of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 407–08 (2007). On the scope of rights to roam in
other European nations, see Sawers, supra note 111, at 684–89. Few of these nations authorize
a roamer to hunt or fish, but some recognize a right to gather berries and mushrooms. Id.
113. For criticism of the current legal stance, see, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 VA. L. REV. 741 (1999).
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CONCLUSION: CONFINING PROPERTY LAW TO WHAT IT DOES BEST
Lawmakers at times assign to a property owner affirmative duties
to provide specific services, such as providing care to a domestic animal and clearing snow from an abutting city sidewalk. In these instances, the owner typically both benefits personally from performing
the service and also has special pertinent knowledge and ability to act
on that information. The increasing specialization of labor and capital
suggests, if anything, that the scope of owners’ duties to provide these
sorts of in-kind services will tend to contract. In many contexts, an
owner lacks the skills and equipment to provide a service as capably
as a specialist hired by a government agency could provide it. Until
a century ago, many states called on adult males to contribute stints
of road duty.114 None continue to enlist amateurs in this fashion.
To marshal resources, governments instead are inclined to impose
on owners obligations to make monetary payments such as benefits
charges and general taxes. A duty to pay burdens individual autonomy less than does a duty to serve. But even a duty of an owner to
pay increases the informational complexity of the property system.
In some contexts, this consideration, coupled with the risk that imposing a legal duty will crowd out intrinsic motivations to contribute
funds, counsels against the creation of a duty to pay.
Distributive justice is a worthy goal. With the rise of the welfare
state, however, landowner duties to aid the poor rightly have declined.
As Tom Merrill has stressed, simple rules of property law enable individuals to navigate a world full of strange objects and unfamiliar
people. Gregory Alexander’s wish to burden owners with a generalized legal duty to share would greatly complicate this navigation. A
legal institution, even one as fundamental as property law, should
not be asked to do too much. In Henry Smith’s words:
To assert that doctrines are part of an issue-by-issue balancing
of values like community, autonomy, efficiency, personhood, labor,
and distributive justice is to commit the fallacy of division. These
are all important values for the system to serve, but the bundle

114. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916); Michael H. LeRoy, The Inequality of Sacrifice:
Reducing Moral Hazard for Bailed-Out Homeowners: The Case for Compulsory Community
Service, 36 J. LEGIS. 139, 143–44 (2010).
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picture [of property rights] creates the expectation that the pieces
of the system will serve these values individually and separably as
well as collectively. Little attention is directed toward the possible
specialization of the parts in achieving the goals of the whole.115

In a nation with a full-fledged welfare state, putting issues of distributive justice into play in a routine trespass dispute would be a
grave mistake.

115. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1719 (2012).

LOST VISIBILITY AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE:
HOW MERRILL’S SINE QUA NON OF PROPERTY COMPELS
JUST COMPENSATION IN TAKINGS CASES

MARK D. SAVIN* & STEPHEN J. CLARKE**
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND LOSS OF VISIBILITY
DUE TO GOVERNMENT TAKINGS
In 1998, Thomas W. Merrill, one of the great modern property law
scholars, published an article in the Nebraska Law Review that has
since framed much of the scholarly discussion on the nature of property rights.1 Now, fifteen years after it was published, Merrill’s essay,
Property and the Right to Exclude, still compels those looking to understand the fundamental nature of property to address his famous
assertion: “[T]he right to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the
most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”2
In this Article, we propose to connect Merrill’s observation about
the supremacy of the right to exclude among the “bundle of sticks”
that is commonly thought of as property to a specific aspect of property law: the question of what should constitute a taking of property
* Shareholder, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, A.B. Kenyon College, Ph.D.
Stanford University, J.D. University of Minnesota.
** Attorney, Waldo & Lyle, P.C., Norfolk, VA. Mr. Clarke limits his practice to representing
property owners in eminent domain and property rights litigation. In addition to his co-author,
Mr. Clarke would like to thank the coordinators of the Brigham-Kanner Property Rights
Conference for fostering the free flow of information regarding property rights issues between
academia, the bench and the practicing bar.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
2. Merrill, supra note 1, at 730. A recent search using Westlaw reveals more than 175 law
review and journal articles which cite to Merrill’s essay. Citing References for 77 NEB. L. REV.
730 (1998), WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (search “77 Neb. L. Rev. 730”; then follow “Citing
References” hyperlink). While much of the scholarly debate has centered on whether the right
to exclude reigns supreme over all the other rights which collectively comprise property, it is
important to note that Merrill was not advancing the argument that the right to exclude is the
only relevant attribute of property. Rather, his contention is that without the right to exclude,
there cannot be property. Taken on its face, this claim should be non-controversial: the Supreme
Court has called the right to exclude “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (same); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (same); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 831 (1987) (same).
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for purposes of compensation in eminent domain cases. In particular,
the right to exclude has significant implications for courts seeking
to determine whether a change in visibility as the result of a taking
of property for public use should be a compensable element of just
compensation. As we argue here, a property owner’s right to exclude
others necessarily means that when a government actor wielding
the power of eminent domain uses that power to intrude upon this
fundamental owner’s right, a taking has occurred. Specifically, when
eminent domain is used to overcome an owner’s right to exclude in
such a way that the owner’s control over the visibility of his property is lost, compensation is required equivalent to the value of that
which has been lost. As straightforward as this proposition seems, it
has been disregarded by numerous courts that have lost sight of this
foundational right to exclude. Professor Merrill, both in his 1998
article and in his more recent remarks at William & Mary Law School,
reminds us that if we misunderstand the place of the right to exclude,
we misunderstand property.
In Part II of this Article, we will trace and consider the history of
the law regarding takings of visibility in the context of eminent domain, pointing out three approaches that have been used by the
courts which have considered the issue. In Part III, we will offer an
argument regarding the analytical approach found in the better
reasoned of these cases—that an owner’s right to exclude others
requires that a condemning authority must compensate the owner
for lost visibility as a result of the project when the authority uses
its extraordinary power to overcome an owner’s fundamental right.
II. THE EVOLVING CASE LAW INVOLVING THE COMPENSABILITY OF
LOST VISIBILITY IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES
Until as recently as the 1940s, there existed very little appellate
law regarding takings of visibility within the law of eminent domain.3
3. LEXIS Advance database, search for “Eminent Domain and Visibility” showing 0 cases
between 1900 and 1910; 2 cases between 1910 and 1920; 0 cases between 1920 and 1930; 5 cases
between 1930 and 1940; 5 cases between 1940 and 1950; 16 cases between 1950 and 1960; 39
cases between 1960 and 1970. Using the same search and database, eminent domain cases between 2000 and 2010 constituted about 1% of all civil actions; between 1900 and 1910 eminent
domain cases were about 3% of all civil actions. Ben Tozer at Fredrikson & Byron constructed
the searches that provided this data and that found in note 6, infra.
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The reason for this absence likely reflects changes in American life
and commerce that are now so pervasive that we have lost sight of
them. When shopping was done principally in downtown and neighborhood shopping districts, “visibility” meant shoppers looking in
store windows from adjoining streets and sidewalks. In such instances, visibility might be obstructed on occasion, but such obstructions were typically temporary and infrequent.4 But with the advent
of the modern freeway,5 and particularly with the development of
grade separated interchanges that simultaneously change traffic
flow and obstruct visibility, the law regarding visibility became—
and continues to be—an important and developing issue within the
law of eminent domain.6
Until the spring of 2012, however, when the Utah Supreme Court
published its decision in Admiral Beverage,7 changing the law of eminent domain in Utah to allow compensation for the taking of visibility, no state supreme court had ever made a decision regarding the
4. See, e.g., Sinsheimer v. Underpinning & Found. Co., 165 N.Y.S. 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)
(complaint by store owner about shop windows obscured by construction for NYC subway).
5. The commercial importance of visibility in modern highway-oriented real estate is wellestablished and frequently discussed in real estate publications. See, e.g., Robert Bainbridge,
Site Essentials of Convenience Stores and Retail Fuel Properties, APPRAISAL J., June 7, 2012;
Robert Simons, Site Attributes in Retail Leasing: An Analysis of a Fast-Food Restaurant
Market, APPRAISAL J., Oct. 1992.
6. Claims for loss of visibility appear to be occurring with significantly increased frequency
since the late 1980s. While the absolute number of claims remains relatively low compared,
for example, to claims for lost or impaired access, the correlation between visibility issues and
eminent domain cases involving freeways shows a fourfold increase between the 1950s and
the 2000s. The table shown below, based on case information in all U.S. jurisdictions obtained
through LEXIS Advance, indicates that visibility now appears as an issue in more than threequarters of cases involving freeway takings. This suggests that an increased number of jurisdictions will be faced with considering or reconsidering visibility issues.
Decade
50s
60s
70s
80s
90s
00s

Freeway Cases and
Eminent Domain
80
234
198
89
114
132

Visibility Cases and
Eminent Domain
16
39
37
26
80
102

Visibility Cases /
Freeway Cases
20%
16.7%
18.7%
29.2%
70.2%
77.3%

7. Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208 (Utah 2012). The Utah
court released its decision in the fall of 2011, but the decision was not published until the following year.

74

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:071

compensability of visibility and then revisited and re-examined that
decision in light of the actual consequences of its prior decision. The
Utah court’s decision in Admiral Beverage to review sua sponte its
holding of fewer than five years prior in Ivers8 may signal a change in
the way in which appellate courts will consider the issue of what constitutes a property right for which compensation must be paid in a takings case. More significantly for property owners, the Utah Supreme
Court’s decision to expressly overrule the holding of Ivers as it relates
to visibility and to hold that “when a landowner suffers the physical
taking of a portion of his land, he is entitled to severance damages
amounting to the full loss of market value in his remaining property
caused by the taking”9 represents a noteworthy development in that
court’s approach to takings of visibility. It may also suggest how other
courts will begin to approach this issue. It is a decision that, even if
not followed, cannot be ignored. A key premise underlying the Admiral
Beverage court’s analysis is that an owner has a fundamental right
to exclude from his own land that which interferes with visibility, and
while the owner may be forced to surrender that right in face of eminent domain, the right to be fully compensated for that taking is
retained. This premise suggests how deeply Merrill’s thinking has
pervaded modern property theory. Though Merrill’s name is never
invoked, his analysis is echoed.
While there are cases in numerous jurisdictions regarding the compensability of loss of visibility,10 fundamentally there are three approaches to the taking of visibility that have been used by the courts:
(1) an often amorphous “easement” analysis based on borrowings from
the older law of implied easements of light, air and view;11 (2) a state
8. Ivers v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007).
9. Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 214.
10. See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Eminent Domain: Compensability of Loss of
Visibility of Owners Property, 7 A.L.R. 5th 113 (collecting and summarizing cases); James L.
Thompson & Joseph P. Suntum, Compensation for Loss of Visibility to and View from the
Owner’s Property, A.L.I.–A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY ON EMINENT DOMAIN & LAND VALUATION
LITIG. (2006) (discussing legal principles and cases and law on loss of view); 4 NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 13.21, G9A.04[4][c][iii] (3d ed. 2000). In more than half of the states
there appears to be no dispositive law on the compensability of visibility in eminent domain.
Approximately a dozen states now allow claims for loss of visibility; approximately nine do not.
11. For a discussion of background principles, see generally J.A. Robinson, Implied Easements of Light and Air, 4 YALE L.J. 190 (1895). A grantor of land who subdivided land and sold
a portion of that land to another was deemed to have created by implication reciprocal easements such that neither buyer or seller could unreasonably interfere with light or air serving
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constitutional analysis based on loss of market value before and after
the taking, particularly in jurisdictions where owners are protected by
state constitutional language against “damaging” of their property;
and (3) an analysis based on the landowner’s lack of any property
interest in the traffic flow passing the land taken. Cases finding visibility to be compensable will typically look to the first and second
approaches; cases denying compensability will typically employ the
first and third approaches. This Article argues that a fourth approach
based on an owner’s right to exclude provides a superior means of
analyzing such cases.
A. Visibility Takings: Recurring Fact Patterns
Talking about takings of visibility in the abstract tends to be confusing, uninteresting, and insufficiently detailed to either follow or
test the legal analysis of most court decisions. When the properties
described in the cases can be examined,12 however, the decisions can
be more readily analyzed and three common fact patterns emerge:
Pattern I: There is no taking by eminent domain, either permanent or temporary, but the property that was visible before
either property without specific agreement. On a similar theory when land was dedicated by
an adjoining owner for street use, the owner was deemed to retain an implied easement for
access, light, air, and view (particulars varying with jurisdictions) subject, however, to the dominant “proper street use.” There are exhaustive and inconclusive discussions of these rights in
the late 19th and early 20th century cases involving street railways; see, e.g., Adams v. Chicago,
B. & N. R. Co., 39 N.W. 629 (1888), for a particularly full discussion of the issues involved and
the uncertainty of application of these principles. An especially interesting case, but again one
which is ultimately inconclusive in defining how such implied easements are to be viewed for
purposes of eminent domain is “The Forty-Second Street Elevated Spur Case,” In re City of
New York, 192 N.E. 188 (1934), aff’d sub nom., Roberts v. City of New York, 295 U.S. 264
(1935), in which a railway company which was required to acquire such implied easements
later had the easements condemned by the City of New York.
There is underlying the implied easement analysis a powerful reliance argument that, if
developed, weighs in favor of the abutting property owner. This argument is implicit in several of the cases holding that loss of visibility is compensable and is typically dismissed or
disregarded when compensation is denied. When courts are discussing these implied easements,
they are often talking about “equitable rights” clothed for purposes of discussion as “property
rights.” Even if mislabeled as a matter of property law, the rights remain substantial.
12. The widespread availability of satellite and aerial photos through technology services
such as Google Earth has made it possible in many instances (and especially in more recent
matters) to obtain a photographic record of the properties at issue. Use of such services will
often clarify the circumstances of the cited cases.
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the project has now lost visibility. Since, in most of these cases,
there is no direct use of eminent domain, they must necessarily
proceed as tort or inverse condemnation matters. The law is generally unfriendly to property owners making such claims. See,
e.g., Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 249 N.W. 73 (Wis. 1933) (finding no taking where shelter at entrance to subway obstructed
visibility of store owner’s property because implied easement of
light and air overcome by doctrine of proper street use). But see
Sinsheimer v. Underpinning & Foundation Co., 165 N.Y.S. 645
(N.Y. App. Div. 1917) (holding obstruction by builder of Lexington
Avenue subway for impairment of abutter’s rights when cribbing
used for construction temporarily blocked storefront windows
and obstructed light and visibility to constitute a taking of easement rights without just compensation).
Pattern II: There is a taking by eminent domain and that
which impairs visibility is built in part within the parcel subject to the taking. See State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554 (Minn.
1992); see Colorado Department of Transportation v. Marilyn
Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111 (Colo. 2007). In both of these
cases, the condemning authority did not dispute that visibility
from the adjoining roadway was impaired. Compensation was
awarded in the Minnesota matter; compensation was allowed by
the Colorado Appellate Court but denied by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Hickey Ministries.
Pattern III: There is a taking by eminent domain and that
which causes the actual loss of visibility is not actually built
within the parcel taken, but the property taken was either
(1) essential to the completion of the project; or (2) integral
and inseparable from the project. See Ivers v. Utah Department
of Transportation, 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007) (finding that taking
for U.S. 89 overpass was essential to completion to project but
denying compensation for loss of visibility). But see Admiral
Beverage, 275 P.3d 208 (Utah 2011) (finding that taking for I-15
project was essential to completion of project and, overruling
Ivers, allowing compensation for loss of visibility).

B. The Ancestral Split in the Analysis of Visibility:
People v. Ricciardi
The most important early case concerning the compensability of
visibility comes in 1943, predictably enough from California. In People
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v. Ricciardi,13 the California Supreme Court held by a 4–3 majority
(with Justice Shenk authoring the opinion) that both loss of direct
access and loss of visibility were compensable;14 three justices including Justice Traynor joined in a furious dissent.15 Rehearing was
sought by the State a year later and denied on the same split.
The case is an early and landmark freeway case involving what is
now known as the I-10, the San Bernardino Freeway. The fact pattern, even though 70 years past, is precisely that which gives rise to
most modern cases: the creation of a limited access interchange based
on a separation of grade—in this case Rosemead Boulevard, the northsouth cross street, was lowered by about 17 feet so as to pass under
the new Ramona Boulevard freeway.16 The Rosemead underpass obstructed visibility to the Ricciardi property (a retail meat market and
“modern slaughterhouse”) located at the northeast corner of Ramona
and Rosemead.17
At its essence, the dissent’s position was (1) that the majority was
adopting a before and after rule not previously accepted in California;
(2) that the new overpass was a “proper street use” and thus, if there
was an easement for view and if that easement was obstructed, then
it was not compensable; and (3) most importantly, that the property
owner was being compensated for loss of traffic flow to which he had
no legal right and that, as a matter of public policy, recognizing the
loss of visibility would have a “prohibitive effect . . . upon the construction of increasingly necessary arterial freeways, without grade
crossings,”18 identifying in particular the then contemplated Bayshore Freeway in San Francisco and San Fernando Freeway in Los
Angeles.19 In retrospect, the dissent’s prediction about the importance of freeways appears prescient, but its concern about stunting
California freeway growth is, at best, wishful thinking. Nonetheless,
the fundamental argument that would be repeated by condemning
authorities in every jurisdiction thereafter where this issue was litigated had been set: abutting owners have no property rights in traffic flow and allowing compensation for takings of visibility takes
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1943).
Id. at 806.
Id. at 807–18.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 816.
Id.
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money away from transportation departments and constrains highway growth.20
The Ricciardi majority’s analysis concluded from the older street
easement cases that “an abutting owner . . . on a public highway has
an easement of reasonable view of his property from the highway,”21
and then relied on a different public policy interest than the cost of
highway construction to support its conclusion: “The courts have the
burden and responsibility . . . of safeguarding the constitutional rights
of private parties on the one hand and on the other hand of seeing to
it that the cost of public improvements . . . not be unduly enhanced.”22
The majority could not avoid the fact that the underpass constructed using Ricciardi’s land 23 left the Ricciardi property with
little or no visibility from Rosemead, which would cause a loss in the
post-taking market value that had to be regarded as “damage” under
the California Constitution. These antipodal public positions, protection of the government’s interest in controlling the cost of property acquisition for an expanding roadway system on the one hand,
and protecting the individual’s right to compensation from disproportionately burdensome market value losses on the other, underlie
the split that is at the core of most visibility cases and that is ultimately seen in Admiral Beverage’s overruling of Ivers. The Ricciardi
decision does not explicitly address the right to exclude in the context
of visibility, instead relying largely on the property owner’s “easement
of reasonable view of his property from the highway.”24 Nonetheless,
analysis of the majority’s opinion shows that the critical aspect of
Ricciardi was that the improvement which obstructed visibility was
itself constructed on the property taken. Seen in that light, Ricciardi’s
right to exclude the State of California from his property absent the
state’s use of its power of eminent domain is a dispositive fact. A prudent Ricciardi would only willingly convey the land needed for the
new interchange if he were compensated for the loss of a right that
he controlled. The state could choose to locate its interchange elsewhere, but if it chose to locate the new structure on land over which
20. See, e.g., Kansas City v. Berkshire Lumber Co., 393 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Mo. 1965).
21. Ricciardi, 144 P.2d at 806.
22. Id. at 802.
23. Ricciardi thus falls squarely into Pattern II of the familiar fact patterns that arise
in visibility cases, as the improvement which eliminated the visibility of the Ricciardi property
from the roadway was built, at least in part, on land actually taken from Ricciardi.
24. Id. at 806.
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Ricciardi held a right to exclude, it must purchase the land from him.
Or, it could use its power of eminent domain to force an exchange, and,
in doing so must compensate the owner for the value of overcoming
the right to exclude.
C. The Alaska Court Thinks About Visibility: The Dimond D Case,
“ 8,960 Square Feet”
In the Dimond D case,25 the Alaska Supreme Court considered
two different fact patterns of visibility loss within the same condemnation and found one compensable and one not. In reaching these
conclusions, the Alaska court provides one of the few post-Ricciardi
decisions which actually analyzes the issues involved rather than
simply coming down on one side or the other of the Ricciardi split.
Recognizing that the compensability of visibility was for it an issue
of first impression, the Alaska court reviewed cases from numerous
jurisdictions (including Ricciardi) in reaching its conclusion, looking
with some care at the rationales provided in the cases it reviewed. The
project at issue involved widening Dimond Boulevard from two lanes
to six lanes and providing an overpass across Dimond Boulevard for
the Alaska Railroad. As a part of the widening of Dimond Boulevard,
and in conjunction with the railway overpass, Dimond Boulevard was
lowered between five-and-a-half and seven feet as it passed by the
adjoining Dimond D property. In addition, earthen berms were constructed within the Alaska Railroad right-of-way in order to further
elevate the tracks as they crossed over Dimond Boulevard.26 The court
ultimately concluded that loss of visibility was compensable where
the loss results from changes made on the parcel taken for the road
widening but found that the loss of visibility caused by the construction of the railway trestle within existing and legally separate Alaska
Railroad right of way was not compensable.27
While the case’s holding is clear, its consequence is difficult to comprehend without understanding the physical layout involved. Prior
to the project, the Dimond D parcel had clear visibility from a large
shopping center property to the east. This borrowed visibility was lost
when the railroad overpass was constructed. The Alaska court reasoned that because the Alaska Railway had the right to change the
25. 8,960 Square Feet v. State (Dimond D), 806 P.2d 843 (Alaska 1991).
26. Id. at 845.
27. Id. at 846.
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elevation of its tracks at any time that there could be no reasonable
expectation by Dimond D, and certainly no legal right, to control what
would occur on that parcel. In other words, key to the Alaska court’s
decision was that Dimond D had no right to exclude with regard to the
railroad property. Accordingly, with regard to that particular claim for
damages—the loss of visibility caused by the Alaska Railroad trestle—
compensation was denied. The logic of the Court’s argument, however, requires the conclusion that compensation for loss of visibility
would have been due if a new elevated structure had been built by
the condemnor on land owned by Dimond D.
With regard to the loss of visibility caused by the change in grade
directly in front of the Dimond D parcel caused by the taking from
Dimond D’s property, the court found it to be compensable. In reaching this conclusion to allow claims for impaired visibility resulting
from work done on property taken from the landowner for the project,
the Alaska Supreme Court considered and rejected the dissent’s argument in Ricciardi and its progeny in Missouri and elsewhere that
“since landowners have no right to traffic flow, they cannot have a
right to be seen by traffic.”28 The defect in the traffic flow argument
identified by the Dimond D court is that “as long as there is a road
adjacent to the taken property,” the owner of that property possesses
a valuable right “to control the visibility of land further away from
the road.”29 “The state must compensate the owner for the loss of the
right to control the visibility of the remaining parcel.”30
In analyzing the problem in this way, the Alaska court avoided the
morass of much of the implied easement analysis: an owner has the
right to control any use of its own property against a detrimental use.
A rational owner would not convey part of its property to another for
a use that would diminish the value of the owner’s remainder without exacting a cost sufficient to compensate for any such diminution.
Such must also be the case when a conveyance is compelled through
eminent domain.31
28. Id. at 847.
29. Id. at 847, 848.
30. Id. at 846.
31. Id. In footnote 6 of Dimond D, the court considers the problem where the condemnor
takes a parcel yet does not immediately cause a loss of visibility. This is the “later project”
problem where the subsequent project does not occur until after the current eminent domain
proceedings are over. “To protect the owner of the remaining parcel from such an occurrence,
we believe that . . . an easement of visibility across the taken parcel is reserved to the owner
of the remaining parcel. If and when the state causes a loss of visibility to the remaining
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As a coda to the Dimond D decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court
in considering the compensability of loss of visibility a year later—
again as an issue of first impression—observed that “the reasoning
we find most persuasive is that of the Alaska Supreme Court.”32 The
court then followed the holding of the Alaska court that loss of visibility was compensable where the obstruction resulted from the condemnor’s use of property within the parcel taken for the project.33
D. Regression to the Mean—Two 2007 Cases Return to the Lost
Traffic Analysis: Ivers and Hickey
In the first six months of 2007 two cases were decided in two neighboring Western states regarding the compensability of visibility: Ivers
v. Utah Department of Transportation,34 filed February 6, 2007, and
Colorado Department of Transportation v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries,35
filed May 29, 2007.36 Both cases adopted what each characterized as
a property rights analysis and concluded that because there was “no
right to passing traffic, an impairment of the visibility from the traffic
is not compensable.”37 Both cases rest principally on the lost traffic
parcel through a change on the taken parcel, then this constitutes a separate taking.” Id. at 846
n.6. The court’s proposed solution reflects its knowledge of eminent domain and transportation
projects. Terming the preserved right an “easement,” however, suggests the imprecision with
which courts sometimes use this term, and further muddies the waters with regard to the
“implied easement of visibility” noted in Ricciardi and other cases.
32. State v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554 (Minn. 1992). Strom is another freeway case arising
from the conversion of U.S. 12 (a major at grade intersection highway connecting Minneapolis
and its western suburbs) to Interstate 394, a grade-separated freeway. There is a Ricciardistyle dissent by Justice Tomljanovich.
33. Id. at 561. Minnesota follows the inseparability doctrine set forth in City of Crookston
v. Erickson, which provides that “where the use of the land taken constitutes an integral and
inseparable part of a single use . . . the effect of the whole improvement is properly to be considered in estimating the depreciation in value of the remaining land.” City of Crookston v.
Erickson, 69 N.W.2d 909, 914 (1955). Under this analysis, it should make no difference whether
the taking is permanent or temporary so long as the land taken is essential to the project and,
but for the taking, under the control of the owner. The issue of project inseparability (or the
parallel doctrine of “essential to completion”) with regard to the relationship between the railway overpass and the street project was apparently not raised in the Dimond D case, but it
lies at the crux of the Utah Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in Admiral Beverage.
34. 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007).
35. 159 P.3d 111 (Colo. 2007).
36. See also Kurtis T. Morrison, Note, Compensable Property Rights and Visibility Damages
in Public Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Department of Transportation v. Marilyn
Hickey Ministries, 38 TRANSP. L.J. 145 (2011).
37. Hickey, 159 P.3d at 114 (describing the holding of Ivers).
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flow theory that had been considered and rejected by the Alaska and
Minnesota courts; Hickey notes Dimond D only in passing38 and the
Utah court notes that the Alaska court found loss of visibility compensable where the obstruction was constructed on land taken from
the claimant and then found that such was not the case in Ivers.39 The
Ivers decision includes no discussion of the significant difference between the Alaska Railroad configuration and the Ivers configuration
or of the controlling principle for the decision in Dimond D.40
The fact patterns for the two cases are similar, but not identical. In
Hickey the Department of Transportation condemned a lengthy (650')
but narrow strip from the easterly edge of the Hickey property (a former shopping center, now used as a religious school, house of worship,
and ministry center) to construct a new light rail line. Construction
occurred on land taken from Hickey and completely cut off visibility
of the church property from I-25, the adjacent roadway. Prior to the
taking, the church owned the property at issue and had the absolute
right to control what structures could be built upon it. It is safe to
assume that the church would not have conveyed this strip to any
acquiring entity without either protection of its visibility or compensation for the loss of such visibility. Though the owner’s right to control use of its own land is a key point made by the Alaska court in
analyzing the relevant rights where a taking from the owner’s property results in the obstruction of visibility,41 this issue is not addressed by the Colorado court.
In his discussion of the Hickey case in the Transportation Law
Journal, Kurtis T. Morrison notes that the Colorado Department of
Transportation (“CDOT”) argued that a ruling allowing compensation for visibility “would unleash ‘a great financial burden’ on state
transportation authorities.”42 CDOT’s argument, of course, repeats
38. Id. at 114 n.4.
39. In fact, the Ivers decision refers obliquely to the Dimond D decision as reflecting the
decisions of “some states [which] recognize an easement of visibility where an obstruction is
built on the condemned land.” Ivers, 154 P.3d at 805 & n.3. This is a mischaracterization of the
holding of Dimond D, which relied not on the implied easement of visibility found in Ricciardi,
but rather on a landowner’s right to limit obstructions from being placed on his or her land. See
Dimond D, 806 P.2d at 846. This mischaracterization, however, allowed the Ivers court to
frame its decision in terms of a landowner’s right (or lack thereof) to traffic flow past his or her
property as opposed to confronting the issue of the landowner’s right to exclude.
40. Ivers, 154 P.3d at 805.
41. See Dimond D, 806 P.2d at 846.
42. Morrison, supra note 36, at 158 (quoting CDOT’s Opening Brief).
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the damper on new freeways argument employed by the dissent in
Ricciardi.43 Recognizing a taking that causes a loss in visibility as compensable, argued CDOT, could have “potentially staggering costs and
adversely affected or altered future transportation planning.”44 While
Morrison notes that a different policy consequence of the Court’s decision “may be to spur reticence by private actors seeking to locate
business interests along transportation corridors,”45 the Colorado
court’s opinion reflects no public policy analysis other than increased
cost as stopping transportation growth.
Ultimately, the Hickey court held that “there is simply no inherent
property right to continued traffic or visibility along the I-25 transit
corridor” and characterized the church’s claim of lost visibility as
“nothing more than an access claim.”46 Given that starting point, it
was easy for the Colorado Supreme Court to conclude that the church
had not suffered a substantial (and therefore compensable) limitation
or loss of access. By focusing on the claim as one for lost access, the
Hickey court circumvented the need to address the right which formed
the basis for the holding in Dimond D: the right of the landowner to
exclude a private entity from constructing an elevated highway on
its property unless the owner is appropriately compensated.
In Ivers, the Utah court faced a slightly different fact pattern.
U.S. 89 in Farmington, Utah was being converted to a limited access
highway and what had previously been an at-grade intersection was
being converted to an elevated interchange, which would reduce visibility of an Arby’s restaurant on the Ivers property. Property was
taken by eminent domain from Ivers for part of a new service road
to be constructed as part of U.S. 89 project. Unlike Hickey, where the
LRT viaduct was constructed on land taken from the church, in Ivers
the actual elevated highway was constructed on land adjacent to
Ivers’s, but not on property taken from Ivers.47
Ivers made claims for both loss of view and loss of visibility. The
court held that loss of view (not visibility) was a “property right,”
43. 144 P.2d 799, 816 (Cal. 1943).
44. Morrison, supra note 36, at 158.
45. Id.
46. Hickey, 159 P.2d at 114–15.
47. Thus Ivers falls into Pattern III of the typical fact patterns found in loss of visibility
cases, as set forth in Part II.A, supra, in that the improvement which actually obstructed visibility to the property was not constructed on the property taken from Ivers, but the taking of
Ivers’s property was essential to the completion of the project which, as a whole, resulted in
the loss of visibility.
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citing an earlier decision that found that an “easement of view” was
a protectable property interest.48 To address the objection of the
Department of Transportation that the improvement which obstructed the view was not built on the Ivers property, the Utah court
then further held that land taken in Ivers was “essential to the completion of the project”:
When land is condemned as part of a single project—even if the
view impairing structure itself is built on property other than that
which was condemned—if the use of the condemned property is
essential to the completion of the project as a whole, the property
owner is entitled to severance damages.49

When it came to claims for loss of visibility, however, the Utah
court simply followed the “no right to traffic flow” position and thus,
for the claim of lost visibility, it was irrelevant that the Ivers land
was essential to the project. Its simplistic position on this point, as
well as its choice to avoid the contrary position taken in the Alaska
and Minnesota cases, may explain the attractiveness of Ivers to the
Colorado court in Hickey. It may also explain the dissatisfaction
that caused the Utah court to revisit this identical issue in Admiral
Beverage only four years later.
E. Admiral Beverage: The Utah Court Changes Direction
Although the Utah Supreme Court issued its opinion in Admiral
Beverage50 in October 2011, the decision was not actually released
for publication until May 9, 2012.51 There has been some speculation
that the seven-month delay in publication reflected uncertainty in the
48. Ivers v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 154 P.3d 802, 806 (Utah 2007).
49. Id. at 807. The court considered and did not adopt the “inseparability” analysis employed
by the Minnesota Court in Crookston, 69 N.W.2d 909, 914 (1955), suggesting that it considered
the “essential to completion of the project standard” narrower than the “inseparability” standard.
Implicit in the “essential to the project” standard is that the condemnor has made a considered
and intentional decision to take the owner’s property and, with it, responsibility for any severance damages.
50. See generally Richard E. Danley, Jr., Severance Damages Take a Sea-Change with
Admirable Beverage, 25 UTAH BAR J., May/June 2012, at 42. Danley’s title suggests the significance of the change in the Utah court’s position. This change in position is especially striking
because the composition of the court was largely unchanged; four of the five justices who participated in Ivers also participated in Admiral Beverage. The new justice on the court, Justice
Thomas Lee, took the seat left by Justice Wilkens, the author of Ivers. Admiral Beverage is
authored by Justice Parrish.
51. See Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208 (Utah 2012).
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Utah Supreme Court about a decision that reversed the analytical
direction of eminent domain law in Utah. Any such speculation must
now be dismissed in light of the Utah court’s even more recent decision in Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA West Point, LLC,52
in which it expressly relied on the compensation principles established by Admiral Beverage in rejecting the so-called “unit-rule” and
instead adopting a position intended to indemnify all holders of an
interest in property taken against actual market-value loss.53
The fact pattern in Admiral Beverage is, as the court itself notes,
“strangely similar” to that in Ivers.54 In connection with the massive
reconstruction of I-15 through Salt Lake City, land was taken by eminent domain for expansion of a frontage road necessary to accommodate one of the I-15 ramps; the actual new elevated I-15 roadway,
ramp and flyover which obstructed visibility was not constructed on
the land taken from Admiral Beverage but on land which abutted
the new frontage road for which property was taken from Admiral
Beverage.55 Both the Department of Transportation and the owner
agreed that the property taken from Admiral was “essential to completion of the project.”
The most salient part of the Admiral Beverage decision is the court’s
choice to reject the mechanistic notion of “recognized property rights”
theory it held to in Ivers by allowing compensation for lost view, but
not for lost visibility (a distinction the Court could not justify). Rather,
the court premised its approach on indemnification of actual market
value lost, which the court found comported with both its obligations
under the Utah Constitution56 and common sense.57 As a practical
matter, what the Court did was recognize that an owner would not
surrender a valuable right—what Merrill identifies as the right to
exclude—without market-based compensation.
52. 304 P.3d 810 (2012).
53. FPA West Point is itself an important decision in the law of eminent domain, rejecting
the so-called “unit rule” and holding instead that the value of each interest condemned must
be valued under an “aggregate-of-interests” approach.
54. Counsel for Ivers, Donald J. Winder and John W. Holt, participated as amicus in the
briefing of Admiral Beverage.
55. In this regard, Admiral Beverage is, like Ivers, a Pattern III case. See supra Part II.A.
56. The Utah Constitution, like a majority of state constitutions, provides for compensation
when property is taken “or damaged.” Utah Const. art. I, § 22. Admiral Beverage contains a
careful exposition of the importance of this language to its analysis. Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d
at 215–16. See also People v. Ricciardi, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (Cal. 1943) (discussing “damage”
under the California Constitution).
57. Admiral Beverage, 275 P.3d at 211.
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Procedurally, the case is remarkable because while the court initially granted review only on the issue of severance damages for loss
of view, after hearing oral argument the court sua sponte issued an
order for supplemental briefing and re-hearing on the issue of whether
Ivers should be overruled with regard to damages for loss of visibility.58
The Utah court recognized that overruling its recent decision in
Ivers with regard to the compensability of lost visibility was not something to be undertaken lightly,59 but concluded both that its earlier
rule was “originally erroneous” and failed to “comport with a constitutional right.”60 The court specifically noted that its holding in Ivers
that a person whose property was taken by the Utah Department of
Transportation could only recover for damages to “recognized property rights” was at odds with the constitutional obligation that severance damages are to be measured by the diminution in market value
of the remainder property.61 In assessing fair market value, the court
explained “we have always allowed evidence of all factors that affect
market value.”62 Although such statements of broad admissibility are
not uncommon within the law of eminent domain, the willingness
of the Utah court to tie this evidentiary standard to a meaningful
constitutional requirement for compensation is unusual.63
Admiral Beverage holds that when “a landowner suffers the physical taking of a portion of his land, he is entitled to severance damages
amounting to the full loss of market value in his remaining property
caused by the taking.”64
58. Id. at 212.
59. Id. at 214–15.
60. Id. at 215.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 214 (emphasis in original).
63. Indeed, instead of focusing on the public policy arguments raised by the dissent in
Ricciardi and by condemnor in the Hickey matter, the Utah Supreme Court focused instead
on the fundamental constitutional right of a property owner to be made whole by a just compensation award. In light of the overarching policy in favor of allowing evidence “of all factors that
affect market value,” the Utah court had no trouble finding that a rule excluding from compensation damages attributable to loss of visibility would be nearly impossible to implement and
would deprive property owners of the protections guaranteed them under the Utah Constitution.
64. Id. at 214. The line drawn by the Utah court requires that there must be an actual taking from the property in question, though it is not necessary that the obstruction to visibility
be constructed on the land taken, so long as the land taken is essential to the project. This is
the threshold that must be crossed. Once crossed, however, the measure is loss in market
value. Allegations of damages not connected to a physical taking will only be sustained if there
is damage to “protectable property rights.” A landowner under the Utah analysis does not have
a protectable property interest in a particular flow of traffic past his property—a change in the
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If Ivers’s constitutional infirmity provided the initial reason for its
rejection by Admiral Beverage, it is clear from the supplemental briefing and the court’s opinion that when the court found itself immersed
in the practical issues of valuation, it found the sorting of severance
damages into compensable and non-compensable elements to be
unworkable as a practical matter. In particular, the court found it
would be “rank speculation” for an appraiser to attempt to exclude
from a property’s post-taking value the amount attributable to loss
of visibility.65 The court’s pragmatic conclusion was that: “Not only
is there no factual basis for such speculation, but requiring it would
result in an increase in unnecessarily complex drawn out litigation
involving valuation of partially condemned property. In contrast,
using market value as the measure of severance damage is relatively
simple and fact-based.”66
The Admiral Beverage court’s analysis ends with a common sense
notion that is familiar to all whose work engages owners whose property is taken by eminent domain:
The average landowner assumes that the value of his land is
equal to the amount that a willing buyer would pay for it. And
the average landowner ought to be able to expect that he will be
compensated for any reduction in that amount that results if the
state takes part of his property.67

III. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE REQUIRES THAT PROPERTY OWNERS
BE FULLY COMPENSATED FOR THE MARKET VALUE OF
THEIR PROPERTY TAKEN AND THE MARKET VALUE OF
SEVERANCE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE TAKING
None of the state supreme courts to have addressed the issue of
the compensability of loss of visibility in the context of an eminent
traffic flow under Utah law does not create a taking—but once there is an undisputed physical
taking the owner is then entitled as a constitutional matter to be put in the same place he would
have been economically but for the taking. Id. at 216. What would constitute a “protectable
property right” remains generally undefined.
65. Id. at 220.
66. Id. The briefing in Ivers and particularly an amicus brief submitted by Ivers’s counsel
appears to have sharpened the court’s focus on these pragmatic appraisal issues. In particular,
the court recognized problems in jury instructions relating to market value as the measure
of just compensation if visibility, a key component of market value, could not be considered by
the jury.
67. Id.
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domain case have explicitly referred to Merrill’s Property and the
Right to Exclude to support their holdings.68 Nonetheless, at the core
of the approach adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Admiral
Beverage, the Alaska court in Dimond D, and the Minnesota court
in Strom, is the concept that a property owner possesses the right to
exclude a third party from his or her property. Therefore, if even a
tiny taking or a temporary taking of a landowner’s property is deemed
necessary for the completion of a public project, and such taking both
overcomes the owner’s fundamental right to exclude and results in
the remainder of the landowner’s property having reduced visibility
which affects the market value of the remainder, the landowner logically must be compensated for that diminution in market value caused
by the reduction in visibility.
Merrill directly touches on this in his seminal essay in defending
the “logical primacy of the right to exclude.”69 Constructing a hypothetical in which A is the owner of the proverbial Blackacre, Merrill
pointed out that “A has the power to act as the gatekeeper of Blackacre. A can forbid other persons from entering onto Blackacre or
from causing structures or objects to encroach on Blackacre; alternatively, A can consent to other persons entering onto or encroaching
on Blackacre. As Blackacre’s gatekeeper, A has the power to determine who has access to Blackacre and on what terms.”70
Using the right to exclude as his touchstone, Merrill then proceeds
to set out how the rest of A’s rights in Blackacre flow from his right to
serve as its gatekeeper. For example, Merrill notes that “no one other
than A or those given permission by A may enter onto Blackacre or
encroach on Blackacre.”71 If B owns Greenacre, adjacent to Blackacre,
A can prevent B from building a billboard (or any other improvement)
that encroaches on Blackacre and hinders its visibility from the adjoining public street because A has the right to dictate whether B can
enter upon Blackacre and under what terms. Similarly, A may sell to
B the right to construct a billboard that encroached on Blackacre, but
will demand that price which fully compensates A for the expected
loss in the value of Blackacre, including that loss attributable to
Blackacre’s loss of visibility from the public street.
68. This should not be surprising, as many of the decisions, including, significantly,
Dimond D and Strom, predate the publication of Property and the Right to Exclude.
69. Merrill, supra note 1, at 740.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 741.
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Now, consider a slight change to the scenario, in which Greenacre
is not owned by B, but rather by the local municipal government,
G. Instead of proposing a billboard which will be partially built on
Blackacre, G plans to construct a highway overpass with sound walls
and needs a small portion of Blackacre in order to build the project.
If G did not possess the power of eminent domain, a prudent and
reasonable A would prevent G from acquiring a portion of Blackacre,
unless G were willing to pay A an amount equal to and commensurate with the harm caused by the taking, including specifically the
diminution in value to the rest of Blackacre from the loss in visibility
due to the highway overpass. If, on the other hand, G does possess
the power of eminent domain, A cannot prevent G from taking a
portion of Blackacre, but compensation for this substitute forced exchange should be no different than it would be in an unforced market transaction with a reasonable and prudent seller.
It is the landowner’s right to exclude which forms the basis for the
landowner’s right to be justly compensated for the conveyance of that
right. In the first hypothetical, A may exercise A’s right to exclude in
order to prevent B from constructing the billboard that encroaches
on Blackacre, or A may allow B to construct the billboard on the
condition of appropriate compensation. In the second hypothetical,
A’s right to exclude is subservient to G’s power to take property for
public use, and therefore the taking of A’s right to exclude must be
matched with the payment of just compensation, the “full and perfect
equivalent” in money.72
To the extent that the billboard proposed by B is to be built entirely
or mostly on Blackacre, such that the portion of the billboard which
blocks visibility is itself located on Blackacre, then the hypothetical
falls squarely within Pattern II of the recurrent fact patterns seen in
those cases considered by the courts as noted in Part II of this Article.
But if the only part of B’s proposed billboard that encroaches on
Blackacre is a small piece of a footing that is located entirely below
ground level, then the hypothetical falls into Pattern III, in which
the part of the improvement that causes the loss of visibility is not
72. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (“The Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Such compensation means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. The owner is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied
if his property had not been taken.”).
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actually constructed on the property in question, but is nonetheless
integral to the operation of the billboard itself. The analysis does not
change if the taking is temporally limited, rather than limited in area.
Turning to the scenario in which G is constructing a highway overpass with sound walls, if the only portion of G’s public road improvement that is actually built on what was formerly part of Blackacre
are some underground storm drainage pipes, is A entitled to receive
compensation for the loss of visibility to rest of Blackacre caused by
the overpass and sound walls themselves? Or to put it another way,
even though those parts of the project which actually block the visibility of Blackacre from the public street are not built property taken
from A, should A receive compensation for the loss of visibility as
part of the just compensation award?
Analyzing this scenario through the lens of A’s “easement of
visibility,” as set forth in Ricciardi, it is not immediately clear that
G has taken or impinged upon A’s easement rights by constructing
visibility-blocking improvements offsite. Indeed, this is the crux of
the now rejected Ivers holding—even though the Utah Supreme Court
found that the use of the condemned property was essential to the
completion of the project, it nonetheless held that the landowner was
not entitled to compensation for lost visibility because he had no property right in the flow of traffic.73
Yet considering the scenario through the rubric of A’s right to exclude (as opposed to A’s “easement of visibility”), the compensability
of G’s taking, which causes a loss of visibility to the remainder of
Blackacre, is readily apparent. Just as A has an absolute right to
prevent B from encroaching upon Blackacre for even the slightest portion of an underground footing for a billboard, A also has the right to
permit B to build the billboard footing on Blackacre, and will demand
in exchange for that right the appropriate amount of compensation
for the loss of visibility caused not merely by the footing itself, but
by the entire billboard, for which the footing is an integral part. And
a prudent A’s right to extract from B the appropriate amount of compensation for all of the negative aspects of B’s billboard is entirely
analogous with a prudent A’s right to extract from G the full measure of just compensation for all of the negative aspects of G’s overpass and sound wall, including the loss of visibility, so long as the
73. Ivers v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 154 P.3d 802 (Utah 2007).
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underground stormwater drainage pipes are essential to the completion of G’s road project.
Although not termed as such, it is clear that the Alaska Supreme
Court in Dimond D relied upon the landowner’s right to exclude
others from its property in holding that a public improvement that
obstructs visibility and is built, at least in part, on property taken
from the landowner by eminent domain, is compensable:
Ownership of land gives the owner the right and ability to limit
any obstructions from being placed on that land. In particular,
ownership of land abutting on a road gives the owner the right
to control the visibility of all adjoining land further off the road.
This obviously can be an important commercial asset. Thus when
the state takes a parcel which abuts the road, it also takes the
potentially valuable right to control the visibility of the remaining
parcel. For this reason, we believe that the best rule in light of
reason and policy is that loss of visibility to a remaining parcel is
compensable where that loss is due to changes made on the parcel
taken by the state.74

Indeed, a landowner’s “right and ability to limit any obstructions from
being placed on that land” flows directly from the landowner’s right
to exclude others from encroaching on his or her property. It follows,
then, that the taking of the “potentially valuable right to control the
visibility of the remaining parcel” must be compensable. Thus, the
Dimond D court’s recognition of this right in the context of the loss
of visibility in an eminent domain context serves as an example of the
proper application of Merrill’s thesis on the right to exclude to a realworld scenario involving the constitutional right to just compensation.
In reversing the holding of Ivers, the Utah Supreme Court in
Admiral Beverage took the Dimond D court’s analysis to the next
logical level.75 Under its holding, lost visibility is compensable not
only in Pattern II cases (like Dimond D), but also in Pattern III cases,
in which the improvement obstructing visibility was not itself built
on property taken from the owner claiming loss of visibility, but the
property taken was essential to the completion of the improvement
74. 8,960 Square Feet v. State (Dimond D), 806 P.2d 843, 846 (Alaska 1991) (emphasis in
original). But see Colo. Dep’t of Transp. v. Marilyn Hickey Ministries, 159 P.3d 111, 114–15
(Colo. 2007).
75. See Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 275 P.3d 208 (Utah 2012).
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project. Given the primacy of the right to exclude among all the rights
in the “bundle of sticks,” and especially in light of Merrill’s pronouncement that the right to exclude is the sine qua non of property,76 this
is the necessary result for both Pattern II and Pattern III cases. Of
course, analyzing a Pattern I case under the right to exclude framework will generally result in a finding of no compensability, unless
the landowner has some specially defined right to visibility, such as
an easement of visibility,77 over adjoining property.78
Indeed, although the application of the landowner’s right to exclude as a basis for analyzing loss of visibility in condemnation cases
often focuses on those takings in which the remainder of the landowner’s property is negatively impacted (“damaged”) as a result of
the lost visibility, the principle has equal application to those cases
in which visibility is not a valuable attribute of the property before
the taking. Consider the scenario of a single family residence located
on property that backs up to a busy highway. Should the local government acquire a small strip of land along the rear of the property
for expansion of the highway and construction of a sound wall, the
landowner would likely look favorably on the opportunity to have his
or her backyard shielded from the view of every passing motorist.
The landowner’s right to exclude the local government from constructing such a sound wall without being appropriately compensated
still remains. However, the amount of appropriate compensation for
a public improvement which enhances the owner’s privacy while diminishing the property’s visibility could be zero.79 The landowner’s
right to exclude still exists, but its value under that particular circumstance may be minimal or zero. In the end, however, employing
the landowner’s right to exclude as an analytical tool permits the
76. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 730.
77. This is the holding of the Alaska Supreme Court in Dimond D with regard to the loss
of visibility resulting from berms built within the Alaska Railway right-of-way. 806 P.2d 843,
845–46 (1991).
78. There is some argument to be made that Pattern I cases, in which there is no taking of
property, either permanent or temporary, but an improvement is constructed which results in
a loss of visibility, should still result in compensation for loss of visibility, especially in jurisdictions in which just compensation must be paid for the taking “and damaging” of private
property for public use. However, that argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
79. Or it could be negative, as the landowner’s remaining property may be enhanced in
value by the addition of the sound wall. Whether this enhancement is compensable will often
depend on whether the jurisdiction in which the condemnation matter is proceeding follows
the “state rule” or “federal rule” on calculation of just compensation.
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full consideration of all the impacts of the condemnation while preventing a landowner from reaping a windfall award for lost visibility
if visibility was not a valuable attribute of the property before the
condemnation.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes the most important legal principles are the most difficult to identify because they are so fundamental that we lose sight of
their foundational position. Such is the case with the right to exclude.
While the case law often struggles to understand exactly what rights
are at issue when property is taken, Professor Merrill’s statement
that the right to exclude is the sine qua non of property provides a
clear and practical tool for establishing when compensation must be
paid. This is especially so when visibility, often a key attribute of value
in real property, is lost as a result of a condemnor using its power of
condemnation to overcome an owner’s fundamental right to exclude.
Merrill’s principle used as an analytical tool allows us to logically
resolve when compensation should be paid for lost visibility.

THE THING ABOUT EXCLUSION

HENRY E. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
The right to exclude is a sine qua non of debates over property.
No one has been more persistent than Tom Merrill in promoting the
idea that the right to exclude is “the sine qua non” of property itself.1 As reflected by the contributions to this conference in honor of
the many achievements of his in the area of property, few positions
provoke such strong and varied reactions as the placement of the
right to exclude at the center of property.
As someone who is often considered to be an “exclusion theorist”—
whatever that means—I will take this occasion to offer an account
of what the right to exclude does—and does not—offer to property
theories, especially those, like Merrill’s, that aim for description and
explanation. Merrill is right that the bundle of rights picture is ultimately unsatisfying because it offers no account of any the unifying
threads in property law. For Merrill, the right to exclude serves the
unifying role not just by being present wherever there is property,
but by serving as the source out of which other features typically
flow. In this Article, I will show that these derivations of the features
of property from the right to exclude are not really derivations but
symptoms: although the right to exclude plays an important (if not
omnipresent) role in property, it does not have the ontological status attributed to it by Merrill. Even drawing out the implications of
the right to exclude, there is still a hole in property where the connective tissue should be. Quite simply, the missing thing in Merrill’s
account, as in most current accounts, is the thing of property.
Property is the law of things.2 This proposition, accepted throughout most of recorded history, in most of the world’s legal systems,
* Fessenden Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, hesmith@law.harvard.edu. I would
like to thank Yun-chien Chang, Eric Claeys, and participants at the Tenth Annual BrighamKanner Property Rights Conference at the William & Mary Law School for their helpful
comments. It is an honor to celebrate the work of Tom Merrill, and it is a privilege to count
him as a long-time co-author and friend. All errors are exclusively mine.
1. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998).
2. This Article builds on the analysis in Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
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and by lawyers and laypeople alike, is precisely what American commentators on property deny. As Merrill correctly notes, the contrary
proposition, that property is not about things, is the one point of consensus among American commentators, despite their diversity of
views on other matters—like the importance to property of the right
to exclude.
I will argue that the right to exclude is important in property—
even if it is not quite a sine qua non—precisely because of its association with the definition of the legal things over which property rights
are delineated. Trespass and other doctrines that track the boundaries
of land or the outer contours of objects loom large in property because
of the central role that thing-definition plays in property. Property
relies on legal things when it defines what counts as a violation of a
right and how duty bearers are expected to respect property rights.
While rights in property, like all other rights, avail between right
holders and duty bearers, in property they are typically mediated
by the thing. The nature of that thing goes a long way toward determining what kinds of rights one can have and how they work.
Land, cars, water, and inventions all may be things subject to property rights, but their very different qualities determine what it means
to have property in them.
In this Article, I will show how an account of property as the law
of things completes the picture of property, putting the right to exclude in proper perspective. I will argue that Merrill is right to search
for a unifying theme in property and that the right to exclude is in
the ballpark. Nevertheless, as a candidate for the role of linchpin in
property it does not quite fit, and the strain shows. Instead, at the
heart of property is the thing. Private law deals with the complex
interactions of members of society, and a first cut at managing potential conflict is to carve the world into modular things and associate them with people. The things that property law sets up gather
together attributes that “belong” together and allow them to interact intensely, while keeping the interface between these legal things
and the outside world relatively less intense. They are modules.3
The innards of the thing are semi-opaque to those outside, most
3. See, e.g., 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF
MODULARITY 58–59, 236–37, 257 (2000); HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL
210 (2d ed. 1981).
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prototypically in rem duty holders. The proverbial pedestrian in the
parking lot need know nothing about the owner of any car he doesn’t
own—whether it is leased, whether the owner is virtuous, and whether
the car is borrowed from the driver’s sister-in-law, or even stolen.4
The duties are simple: don’t take, keep out, don’t damage. The thing
and its boundary make it easy to use exclusion strategies and to enrich the interface with governance strategies when needed: those
contracting over a car know what the subject matter is.
In Part I, I show that the right to exclude on Merrill’s account is of
unclear ontological status. Perhaps this lack of clarity can be attributed to the outsized role it has to play in Merrill’s account. He attempts to derive other important rights, like the right to transfer,
from the right to exclude. These derivations do not work on their
terms, but they do point to the need for thing definition. Part II explores some of the limits of the right to exclude when it is taken to
be the sine qua non of property. Intangible property is an uncomfortable fit, and we can find examples of property that do not feature
the classic right to exclude. These include powers of appointment and
(to some extent) even familiar interests like easements. The right to
exclude is either absent or highly attenuated here, or we have to water
down the notion of the right to exclude in order to accommodate them.
By the same token, isolating the right to exclude threatens to atomize property along the lines of the bundle of rights in a fashion that
Merrill rightly wants to avoid. Part III shows how possession is indeed, as Merrill’s more recent work shows, associated in important
ways with exclusion, but possession too requires crucially the definition of a thing that can be possessed, which makes exclusion less
than the central player even here. In Part IV, I show that many of the
advantages of focusing on the right to exclude follow from a theory
of property based on the need to define modular things in order to
obtain the benefits from—and manage the costs of—complexity of
the interactions among private parties, as well as their property relations with the state. Property as a law of things suggests why exclusion is important but not fully a sine qua non of property. The article
concludes with some thoughts on why thinghood helps us understand
the attractions of the right to exclude and yet points to a spectrum of
property-ness that captures a fuller picture.
4. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75–76 (1997).
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I. THE STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE
The right to exclude sounds reassuringly concrete, but is it? In his
writings on the right to exclude, Merrill uses a range of metaphysical
and logical terminology of unclear import. In this Part, I first consider
the plausibility of the right to exclude as a leitmotif for property. To
follow through on making the right to exclude the thread that keeps
all of property together, Merrill’s analysis casts the right to exclude
in metaphysical and logical sounding terms, even though the theory
is primarily a functional one. The unclear status of terms like “sine
qua non,” “essence,” and “derive” are, I will argue, a symptom of the
problem—asking the right to exclude to do too much work, including
work that the “thing” of property could do better.
At the outset, let’s start with the phrase “right to exclude.” Exclude from what? Merrill endorses the “consensus” that property is
not about things. In this, he joins many other exclusion theorists in
not foregrounding the thing of property.5 In the Nebraska essay,
5. This was certainly true of the exclusion theorists from the Realist era. See infra notes
49–53, 77–92, and accompanying text. More recently, exclusion theory in North America includes strands emphasizing Kantian mutual freedom and owner control. Arthur Ripstein argues
that exclusion is not just crucial to the working of property but is normatively central—that
exclusion is normatively prior to use. Arthur Ripstein, Possession and Use, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 156 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds. 2013). Things
play a role here but the emphasis is on the “authority structure.” Theorists who emphasize
exclusive control over things tend not to let the thing play a large role in the theory; control
does most of the work. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 31
(1988) (stating that “[t]he concept of property is the concept of a system of rules governing
access to and control of material resources.”); id. at 32 (“The concept of property does not cover
all rules governing the use of material resources, only those concerned with their allocation”);
Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 289–90
(2008) (distinguishing exclusivity of control from the right to exclude). See also Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593 (2008) (arguing that the right to exclude is
not to be identified with the availability of injunctive relief, which points to the primacy of the
right to exclude in property). English exclusion theorists emphasize things in property to a
greater degree. For example, Harris takes the role of a thing more seriously than do most
American theorists. J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30–32, 119–61 (1996). For Harris, the
“essentials of a property institution are the twin notions of trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum.” These trespassory rules make reference to things, id. at 5, or “a resource,” id.
at 25, and “purport to impose obligations on all members of society, other than an individual
or group who is taken to have some open-ended relationship to a thing, not to make use of that
thing without the consent of that individual or group,” id. at 5. James Penner is thought of
as an exclusion theorist, but for him things are central and he emphasizes the importance
to property of his Separation Thesis just as much as the Exclusion Thesis. PENNER, supra
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Merrill notes with apparent approval under a heading titled “Points
of Consensus” that “[f]irst, nearly everyone agrees that the institution of property is not concerned with scarce resources themselves
(‘things’), but rather with the rights of persons with respect to such
resources.”6 In his follow-up article in this Volume, he notes the
necessity of the “triad” of a “an owner, a thing, and the right of the
owner to exclude others from the thing.”7 What is a thing? For the
updated Merrill, “[t]he ‘things’ to which property attaches are scarce
resources that humans find valuable, and they are valuable because
they are things people want.”8 Not much content there. So as before,
resources are the assumed backdrop of property, with the right to
exclude doing the interesting work.
There is a great deal of plausibility in a focus on the right to exclude as the sine qua non of property. But I will argue that this plausibility derives not from the right to exclude itself being the “sine
qua non” or “essence” of property, but rather from the “thing” that
the consensus would have us downplay.
Before turning to the positive role of things, let us diagnose the
problem with the relatively free-floating right to exclude as a sine qua
non. The Nebraska essay adopts a philosophical-sounding terminology.
The article starts with a conceptual analysis, as reflected in the term
“sine qua non” and “necessary and sufficient condition,”9 and that
note 4, at 68–127 (devoting one chapter each to “The Right of Property: the Exclusion Thesis”
and “The Objects of Property: The Separability Thesis”). Recently, Simon Douglas and Ben
McFarlane have shown how in a Hohfeldian framework one can in a sense derive the right
to exclude from the non-owner’s duty to refrain from deliberately or carelessly interfering
with the owner’s physical thing. Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Defining Property Rights,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 219 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith
eds. 2013).
6. Merrill, supra note 1, at 731–32.
7. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude II, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP.
RTS. CONF. J. 1 (2014). Merrill takes a similar “triadic” approach in other recent work. Thomas
W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2061 (2012). After discussing the
wide variation in what counts as a thing in different societies and difficulties with marginal
cases like bank accounts, he goes on to claim that the “crux of the property strategy lies in
the concept of ownership,” which is identified with the “nature” of the prerogatives of the owner;
these prerogatives, he says, are “often . . .described in terms of the right to exclude others.” Id.
at 2066. Merrill then reaffirms that “[a]s I have previously written, the owner’s right to exclude
is a necessary condition of identifying something as being property.” Id. at 2066–67 (citing
Merrill, supra note 1, at 731).
8. Merrill, supra note 7, at 4.
9. Merrill, supra note 1, at 731, 734, 740.
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the right to exclude is the “essence”10 of property and “essential” or
“central” to “our understanding of property.”11 He heads up his discussion with the heading “The Logical Primacy of the Right to Exclude,”12
and the discussion is replete with invocations of logic. More substantively, Merrill claims to be able to “derive”13 other rights and attributes of property from the “core” right to exclude.14
There is a category mistake here. Whatever the right to exclude
might have in the way of importance to property, logic has nothing to
do with it. One could argue, as have Kantians like Arthur Ripstein,
that the right to exclude is central to property because the very nature
of the property relationship is based on an authority relation that
relies on location and exclusion.15 For Ripstein, exclusion has normative value that inheres in the nature of the relationship. This is not
Merrill’s claim, and in his Article for this volume, he endorses the view
that the right to exclude is the means to the end.16 In this Merrill accords with Penner, for whom exclusion is “the formal essence of the
right” and the interest in use serves to justify it.17 Indeed, Merrill
endorses Penner’s “exclusion thesis: the right to property is a right
to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we
have in the use of things.”18 For Merrill, it is not exclusion all the
way down.
If so, we should be skeptical of Merrill’s a priori approach that
derives one aspect of property from another. These derivations do not
work. Take the derivation of the right to use from the right to exclude. Merrill claims that, in general, the right to exclude “entail[s]”
or “leads directly” to the right to use.19 But a true right to use cannot
be derived in this way. With the right to exclude and the background
10. Id. at 736.
11. Id. at 734.
12. Id. at 740.
13. The word “derive” is used in this sense nine times in this Part of Merrill’s essay. Id.
at 740–45.
14. Indeed the term “core,” id. at 749, and its variants—“irreducible core,” id. at 734, “fixed
core,” id. at 737, “essential core,” id. at 735 n.11—pop up all over, leading, as Merrill notes in
his more recent Article to a lot of misunderstanding: “core” here does not mean morally more
important or anything like that. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 1–3.
15. Ripstein, supra note 5, 161–78.
16. Merrill, supra note 7, at 9.
17. PENNER, supra note 4, at 71 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id.
19. Merrill, supra note 1, at 741.

2014]

THE THING ABOUT EXCLUSION

101

liberty in everyone to use, the owner can exercise that (general) liberty without interference from others who would, but for the right
to exclude, act on their similar liberty. These background liberties or
privileges of use need no separate delineation because they are indirectly protected—and bolstered in their exercise—by the right to
exclude. This is a subtle distinction, much emphasized by Hohfeld,20
and in many situations we speak, sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly, of a right to use. And courts will sometimes afford
an injunction or damages against one interfering with an owner’s
use, as in the law of nuisance. Easements, to which I return shortly,
would be a more explicit example of a true right to use. But there
is no “derivation” here. It is true, as I and others have argued, that
the law of nuisance is more based on boundaries and invasions than
in the usual characterization of nuisance law as a formless jumble.21
But note well: any robust right to use here tracks the boundaries and
invasions that are keyed to the land as a thing. Even here, the right
to exclude shines with the borrowed light of the thing.
We can also see that the notion of “derivation” here is slippery,
because it is not the one-way road Merrill portrays it as. The theorists of “exclusive use” make a move that is in some sense the opposite of Merrill’s. That is, an owner’s rights to use a resource require
robust protection that leads to something like a right to exclude, as
implemented in the law of trespass and the like.22 For many uses of
tangible things we need robust protection, which the right to exclude
affords. In particular, if the law protects a wide (and open) set of uses,
the uses in some loose (non-logical) sense “add up to” a right to exclude. What’s really going on here is that the very fact that the right
to exclude does not make direct reference to use or particular uses
20. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
21. Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the Neighbourhood,
5 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14–25 (1993); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1023–24 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Gridlock, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 17–
28 (2011) (reviewing MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATIONS, AND COSTS LIVES (2008)); Adam Mossoff, What Is
Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 394 (2003); see also Richard
A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private
Property, 8 ECON J. WATCH 223, 230–31 (2011).

102

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:095

is what makes it a strong device for protecting those uses. If trespass,
for example, does not require a showing of interference with use, it is
all the more attractive to an owner as a potential plaintiff.
So much for the right to use. How about the right to transfer, either
during life or upon death? Here Merrill admits the need for a “relatively modest clarification about the domain of the right to exclude.”23
Here’s how the derivation is supposed to work. For transfer during
life to be a right, the owner must have the right to include others
and “also to exclude him or herself.”24 So if A exercises the right to
include B, B has a panoply of use rights, and if A excludes himself
(whatever that means), A cannot enter. Transfer complete. Or is it?
Why doesn’t A still have the gatekeeper role? The derivation is missing something: A must also give up the power to alter these relations.
Moreover, as James Penner has shown, the transfer of a right is the
transfer of the very right: When A transfers her property right to B,
B has the very right A had.25 It is true that the set of duty bearers
is different (minus B, plus A), but that happens automatically in the
transfer. Some have argued that for this shift in right holders and
duty bearers to occur, we need an “office” of ownership: A leaves the
office and hands it over to B, but the rights and duties avail between
the officeholder (whoever that is) and the duty bearers.26 I will suggest that the solution to the problem Merrill’s account faces does not
require that much extra machinery. All we need is a relatively depersonalized thing in terms of which rights and duties can be couched.
Then, a transfer of property rights from A to B involves the transfer
of the legal thing and the automatic (because depersonalized) change
in the set of rights and duties surrounding that legal thing.
Similarly for transfers upon death. Merrill says that “the right to exclude entails the right to devise upon death,”27 with the mere specification that the owner’s directions about the disposition of property will
be respected for a certain period after death. This “modest extension”
is couched in terms of letting the owners decide “who shall be included
23. Merrill, supra note 1, at 743; see also Merrill, supra note 7, at 5–6.
24. Merrill, supra note 1, at 743.
25. James Penner, On the Very Idea of Transmissible Rights, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 244 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds. 2013).
26. Christopher Essert, The Office of Ownership, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 418 (2013); Katz, supra
note 5, at 306–07; see also Avahi Dorfman, Private Ownership, 16 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2010).
27. Merrill, supra note 1, at 743–44.
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and excluded upon the death of the owner.”28 But as with other transfers, what we need is not just inclusion and exclusion but a shift in
the powers and other incidents of ownership, which can be framed in
terms of the legal relations surrounding the legal thing. There is no
logical entailment here; it is simply that for legal systems that do respect testators’ wishes, owners can set in motion a transfer (of the
very right to the thing) that occurs at or shortly after death (the executor may have temporary rights).
Even if logic does not get us very far here, Merrill is right that the
various rights and duties (and, I would add powers, liabilities, immunities, and so forth) do hang together. The reason for this is not that
the right to exclude is the basis for derivations or modest clarifications,
but rather the thing of property—the depersonalized subject matter
of the legal relations—provides the glue holding it all together.
II. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AS A NON SINE QUA NON
The right to exclude is often present in property. And because exclusion is a low-cost strategy for protecting property rights, it is almost ubiquitous in some form or other, especially in modern property
systems. It is, as I will argue, especially tied to things and possession.
As resource conflicts become more important we should expect it to
be modified more and more by detailed governance strategies.29 These
can take the form of contracts and servitudes, nuisance law, zoning,
and other land-use regulation. Indeed, because much of the focus is on
particular problems, it is easy to overlook the important role that exclusion and the right to exclude still play in property law and norms.
A sine qua non is something different. Can we find property without exclusion? The balance between exclusion and governance can
be struck differently in different systems. Think of indigenous property systems, in which one person might have the right to pick berries
in a given location and another the right to hunt birds.30 What is the
28. Id. at 743.
29. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).
30. See Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century
New Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 807–08 (1999); see also WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES
IN THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 62 (1983), cited by
Merrill, supra note 1, at 746.
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exclusion and what is the thing here? Yes, the tribe or clan might be
excluding other groups from the area. I think, though, that we are
inclined to say that the individuals with the berry-picking or birdhunting rights have a kind of property. It is basically a usufruct, and
Merrill notes that Ellickson hypothesizes that this is the oldest type
of property right.31 This may be, but in what sense is there a right to
exclude as opposed to a right to use?
The same might be said about easements. They are, if anything is,
robust rights to use. And yet along with the usufruct Merrill claims
that an easement affords its holder a right to exclude simply because the use right can be enforced against the owner of the servient estate.32 The problem with the right to exclude, then, becomes
one of dilution: any right is a right to exclude. For a right to exclude
to have any content beyond that of a generic right, the “exclude” has
to have some bite.
I would argue that usufructs and easements are property, but they
are less property-like because their definition is more focused on
use than on a thing. Nevertheless, the thing is not out of the picture
altogether. With the traditional usufruct, the thing is the group’s
land or the berries and birds, but individuals’ and families’ rights
are not primarily delineated in these terms. Rather, the rights are
indeed couched in terms of uses and use-oriented activities, which
shade off into the law of torts or unfair competition.
The right to exclude as a sine qua non of property runs into further
trouble when it comes to intangibles. Is there a right to exclude from
intangibles? There is no question that intangibles present special challenges for theories of property that emphasize exclusion or things.
Previously, I have argued that it makes sense to talk about exclusion strategies and things in the case of intangibles.33 The violation
31. Merrill, supra note 1, at 746, citing Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE
L.J. 1315, 1364 (1993).
32. Merrill, supra note 1, at 744. He states:
And what is the defining difference between use-rights in the form of licenses and
use-rights that are considered nonpossessory property rights? The difference is
that the holder of a nonpossessory property right can exclude others (including
but not limited to the grantor) from interfering with the exercise of the use-right,
whereas the holder of a license lacks such a right. In other words, the feature that
makes nonpossessory property rights property is the right to exclude others, and
the right to exclude cannot be derived from the right to use.
33. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007).
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of the right is framed in terms of an on/off signal that is not keyed
to harm or uses. On this scale—and it is a scale—patent law is more
property-like than is copyright.34 Patent law defines inventions as
things—although with great effort and less than ideal effectiveness—
and one violates the right if one “without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells” the patented invention.35 “Use” is part of the formulation but in a generic, metaphorically boundary-crossing kind of way.
By contrast, copyright law sets out a laundry list of use rights,36 and
spends very little effort defining the thing (the protected expression),
compared to patent law.
When we come to choses in action, things are even more ethereal.
In German law and among some commentators, such as Douglas and
McFarlane, property is limited to rights in tangible things (excluding even IP),37 but Merrill, rightly in my view, does not limit property
in this way. So how does the right to exclude relate to intangibles?
Penner analyzes them in terms of both his exclusion and separation
theses.38 It is important to note that separation plays an especially
big role here because the things involved are quite artificial. Justice
Holmes, sometime hero to the Realists and no friend of legal fictions
for their own sake, gives a succinct account of how contracts are
treated as things when it comes to assignability:
There is a logical difficulty in putting another man into the relation of the covenantee to the covenantor, because the facts that
give rise to the obligation are true only of the covenantee—a difficulty that has been met by the fiction of identity of person and
in other ways not material here. Of course, a covenantor is not to
be held beyond his undertaking, and he may make that as narrow as he likes. Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining
34. Id. at 1799–1819.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). Importation into the United States is also covered. Id.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
37. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] Aug. 18, 1896, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL.] I 1600, § 90 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb
/englisch_bgb.html#BGBengl_000P90 (“Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law.”);
BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 100, 106–07 (1962) (stating that Roman
jurists regarded property as a relation of a person to a thing and that they regarded only corporeal objects as the objects of property rights); BEN MCFARLANE, THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY
LAW 4 (2008); Douglas & McFarlane, supra note 5. Bentham and Austin were skeptical about
talk of property in intangibles as “‘fictitious’, ‘figurative’, ‘improper’, and ‘loose and indefinite.’”
WALDRON, supra note 5, at 35 (quoting Bentham and citing Austin).
38. PENNER, supra note 4, at 115–22.
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Co., 127 U.S. 379. But when he has incurred a debt, which is
property in the hands of the creditor, it is a different thing to
say that, as between the creditor and a third person, the debtor
can restrain his alienation of that, although he could not forbid
the sale or pledge of other chattels. When a man sells a horse,
what he does, from the point of view of the law, is to transfer a
right, and a right being regarded by the law as a thing, even
though a res incorporalis, it is not illogical to apply the same
rule to a debt that would be applied to a horse. It is not illogical
to say that the debt is as liable to sale as it is to the acquisition
of a lien. To be sure, the lien is allowed by a statute subject to
which the contract was made, but the contract was made subject
also to the common law, and if the common law applies the principle recognized by the statute of California that a debt is to be
regarded as a thing, and therefore subjects it to the ordinary rules
in determining the relative rights of an assignee and the claimant
of a lien, it does nothing of which the debtor can complain. See
further, Cal. Civ. Code, §§ 954, 711. The debtor does not complain,
but stands indifferent, willing that the common law should take
its course.39

This is all the more remarkable because in contract in general,
Holmes does not take a proprietarian view but stresses the remedy
of damages.40 In Portuguese-American Bank, not only does Holmes see
that conceiving of a contract right as a thing promotes alienability, he
hints at why this is.41 Precisely because the debt is treated as a thing,
general rules apply to it regardless of the personal identity of the
debt holder, and therefore the debtor can regard much of it as a modular black box, “stand[ing] indifferent” to the identity of the debt
holder. In general, as Merrill and I have argued, when contracts are
treated as property, they tend to be more standardized; and when they
become partway in rem on account of a large number of duty bearers
(mass contracts), the law tends toward partway standardization.42
And to the extent that there is property-style protection of contract
interests, they tend to be standardized.43 None of this is to say that
39. Portuguese-Am. Bank of S.F. v. Welles, 242 U.S. 7, 11–12 (1916) (emphasis added).
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
41. 242 U.S. at 11–12.
42. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773 (2001).
43. P.G. Turner, Proprietary Modes of Protecting the Performance Interest in Contract,
LLOYD’S COM. & MAR. L.Q. 306 (2008); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
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depersonalization is always a good idea or that it always works, but
Holmes here captures how it is supposed to work in the first place.
One could say that intangible property, along with nonpossessory
rights like easements, do have the sine qua non of the right to exclude
because the owner can sue someone else. But then the right to exclude again collapses into any old right. It is not at all clear that the
right to exclude gets us very far with property in intangibles.
The lesson from property in intangibles, and for that matter in fugitive resources like water, is that property and ownership lie along a
spectrum.44 Resource conflicts can be dealt with using a wide variety
of institutions. To the extent those institutions rely on the definition
of relatively impersonal things to mediate rights and duties, the more
we have property. The right to exclude often pops up here, but not
in the sense of a sine qua non.
The danger is that the right to exclude, as it covers more territory,
will become thin to the vanishing point. It is but a short step from
there to the bundle of rights, which is Merrill’s main foil and which
he often calls “nominalism.”45 Nevertheless, and as Merrill recognizes,
the right to exclude is often coupled with the bundle or nominalist
view.46 The Supreme Court, in its frequently (self-)cited formulation
from Kaiser Aetna v. United States, avers that the “right to exclude
others” is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property.”47 Critics of theories,
like Merrill’s, that give a central place to the right to exclude, argue
that doing so treats the right to exclude as just another stick.48 The
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1,
55 (2000).
44. P.G. Turner, Degrees of Property (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper
No. 01/2011, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735953; see also HARRIS, supra
note 5, at 5–6 (introducing the “ownership spectrum”).
45. Merrill, supra note 1, at 737–39.
46. Id. at 736–37 (describing “multiple-variable essentialism”); see also id. at 735 (discussing
Felix Cohen’s views).
47. 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
48. Claeys, supra note 22, at 24–25 (critiquing Merrill’s theory); Mossoff, supra note 22,
at 390 (“Linguistically, exclusion plays a role largely as an adjective of the rights of acquisition,
use and disposal, and substantively, exclusion is, for the most part, only a corollary of the
more fundamental premises that focus on the possessory rights.”). Claeys sees notes that he
“disagree[s] with Merrill and Smith that thing-ownership may be reduced to an owner’s right
to exclude others from his thing.” Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?,
32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617, 631 (2009) (reviewing THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH,
PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2007)). I would argue that Claeys is reading too much
from the Nebraska essay into our casebook.
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Realists were fond of the bundle, because it led to the dethroning of
property and removed a perceived obstacle to social engineering,49 but
as Adam Mossoff has argued, many of the Realists were quite fond
of the right to exclude as a sine qua non of property.50 Thus, Felix
Cohen, whom Merrill invokes, emphasizes the right to exclude, but
was in general no friend of traditional notions of property or received
concepts in general.51 Thing ownership in particular was a prime
example of “transcendental nonsense” for Cohen.52 The danger (or
welcome feature, depending on your point of view) is that the right
to exclude leads to the bundle picture and all of its inadequacies.
In contrast to the bundle picture, Merrill rightly seeks an account
of the holism of property. What the owner owns is more than a bundle of sticks. As William Markby said, ownership “is no more conceived
as an aggregate of distinct rights than a bucket of water is conceived
as an aggregate of separate drops.”53 Exclusion is an important crosscutting theme in property, but it is not the glue that holds it together.
That is why Felix Cohen and the Realists could adopt the right to
exclude as a sine qua non of property without missing a beat. The
glue we need, and the aspect of property the Realists really did deny,
is the important role of the thing in property.
III. EXCLUSIVENESS AND POSSESSION
Before turning to the role that things play in property, consider
one last aspect of property that is closely related both to exclusion
and to things—the law and norms of possession. The right to exclude is closely associated with possession, as Merrill’s new article
explores at length. Consistently with some of our joint work, he notes
that possession is a low information cost method of establishing property claims.54 This is true, although I will argue that like the right
49. See, e.g., Tom Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69,
80 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1980); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 357–58, 365 (2001).
50. Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2009–20 (2009).
51. Merrill, supra note 1, at 735 (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property,
9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954)).
52. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled by the ‘thingification’ of property.”).
53. WILLIAM MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 158 (6th ed. 1905).
54. Merrill, supra note 7, at 17–18.
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to exclude itself, much of the importance of possession to property
is attributable to its role in defining the basic things of property.
Possession and accession—another interest of Merrill’s55—help get
the basic ontology of property law started.56 Property may well have
its origins, as Hume and Sugden would have it, in an emergent convention based on salience.57 The basic ontology requires the definition of persons, things, and relations between persons and things.
De facto possession is very intuitive, and possessory custom is quite
close to everyday notions of possession. Custom tends to be simplified and formalized as it applies beyond its community of origin.58
Thus, customs that need to apply to large and impersonal audiences
of duty bearers (they are functionally in rem) cannot presuppose a
lot of community-specific information. Title and ownership rules are
layered on top of this stratum of possession. Custom, and especially
this more generally applicable law of possession and ownership, is
feasible because it relies on the thing. Possessors and duty bearers
relate to each other through the thing. Exclusion strategies are closest to this: keep out of and keep off the thing, unless you have my
permission. When title rules are layered on top of possession, they
further work out what the thing is. Rules like good faith purchase
get us further from possession. And a set of surveys and title records
define the legal thing that parallels a physical plot of land in a more
articulated fashion than do laws or norms of possession.
Instead of taking possession as a given, what we need is a bottomup theory of possession in order to understand the role it plays in the
architecture of property. Elsewhere I argue that a combination of the
convention-based theories of David Hume, Robert Sugden, and David
Friedman coupled with Barzel’s theory of property rights helps explain the most basic level of property.59 Conventions are regularities
55. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459 (2009).
56. The account of possession in this Part builds on Henry E. Smith, The Elements of
Possession, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., forthcoming,
Cambridge University Press). I am using “ontology” here as it is employed in information
theory and computer science—to refer to the basic set-up of categories—without making
metaphysical claims.
57. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484–516 (L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed. 1896)
(1739–40); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION, AND WELFARE
153–59 (1986).
58. Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
5 (2009).
59. Smith, supra note 56; see also YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY
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in behavior that people adopt in preference to alternatives as long
as others do the same.60 The idea is that people will come to recognize that mutually respecting each other’s possession will lead to
peace. Such a convention can emerge out of pairwise interactions,
based on what strikes actors as salient—such as proximity and potential control. As Friedman emphasizes, the norms of possession do
not emerge because people conclude they are efficient overall, but
rather they reflect an individually advantageous strategy in smallscale interactions.61 Whether the morality and efficiency scale up to
the level of society as a whole is an open question, or rather the extent of yes relative to no is disputable. But one can see here how possession gets property going without ambitious assumptions or deep
claims of justification.
To get anywhere with possession, we—and the members of society—
have to know what goes with what. This is the same question as in
accession, and it is no accident that Hume pays great attention to
accession.62 Hume, Sugden, and Friedman emphasize the psychological aspect—that relations like closeness and attachment strike people
as prominent and form noticeable patterns. More recently Sugden
and co-authors have explored how salience can emerge from inductive reasoning (another concern of Hume’s).63 Part of this learning
process can involve usefulness. This is where Barzel’s theory of property rights is helpful. According to Barzel, we should expect an actor
to have property over collections of attributes over which that actor
has a special ability to affect its mean return.64 Barzel disclaims any
attempt to explain the origins of property, but his theory does dovetail
with the convention-based accounts of Hume, Sugden, and Friedman:
actors will perceive groups of attributes as things and assign them to
possessors based in part on who can most effectively use them as such
a unit. Salience and conventions may or may not be associated with
“system 1” or instincts, as Merrill would have it,65 but they are indeed
RIGHTS (2d ed. 1997); David D. Friedman, A Positive Account of Property Rights, 11 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (Summer 1994); HUME, supra note 57; SUGDEN, supra note 57.
60. DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
61. Friedman, supra note 59, at 3–4, 12, 14.
62. HUME, supra note 57, at 509.
63. Federica Alberti, Robert Sugden, & Kei Tsutsui, Salience as an Emergent Property,
82 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 379 (2012).
64. BARZEL, supra note 59.
65. Merrill, supra note 7, at 17; Thomas W. Merrill, Possession and Ownership, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., forthcoming, Cambridge University
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easy to use and allow for quick on-the-spot judgments. Nevertheless, automatic judgments can incorporate acquired information and
skills.66 Thus, whether features of a resource are grouped into a thing
is based on some combination of proximity, potential controllability,
and usefulness. Thus accession also has a customary base upon which
the law builds. Possession and accession go hand in hand and are
closely involved in the delineation of the legal things of property.67
A prime example of all these processes at work is the pedis possessio
doctrine from mining law.68 Originally it was a possessory custom
among miners, which afforded a miner working a “spot” some protection against interference by other miners, as long as he worked that
spot. When this custom was taken over into the law of mining, the spot
was replaced by the claim, a legal thing that has clearer boundaries,
especially for third parties. Whereas a “spot” was probably abundantly clear to miners in a given camp, the same cannot be said for
outsiders, including purchasers and officials. Here, contra Merrill,
prelegal possession needs to be stripped down in order to keep information costs manageable for larger groups of (in rem) duty bearers.
The claim is a legal thing that serves this purpose better than the
spot. More recently, the uranium mining industry, for which the
standard size claim is too small for exploratory purposes, wanted to
spread the work requirement (on pain of loss) over several claims,
but courts have largely rebuffed them.69 The legal thing associated
with a mining claim (complete with designated boundaries) has a
strong attraction in this context, for information cost reasons.
Merrill asserts that title rules cannot get too far from possession
without raising information costs to intolerable levels.70 There is
some truth to this, but distance is not the main issue. As we just saw,
possessory norms may need formalizing in order to apply in rem,
Press); James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, The Possession Heuristic, in THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., forthcoming, Cambridge University Press);
see also Smith, supra note 56.
66. Id.
67. Merrill builds on Hume and Sugden but treats accession as an acquisition principle.
Merrill, supra note 55. For a treatment of accession more consistent with the argument in
the text, see Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
61, 86–93 (2009).
68. Union Oil v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337 (1919); Smith, supra note 58, at 200–02.
69. Geomet Exploration, Ltd. v. Lucky Mc Uranium Corp., 601 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. 1979);
Smith, supra note 58, at 201–02.
70. Merrill, supra note 7, at 19–21.
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and thing definition is often part of that process. Whether title rules
cannot get “too far” from possession is an empirical question, turning in part on the ease of defining legal things. As Merrill notes, technology has some role to play here. The increasing prevalence of smart
phones may make more detailed information about title more readily
available. For example, Richard Hynes proposes that posting laws
should be modified so that the owner’s wishes are recorded and available over the Internet.71 Hunters planning a trip or even those on the
spot could tell instantly where they are and are not allowed to go.
The legal things defined in the land records can be used for more purposes now and in the future.
Let me end this discussion of possession on a comparative note.
In the civil law, property is the law of things. Consistent with that
notion, property in civil law is defined much more directly in terms
of ownership (dominion) over a thing, and derogations from this unitary ownership are grudgingly permitted. By contrast, the common
law system of estates grew out of possession and can be thought of
as “possession plus,” which brings us toward ownership. As Yun-chien
Chang and I have argued, ownership in the two types of system is
structurally and functionally quite similar in terms of the rights and
duties, liberties, and powers, etc. they afford, but the “style” of getting there differs.72 The common law style emphasizes the connection
to possession much more than does the civil law. To be sure, possession plays an important role in civil law in terms of the architecture
of the system,73 and commentators on the civil law have noticed how
possession as a social fact forms the foundation of property, upon
which the law is layered.74 But when it comes to defining the things
of property, this can be done very explicitly as in the civil law, or more
implicitly, with a lot of talk about possession at the same time. This
should not be surprising because possession and accession are often
ways of getting at thing definition, even if it is only implicit. Again,
possession, accession, and the right to exclude are closely tied to
prelegal and legal things, the objects of the rights.
71. Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949 (2013).
72. Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common
Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2012).
73. Yun-chien Chang, The Economy of Concept and Possession, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF POSSESSION (Yun-chien Chang ed., forthcoming, Cambridge University Press).
74. See HEINRICH DERNBURG & JOHANNES BIERMAN, 1 PANDEKTEN, pt. 2, at 1–7 (6th ed.
1900); Philipp Heck, Grundriß des Sachenrechts §§ 1, 3 (1930).

2014]

THE THING ABOUT EXCLUSION

113

IV. THE MISSING THING
The problem with focusing on the right to exclude as the sine qua
non of property is that it does not sufficiently challenge the postRealist de-emphasis of property as a law of things. Recall that Merrill
cites with approval the “consensus” that the institution of property
is not concerned with “things” themselves.75 I say: not so fast. It is
true that property is not just about things and that it does concern
rights of one party against many other duty bearers (other persons),
with respect to things. But these truisms don’t exhaust the role that
things play in property. As I have argued before and will elaborate
further in this Part in connection with the right to exclude, the thing
plays a crucial role in property in mediating the rights (and other legal
relations) availing between owners, possessors, and others with property interests on the one hand and duty bearers (and so on) at large
on the other.76 The legal thing defined over the actual thing serves an
important function in the delineation of legal relations. In particular,
the legal thing allows property rights to be simple enough and impersonal enough to reach an in rem set of duty bearers and to be more
easily transferable from one party to another.
So it is not out of naiveté or lack of sophistication that courts and
commentators in Commonwealth and civil law jurisdictions (and,
it would seem, other legal systems untouched by American Legal
Realism) characterize property as the law of things.77 Property as
being thing-based has been more or less true through large swaths of
history throughout the world. Indeed in modern times, the American
legal academy and its followers (to the extent it has followers) are the
only ones denying the importance of things to property. People in
everyday life, for whom Merrill has an appropriately high regard,78
75. Merrill, supra note 1, at 731–32.
76. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 2.
77. See, e.g., NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 493 (4th
ed. 2010) (explaining Sachenrecht in accordance with its name as the law of things); 1 ISAAC
HERZOG, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS OF JEWISH LAW (THE LAW OF PROPERTY) 69–136 (2d ed.
1965) (analyzing the notion of a thing implicit in Jewish law and noting differences from civil
and common law, including with respect to air space and to leaseholds); 2 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS,
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PROPERTY §§ 12, 15 (4th ed. 2011) (stating the role of the thing
in the civil law of property in Louisiana); Chang & Smith, supra note 72, at 40–44 (discussing
how property in civil law systems depends on the notion of a “thing”).
78. See Merrill, supra note 7; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality
of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849 (2007).
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see property as crucially involving things. I will show how lay intuition is even more important than Merrill acknowledges, and that
we need not over-privilege “scientific policymaking.”79
The downplaying of things is closely associated with Legal Realism,
which Merrill is right to be dissatisfied with. The bundle of rights
picture of property is one of Realism’s most enduring legacies. But
it is no accident that the Realists downplayed things and embraced
the bundle picture: the two fit neatly together. The Realists were intent on disparaging the role of things in property, not the right to exclude per se. (Indeed, as Merrill notes, arch-realist Felix Cohen was a
fan of the right to exclude, and he was not alone.80 ) The most famous
modern formulation of the post-Realist position is Tom Grey’s:
In the English-speaking countries today, the conception of property held by the specialist (the lawyer or economist) is quite
different from that held by the ordinary person. Most people,
including most specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. To own
property is to have exclusive control of something—to be able to
use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy
it. Legal restraints on the free use of one’s property are conceived
as departures from an ideal conception of full ownership.
By contrast, the theory of property rights held by the modern
specialist tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to
eliminate any necessary connection between property rights and
things. Consider ownership first. The specialist fragments the
robust unitary conception of ownership into a more shadowy
“bundle of rights.”81

Grey takes square aim at the idea of property as being a right to
a thing:
What, then, of the idea that property rights must be rights in
things? Perhaps we no longer need a notion of ownership, but
surely property rights are a distinct category from other legal
79. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26–31, 97–103 (1977)
(contrasting the “scientific” perspective that views property as a bundle of rights with the
“layman’s” perspective that persists in thinking of property as rights to things).
80. Cohen, supra note 51, at 374; Merrill, supra note 1, at 735; see also Mossoff, supra
note 50.
81. Grey, supra note 49, at 69.
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rights, in that they pertain to things. But this suggestion cannot
withstand analysis either; most property in the modern capitalist
economy is intangible.82

Giving up on the centrality of things is what has wider significance:
The substitution of the bundle-of-rights for a thing-ownership
conception of property has the ultimate consequence that property
ceases to be an important category in legal and political theory.
This in turn has political implications . . . . The legal realists who
developed the bundle-of-rights notion were on the whole supportive of the regulatory and welfare state, and in the writings
that develop the bundle-of-rights conception, a purpose to remove
the sanctity that had traditionally attached to the rights of property can often be discerned.83

He goes on to state his conviction that this process is not really ideological in any mystifying sense but is simply the inevitable development of capitalism. There is no talk here of the right to exclude.
In taking aim at things, rather than the right to exclude, Grey is
following in the footsteps of the Realists themselves. Felix Cohen
saw the right to exclude as the sine qua non of property, but he
decried “the ‘thingification’ of property,” which made possible a pretense that “courts are not creating property, but are merely recognizing a pre-existent Something.”84 Indeed, property as a right to
thing was Exhibit A for Cohen of what he derided as “transcendental
nonsense.”85 Nor was Cohen alone among the Realists in downplaying
the thing in property. Arthur Corbin famously stated that “[o]ur concept of property has shifted . . . . ‘[P]roperty’ has ceased to describe
any res, or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle
of legal relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities.”86 Morris
Cohen sounded a similar theme when he stated that “a property right
is a relation not between an owner and a thing, but between the
owner and other individuals in reference to things. A right is always
82. Id. at 70.
83. Id. at 80.
84. Cohen, supra note 52, at 815.
85. Id. at 809. See Mossoff, supra note 50, at 2013–18; see also Smith, supra note 2.
86. Arthur L. Corbin, Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J.
429, 429 (1922).
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against one or more individuals.”87 For this very reason, he disclaims
the traditional view of property as a right to a thing in favor of the (in
his view) correct analysis in which the right to exclude is primary:
The classical view of property as a right over things resolves it
into component rights such as the jus utendi, jus disponendi, etc.
But the essence of private property is always the right to exclude
others. The law does not guarantee me the physical or social
ability of actually using what it calls mine. By public regulations
it may indirectly aid me by removing certain general hindrances
to the enjoyment of property. But the law of property helps me
directly only to exclude others from using the things which it
assigns to me.88

The contrast between the bundle of rights and the right to a thing
goes all the way back to the first instance of the bundle picture in
John Lewis’s treatise on eminent domain:
We must . . . look beyond the thing itself, beyond the mere
corporeal object, for the true idea of property. Property may be
defined as certain rights in things which pertain to persons and
which are created and sanctioned by law. These rights are the
right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of disposition.89

Lewis then goes on to specify how these rights are limited and how
they are supplemented in the case of real property by rights of lateral support, riparian rights and the like.90 When it comes to the
Constitution, Lewis acknowledges the unreflective identification of
property with things but asserts that “[t]he dullest individual among
the people knows and understands that his property in anything is
a bundle of rights.”91 Like Merrill and the Realists, Lewis sets up two
choices: identifying property with things or accepting that property
is a bundle of rights, which in Lewis’s hands leads to an expansive
87. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12–13 (1927).
88. Id. at 12. See also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY (2000).
89. JOHN LEWIS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 54,
at 41 (1888).
90. Id. at 41–43.
91. Id. § 55, at 43.
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version of takings law.92 Lewis and the others are right that property
consists of rights in things—even a bundle, if you will—but what
these discussions leave out is the key role of the thing itself in delineating the right and its consequent role in mediating between the
owner and duty bearers.
In keeping with the consensus, Merrill in his first essay studiously avoided the word “thing,” preferring (starting with the passage
quoted earlier) the more neutral and economic-sounding “resource.”
Later, Merrill starts bringing the thing back into the picture when
he says that property requires a triad of a person a thing and a right
of the person to exclude from the thing. Still, the right to exclude
takes center stage, and “[t]he ‘things’ to which property attaches are
scarce resources that humans find valuable, and they are valuable
because they are things people want.”93 But again, the thing does no
work other than to be scarce. Most importantly, the definition of the
thing plays no crucial role in Merrill’s account—only the right to exclude does. Again, this is not wrong, but incomplete.
What’s missing is the thing. Frederick Pollock defines a legal “thing”
as “some possible matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole
and apart from all others, just as, in the world of common experience,
whatever can be separately perceived is a thing.” This foreshadows
Penner’s separation thesis. He then notes how central to holism in
property a thing is:
[O]n the whole perhaps we have good ground for saying that the
“thing” of legal contemplation, even when we have to do with a
material object, is not precisely the object as we find it in common
experience, but rather the entirety of its possible legal relations
to persons. We say entirety, not sum, because the capacity of
being conceived as a distinct whole is a necessary attribute of an
individual thing. What the relations of a person to a thing can
be must depend in fact on the nature of the thing as continuous
or discontinuous, corporeal or incorporeal, and in law on the
92. Id. § 56, at 45 (“If property, then, consists, not in tangible things themselves, but in
certain rights in and appurtenant to those things, it follows that, when a person is deprived of
any of those rights, he is to that extent deprived of his property, and hence, that his property
may be taken in the constitutional sense, though his title and possession remain undisturbed.”).
Reminiscent of this approach is Epstein’s pro-bundle argument. See Epstein, supra note 22.
The Realists employed the bundle to minimize takings. Mossoff, supra note 50.
93. Merrill, supra note 7, at 4.
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character and the extent of the powers of use and disposal which
particular systems of law may recognize.94

Although property is not a thing, the nature of the thing in the world
helps determine what kind of legal thing it can correspond to.
In recent times, Penner has taken up the strands of theorizing
about intangible property by Pollock and others at the end of the nineteenth century and has explored how central the objects of property—
things—are to the concept of property. Thus, while Merrill focuses
on Penner’s exclusion thesis, equally important for Penner is his
separability thesis, which is a theory of the “thinghood” of objects
of property:
Only those “things” in the world which are contingently associated
with any particular owner may be objects of property; as a function of the nature of this contingency, in theory nothing of normative consequence beyond the fact that the ownership has changed
occurs when an object of property is alienated to another.95

Separability is a necessary condition for legal thinghood in property.96 Depersonalization is important for transfer. Separation and
exclusion also go hand in hand: a non-personal thing can be the basis
for sending a relatively simple signal of keep off or don’t touch.
Thing definition is particularly tied to exclusion through boundaries.
The thing ties together the separability and exclusion theses. By
being a separate thing in the eyes of the law, it can be subject to the
rights employing exclusion (and governance) strategies. Conversely,
as the first cut at defining property, an exclusion strategy sometimes
helps define the thing. Where the thing requires some delineation,
the process of thingification is partly one of drawing boundaries. In the
case of land, a parcel is not a separate thing until we draw a boundary, which is used to define trespassory rules.
94. Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 L.Q. REV. 318 (1894). See also FREDERICK
POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 121 (1896) (“A thing is, in law, some possible
matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole and apart from all others, just as, in the world
of common experience, whatever can be separately perceived is a thing.”); id. at 105 (“possible
objects of common or conflicting interest”).
95. PENNER, supra note 4, at 111.
96. Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 381, 417–19 (2005); Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property
Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1080–92 (1997).
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Modular thinghood plays an important role in capturing many of
the characteristic features of property, which I have elsewhere classified as basic, secondary, and higher-order.97 None of these features
can be derived logically from thinghood (or the right to exclude), but
thinghood is a central part—a linchpin—of a theory that captures
them. We have already seen how the basic features of property—in
rem status, the right to exclude, and the residual claim—are associated with thinghood. By separating out and depersonalizing a chunk
of the world, thinghood makes much easier the sending of an in rem
message and the assertion of a right to exclude to that audience.
Merrill is right that the residual claim is related to the right to exclude, but this happens through thing-definition: the outer boundary
of the thing serves as the starting point from which specific rights
and claims are subtracted. What’s left over depends crucially on the
definition of the extent of the thing.
As for secondary features—alienability, persistence, and compatibility—we have already seen how the depersonalization made possible by thingification promotes alienability. The same goes for the
features of persistence and compatibility. Relatively simple interfaces between things and the rest of the world make it easy to trace
rights to things though remote hands (persistence). And things with
stripped down interfaces are more compatible. Just as in the rectangular survey, rectangular plots have the same features as they are
divided and combined, so too when interests in property, from the
estates to covenants, are defined in terms of modular things, they are
more compatible as they interact and combine.
Finally high-level features of property—recursiveness, scalability,
and resilience—receive an explanation based on the role of things
in property. First, the things of property are recursive (nesting).
The rules for forming things out of things can be applied over and
over. For example, the process of breaking a life estate into another
life estate and a reversion or remainder can iterate, as can the process for forming subsidiaries of nested business entities. This recursivity makes a system with a small set of basic thing types (numerus
clausus) a highly generative one: complexity can be managed through
the use of these modular things.98 Second, the things of property are
97. Smith, supra note 2, at 1709–13.
98. Merrill & Smith, supra note 43, at 36 (recursiveness of estates); Smith, supra note
2, at 1713 (recursiveness and modularity).
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scalable: larger parcels and aggregates of rights inherit many of
the features, including the right to exclude, from their smaller constituents. Likewise, when property rights are divided, many of the
features persist. Not only are smaller parcels like mini versions of
the larger ones they are carved out of, from a legal point of view, but
the possessory actions protecting a lesser possessory interest will be
very similar to those protecting a full fee simple, and so on. Finally,
modular things lend property a resilience it would not otherwise
possess. Recall that the basic problem in private law is the complexity of the horizontal interactions among private actors. By organizing these interactions in a first cut through modular things, many of
the interactions between pairs and small groups of these actors can
be cabined and made irrelevant to others. Not every problem should
be treated as affecting everyone. The distinction between in rem and
in personam sorts problems into those that require a widespread but
cruder treatment and the ones that need more intensive but less
widespread attention.
Even within property, the definition of things is just the beginning.
All sorts of contractual and off-the-rack governance regimes, from
covenants to nuisance to zoning, extend and modify the basic set-up
of modular legal things. The same can be said for equity, in its supply
of the device of the trust and its set of safety valves keyed to bad faith
and disproportionate hardship. Nevertheless, all this superstructure
rests on thing definition: nuisance tracks invasions of boundaries
to a remarkable degree, and even the mildest remedy for building
encroachments kicks in when the boundary is violated. For problems
that do not sort themselves in this way we have reason to question
whether the employment of things really helps us deal with them.
And indeed for the conflict between general activities we have the
law of tort, which manages information in its own way.99
Because the distinctness of a thing and the thing’s importance in
defining rights are both a matter of degree, property falls on a spectrum. As we get further from the thing of property and deeper into
the overlapping realms of contract and tort, we can say that the regime is less property-like. This is not a criticism or a celebration but
a description. I suspect that we do have intuitions about which aspects of law and social norms governing private interactions, with
99. Henry E. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, J. TORT L., no. 2, art. 5,
Oct. 2011.
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respect to things, are more property-like and which are less. Thus,
borderline cases like choses in action and equitable rights are borderline because they deal with legal objects that are thing-like but less
thing-like—less separable and depersonalized—than legal things
that correspond more straightforwardly to tangible objects. The thing
of property is not a sine qua non but the strength of its presence is
an indicator of whether we are deep in Propertyland, in its borderlands, or somewhere else altogether.100
Looking beyond private law, the interface between property and
public law can be understood better when things are brought back
into the picture. This is reflected in Merrill’s pathbreaking work on
Constitutional property.101 Merrill argues that property under the
Takings Clause, which is keyed to the common law, requires a right
to exclude from a “discrete asset,”102 whereas property for substantive
due process requires only a right to wealth. (Procedural due process
is the broadest, and embraces any entitlement, with no requirement
of a right to exclude, a discrete asset, or wealth.) As Merrill’s review
of the case law reveals, the “discrete asset” test helps limit the reach
of the Takings Clause and allows for greater scope for due process.103
Definitionally, he states, that
[b]y discrete asset, I mean a valued resource that (1) is held by the
claimant in a legally recognized property form (for example, a fee
simple, a lease, an easement, and so forth), and (2) is created, exchanged or enforced by economic actors with enough frequency
to be recognized as a distinct asset in the relevant community.104

Thus, the notion of “discrete asset” in turn rests on concepts like
“resource,” “property form,” and “asset.” Merrill notes the perils of
defining property for substantive due process as a right to exclude
without a discrete asset, which the Supreme Court has come close
to doing.105
100. I borrow the term “Propertyland” from Carol Rose. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric
and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82 GEO. L.J. 2409, 2411 (1994), and
note that the theory offered here can help locate the fuzzy border of Propertyland itself.
101. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000).
102. Id. at 964.
103. This is Merrill’s reading of the Breyer/Kennedy position in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
104. Merrill, supra note 101, at 974.
105. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999);
Merrill, supra note 101, at 983–87.
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Let me suggest that “discrete asset” is getting closer to the notion
“thinghood,” and that a theory of legal thinghood would flesh out what
a discrete asset is. Although it goes beyond the scope of the present
Article, let me propose that a return to the importance of the thing in
property would help define “discrete asset” for Merrill’s purposes.
Indeed, Leif Wenar has argued that the failures of the bundle theory
in takings law should cause us to return to the importance of property as a law of things for takings.106
Thus, organizing relations through things, as property does, is far
from the only solution to private law problems, and does not exhaust
the interface between private and public law. Focusing on thinghood
does help us see what property is good at and where it runs out. None
of the features captured on such a theory is derived logically from
thinghood (or the right to exclude). Instead, a good theory of things
serves as the core of a theory of property that explains these important features of property.
CONCLUSION
The right to exclude is an important feature of property, albeit
not a sine qua non. Merrill has provided a real service and an important contribution with his promotion of the importance of the
right to exclude.107 Merrill is right to look for some connecting tissue
or glue holding property together—indeed this is a quest I share and
one that prompted us to write our casebook.108 I would argue that
one can understand the right to exclude better by asking: exclude
from what? The answer to this question points to an aspect of property that explains how the right to exclude—and many other features
of property—are important and when they’re not. Once the thing is
in the picture, it is probably true that exclusion from a thing makes
a package of entitlements more property-like, for many of reasons
that dovetail with Merrill’s account. And it is also true that property
106. Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1923
(1997); see also James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CAL. L. REV. 277, 297–98 (2013).
107. And not, as he notes with characteristic wryness, as a foil for others who have not read
the article. See Merrill, supra note 7.
108. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d
ed. 2012); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
(2007); see also THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: PROPERTY (2010).
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is not to be identified with a thing. Nevertheless, the definition of
a thing and its role in mediating private interactions lie at the heart
of property. The thing of property is a linchpin in the overall architecture, and as we get away from tangible things, we get further from
property and into adjacent areas—contract, tort, unjust enrichment—
not that that’s a bad thing. Private law is a whole, and property is a
crucial but incomplete part of that system. Property also furnishes
a prominent interface between private and public law, notably in the
law of takings. And at the heart of that part of private law we call
property is the thing.

GOVERNMENTAL FORBEARANCE: MYTH OR REALITY?

JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
In their thoughtful book, Property, Thomas W. Merrill and Henry
W. Smith posit that various factors induce governments to forbear
from unduly undermining the expectations of property owners and,
as a result, operate to safeguard the security of property rights.1 This
Essay seeks to explore this hypothesis, and questions whether one
can realistically expect governmental forbearance to provide meaningful support for the rights of individual property owners.
Can modern government be induced to forbear from making policy changes that unreasonably and unpredictably impair the value
of property? Or to quote the Georgia Supreme Court in 1851, is the
security of private property “confined to the uncertain virtue of those
who govern?”2 I submit that the answer is far from obvious. There
are, of course, a number of constitutional restraints on government,
such as the Contract Clause,3 the Takings Clause, and the due process requirement.4 These are important provisions, but they have
received such checkered enforcement in modern law that they can
hardly be expected to compel governmental respect for the rights of
property owners.5
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. I want to thank Jon W. Bruce, Gideon Kanner, and Ilya Somin for
helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.
1. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:
PROPERTY (2010).
2. Parham v. Justices of Inferior Court of Decatur Cnty., 9 Ga. 341, 348 (1851).
3. Section 10 of article I of the U.S. Constitution provides in part: “No State shall . . .
pass any . . . Law impairing the obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
4. In fact, it is debatable whether property owners always receive even rudimentary
procedural due process when their property is acquired through eminent domain. A number
of states permit quick-take condemnations that allow the immediate acquisition of title and
possession by the condemning agency before a hearing. Not only are procedural safeguards
bypassed, but quick-take condemnation hampers an owner’s ability to challenge a taking.
Such expedited takings are particularly prone to abuse. See 6A-28 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN, § 28.02 (3d ed. 2013).
5. James W. Ely, Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing
Rights of Property Owners, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39, 69 (2005) (“The blunt fact is
that an abiding dislike of property rights, derived from New Deal constitutionalism, continues
to hold intellectual sway.”). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 8 (2008) (“The Supreme Court is guilty
of massive neglect in its interpretation of the takings clause.”).
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Merrill and Smith view Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s famous
opinion in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837),6 which denied a Contract Clause challenge to the state-authorized construction of a free bridge to compete with an existing toll bridge under a
prior charter, as striking a good balance between the need for change
in the face of technological innovation and the importance of stability
to encourage investments. The original toll bridge company claimed
that its corporate charter impliedly conferred monopoly status that
the state could not abridge. Taney declared that a corporate charter
should be strictly construed to encompass only express guarantees,
not implied privileges. Building on Taney’s analysis, Merrill and
Smith contend that government could never be expected to refrain
from any interference with the expectations of owners in order to
accommodate a perceived need for useful economic and social change.
In a revealing comment, the authors observe that implicit in Taney’s
view “is the assumption that the government can generally be
trusted to do the right thing.”7 This theme of confidence in the
government is a guiding star for the authors, and one that colors
their treatment of forbearance and explains their preference for
minimal judicial protection of property.
However, there are significant problems in seeing Taney as the
fountainhead of a policy of trusting in government. Important as it
was, the Charles River Bridge decision does not give a complete
picture of Taney’s Contract Clause jurisprudence or of the extent to
which he stressed stability of contractual rights against governmental
interference. In fact, Taney vigorously enforced the Contract Clause
against state interference with both private agreements and public
contracts.8 For example, in Bronson v. Kinzie he invalidated two
Illinois laws that retroactively limited mortgage foreclosure sales
and gave mortgagors broad rights to redeem foreclosed property.9
Taney stressed that the Contract Clause “was undoubtedly adopted
as a part of the Constitution for a great and useful purpose. It was
to maintain the integrity of contracts, and to secure their faithful
6. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11. Pet.)
420 (1837). See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).
7. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 226.
8. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, 20 (1991).
9. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
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execution throughout the Union . . . .”10 Likewise, the Supreme Court
under Taney repeatedly invoked the Contract Clause to strike down
state legislation that attempted to abrogate state tax exemptions,11
to regulate state-charted banks,12 or to repudiate bonded debt.13 In
these cases Taney and his colleagues were not content to rely on governmental forbearance. Nor did they demonstrate confidence in the
ability of state governments to “do the right thing.”
Even when courts in the nineteenth century tended to protect
economic rights more broadly than is the norm today, they nonetheless experienced difficulty in curbing governmental behavior. Again
the history of the Contract Clause is instructive. Numerous federal
and state court decisions invalidating state stay laws and mortgage
moratoria as impairments of contract14 did not prevent state legislators from enacting such laws during periods of economic distress.
The practical impact of court rulings was often muted. As Charles
Warren perceptively noted, adverse decisions “did not, in fact, cause
great hardship to debtors because, by reason of the interval of time
which elapsed between enactment on these stay-laws and the Courts’
decisions as to their invalidity, the laws to a great extent achieved
their main purpose of preventing sacrifice of debtor’s property.”15 In
short, judicial opinions did not always succeed in promoting governmental forbearance. Legislators responded to perceived political
imperatives heedless of constitutional limits or social norms that
supposedly dictated restraint.
Merrill and Smith mention the unique position of railroads that
owned fixed assets that could not relocated to another jurisdiction
10. Id. at 318. See also McCracken v. Heyward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844).
11. E.g., Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845); Piqua Branch of the
State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854); Dodge v. Woosley, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 331 (1856).
12. E.g., Planters’ Bank of Miss. v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848); Woodruff v.
Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190 (1851).
13. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864). Although scholars have long
debated whether Gelpcke was an application of the Contract Clause to encompass judicial
interference with contracts or was the formulation of a uniform commercial law for diversity
cases, under neither interpretation was the Supreme Court deferring to the state.
14. E.g., Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843); Malony v. Fortune, 14 Iowa 417
(1863); Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341 (1861); People ex rel. Thorne v. Hays, 4 Cal. 127 (1854);
Sheets v. Peabody, 7 Blackf. 613 (Ind. 1845); Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68 (1848); Jones v.
Crittenden, 4 N.C. 55 (1814).
15. CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 90 (1935).
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and were thus especially vulnerable to state regulations and taxation.16 The experience of railroads with tax exemptions in New
Jersey is illuminating. The state granted tax concessions to several
railroads during the 1830s and 1840s. By the 1870s changed economic circumstances in the state convinced lawmakers in effect to
renege on these concessions. Although the highest court in New
Jersey upheld the tax concessions under the Contract Clause, the
governor and legislature adopted coercive tactics that eventually
persuaded the carriers to relinquish their exemptions. Political
pressure prevailed over the supposed sanctity of contracts. This
experience has led one scholar to ponder whether government can
ever be trusted to keep its side of a bargain.17
Or consider the Takings Clause, which in modern law is surely
more potent than the generally neglected Contract Clause.18 Merrill
and Smith correctly observe that the current fair market value
standard falls well short of providing a complete indemnification for
owners whose property is taken by eminent domain.19 Not only is the
determination of market value in the context of a forced sale problematic, but the prevailing standard takes no account of lost profits,
relocation expenses, loss of business good will, destruction of community ties, and costs of litigation. It is evident that the fair market
value standard does not provide “a full and exact equivalent” for the
property taken.20 Since the ascertainment of “just compensation”

16. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 230.
17. Christopher Grandy, Can Government Be Trusted to Keep Its Part of a Social Contract?
New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825–1888, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 249 (1989).
18. See James W. Ely, Jr., Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 371 (2010) (discussing the decline of the Contract Clause in constitutional jurisprudence).
19. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 249–50.
20. The Supreme Court defined “just compensation” in terms of “a full and exact
equivalent” in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)
(Brewer, J.). There is a substantial body of scholarship insisting that the fair market value
standard as presently understood does not put the owner in as good position as if his property
had not been taken. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 51–56, 182–86 (1985); Gideon Kanner, “Fairness and Equity,” or Judicial
Bait-and-Switch? It’s Time to Reform the Law of “Just” Compensation, 4 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV.
38, 41–58 (2011). In Community Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1975),
for example, the Supreme Court of California reached the bizarre conclusion that business
goodwill, although treated as property for some purposes, was not property in the context of
just compensation for eminent domain.
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has long been viewed as a judicial matter,21 it would seem appropriate for courts to reconsider the present compensation formula.
In a remarkable but revealing decision, the Supreme Court of
California in 1960 maintained that it had a duty to hold down the
amount of condemnation awards. Otherwise, it worried, the cost of
public improvements would increase and “impose a severe burden on
the public treasury.”22 The court was evidently more concerned with
an imagined impact on government than with the constitutional right
of an individual to receive a full indemnity. This reasoning entirely
inverts the purpose of the “just compensation” requirement. To the
extent that this parsimonious attitude prevails, the protective function of the “just compensation” standard is diluted in a manner not
calculated to promote governmental forbearance. Indeed, skimpy
awards encourage governmental overreach, and constitute in effect
a subsidy to government and allied developers at the expense of individual owners. Merrill and Smith aptly point out that formulation
of a standard “aimed at providing more complete compensation would
enhance the security of property rights, and would be consistent with
a general objective of promoting government forbearance.”23 If government was required to compensate for the full economic loss suffered by individuals whose property was taken, it might well be more
guarded in the exercise of eminent domain.24 The need to raise tax
revenue, always politically hazardous, could make government more
circumspect in resorting to compulsory acquisitions of private property. “The pocket-book,” Justice David J. Brewer observed in 1891,
“is a potent check on even the reformer.”25
Yet there is room to doubt that even a strengthened formula for
determining “just compensation,” although a help, would necessarily
21. See 148 U.S. at 327 (holding that the determination of compensation when property
is taken is “a judicial inquiry”); Van Horne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 312 (C.C.
Pa. 1795) (Paterson, J.) (observing that the legislature “cannot constitutionally determine upon
the amount of the compensation, or value of land”).
22. People ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1960).
23. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 250–51.
24. James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1313 (1985) (“Efficient just compensation should provide the significant legal check on the use of eminent domain that is now lacking. As long as the Court
chooses not to permit meaningful review of public use claims, just compensation is the only
effective constitutional check on governmental exercises of eminent domain.”).
25. David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW
ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 97, 105 (1891).
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constrain government very much. As Merrill and Smith note, the
cost of paying compensation is placed on the taxpayers, not on the
political figures utilizing eminent domain. “The incentives of government officials,” they maintain, “are especially likely to be skewed if
the linkage between government action and the need for higher taxes
is not very transparent.”26 Moreover, although the decision to acquire
private property is frequently characterized as legislative in nature,
such power is in fact commonly vested in unelected officials, such as
redevelopment agencies and irrigation districts, which are largely
immune from political controls.27 Loose judicial language about deference to the public will is problematic. Further, the expense of
acquisition may well be obfuscated as officials have every incentive
to downplay costs while making rosy promises about future public
benefits.28 A further complication is that the success or failure of
projects facilitated by eminent domain may not be apparent for years
after the condemnation. In short, democratic accountability is frustrated. The public frequently has no realistic way of either assessing
the cost of projects or of halting unwanted schemes.29 The present
tendency to inadequately compensate property owners is particularly worrisome because the “public use” limitation on the exercise
of eminent domain has been largely eviscerated at least at the federal level.30
26. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 227.
27. For example, in the controversial case of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
473–75 (2005) the exercise of eminent domain was initiated by the New London Development
Corporation, a private non-profit entity. See Kanner, supra note 20, at 51 n.44.
28. Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (2004) (“Both
corporate interests and political leaders dependent on their support have tremendous incentives to overestimate the economic benefits of projects furthered by condemnation.”).
29. Id. at 1022–23 (pointing out that most voters are not in a position to assess the economic merits of projects which rely on eminent domain); Durham, supra note 24, at 1295 (“The
likelihood that the public educates itself with all the facts and figures behind eminent domain
actions . . . is slight.”). See also ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013) (arguing that widespread voter ignorance and
irrationality calls into question meaningful political accountability in a democratic society).
30. James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, “Public Use,” and New Directions in Takings
Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 845, 851 (2004) (“For all practical purposes, the
Supreme Court, followed by many state courts, has virtually eliminated the ‘public use’ limitation as a meaningful restraint on eminent domain.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and
the Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1569 (1987) (“The Supreme Court has
largely abandoned the requirement that the power of eminent domain be devoted to public
rather than private ends.”).
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In other areas of takings jurisprudence, Merrill and Smith are
inclined to endorse a rather modest level of judicial supervision.
Consider the “public use” requirement of the Fifth Amendment and
its counterparts in state constitutions. It has long been held that private property could not be taken for private use even with the payment of compensation.31 Similarly, prominent scholars also stressed
that eminent domain was limited to use by the public.32 Nonetheless,
the authors correctly recognize that the Supreme Court has given
the “public use” clause “a weak interpretation.”33 It is hard to quarrel
with that conclusion, at least with respect to post–World War II cases.
Not only has the Supreme Court equated “public use” with the more
expansive notions of public purpose and public interest, it has been
highly deferential to legislative and administrative determinations of
the need to acquire private property. Indeed, the Court in Berman v.
Parker (1954) envisioned a very narrow role for judicial review in condemnation cases, declaring that “when the legislature has spoken,
the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”34
31. E.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (insisting that a legislature could not validly enact “a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.”); Wilkinson
v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829) (Story, J.) (“We have known of no case, in which a
legislative act to transfer the property of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a
constitutional exercise of legislative power in any state in the union.”); Olcott v. The Supervisors,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 694 (1872) (“The right of eminent domain nowhere justifies taking property for a private use.”); Bd. of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 114 (1876)
(“Private property cannot be taken from individuals by the State, except for public purposes,
and then only upon compensation . . . .”); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896)
(holding that taking private property “for the private use of another” violates the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80
(1937) (Brandeis, J.) (declaring that “this Court has many times warned that one person’s property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public
purpose, even though compensation be paid”).
32. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 531 (1st ed. 1868)
(“The public use implies a possession, and occupation, and enjoyment of the land by the public,
or public agencies; and there could be no protection whatever to private property, if the rights
of government to seize and appropriate it could exist for any other purpose.”); JOHN LEWIS,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 506–07 (2d ed. 1909)
(“Public use means the same as use by the public, and this it seems to us is the construction the
words should receive in the constitutional provision in question.”). For Cooley’s views about the
appropriate use of eminent domain, see Ely, supra note 30, at 846–50 (noting Cooley’s concern
that “eminent domain, unless confined, would become a tool for the powerful and politically wellconnected to promote their interests, to the detriment of individuals with little political clout.”).
33. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 242.
34. 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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This trend culminated in much criticized case of Kelo v. City of New
London (2005),35 in which the Court sustained the exercise of eminent domain to acquire non-blighted residences for transfer to private
developers for the purpose of promoting economic growth. Somewhat
sympathetic to the Court’s deferential approach, Merrill and Smith
stress the difficulties in ascertaining the appropriate scope of the
eminent domain power in a variety of situations. In light of Kelo, they
feel that the Supreme Court is unlikely to put many teeth in the
“public use” limitation. Still, the authors reject “a universal right of
eminent domain.”36 They point to state court decisions tightening
the definition of “public use” under state constitutions, and to postKelo state legislation and constitutional amendments seeking to
restrict economic development takings.37
The discussion of “public use” by Merrill and Smith raises several
questions. Do we not at the federal level already have “a universal
right of eminent domain?” The authors admit that “practically any
exercise in eminent domain can be described as satisfying a publicinterest standard.”38 Dissenting in Kelo, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
lamented: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.
Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Super 6 with a
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping center, or any farm with a
factory.”39 The record indicates that hardly any condemnations of
property are ever invalidated in federal court.40 So, in effect, does
not private property depend on the whim of governmental officials?
Nor do the authors tackle the question of why courts treat “just compensation” as a judicial rather than a legislative matter, but then
adopt supine deference to legislative decisions to take property.
35. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
36. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 247.
37. For a discussion of the judicial and legislative reaction to Kelo, see James W. Ely Jr.,
Post-Kelo Reform: Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 127 (2009);
Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV.
2100 (2009).
38. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 247.
39. 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
40. For decisions upholding economic development takings, see, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki,
516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008); W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App’x 670 (5th Cir. 2006);
Didden v. Village of Port Chester, 173 F. App’x 931 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1166
(2007). But see 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (invalidating proposed condemnation on grounds that the city’s purpose was
to benefit a particular commercial enterprise which threatened to leave the community).
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“Why the Supreme Court,” Gideon Kanner has observed, “should be
all but powerless to interpret the ‘public use’ clause, but all-powerful
when it comes to interpreting the ‘just compensation’ clause—both
appearing in the same sentence—has not been judicially explained.”41
After all, both “just compensation” and “public use” are constitutional
standards designed to limit government power over individual owners.
It is difficult to justify such disparate treatment of the two clauses.
Another question relates to the theme of governmental forbearance.
Merrill and Smith suggest that, in the absence of federal court review of condemnation cases, state courts may promote forbearance
by more vigorously scrutinizing the “public use” standard with respect to eminent domain. But if that is so, would not a similar move
by the Supreme Court do even more to rein in governmental misuse
of condemnations? We are dealing with a national norm incorporated into the Bill of Rights. Should the Supreme Court simply wash
its hands and relegate the matter to the state courts?
Clearly constitutional doctrines, as currently understood, are unlikely to play more than a secondary role in limiting governmental
reach over property. Indeed, consistent with their preference for
modest judicial oversight, the authors assert that constitutional
provisions may not be the most important factor encouraging governmental forbearance. Among other sources of forbearance, they
give attention to the political process. Merrill and Smith maintain
that, as a practical matter, the government will hesitate before taking actions that would hurt a large number of property owners. This,
they declare, explains the refusal of Congress to eliminate the tax
benefits accorded homeowners despite repeated calls—at least by
academics—to curtail such advantages.42 Now there is certainly
some merit in the argument that the political culture is important
for sustaining property rights; courts do not operate in a vacuum.
Still, the contention of the authors is reminiscent of Chief Justice
Morrison R. Waite’s 1877 admonition: “For protection against abuses
by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not the courts.”43
Too often, however, this call for political redress is simply a myth.
Waite, for example, never explained how railroads headquartered
41. Kanner, supra note 20, at 52.
42. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 230.
43. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
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in other states or out-of-state investors were supposed to seek protection from the political process against confiscatory rates imposed
by state governments in the late nineteenth century.44 Nonetheless,
with regard to the use of eminent domain, the federal courts have
echoed Waite’s deferential approach. In 2008 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals declared that “both in doctrine and in practice, the
primary mechanism for enforcing the public-use requirement has
been the accountability of political officials to the electorate, not the
scrutiny of the federal courts.”45 Such a comment is little more than
a flight into political fantasy. As a practical matter it is highly improbable that individual property owners can arouse sufficient public support to influence a general election when many issues compete
for public attention. The free-wheeling exercise of eminent domain
in the decades since World War II has resulted in the displacement
of many thousands of persons from their homes.46 Yet the political
process, rather than affording protection to displaced persons, encouraged their removal in the name of urban renewal.
Some scholars have expressed great confidence in federalism as
a restraint on governmental abuse of property rights.47 Merrill and
Smith contend that “a credible threat to exit from the jurisdiction”
can furnish a political restraint on government.48 The notion that
people can “vote with their feet” and thereby reduce the threat of
eminent domain abuse has some superficial appeal. But it fails to
adequately take account of factors that limit its effectiveness. Moving
44. In the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court moved away from the deferential
Munn doctrine and established judicial review of state-imposed rates to assure an adequate
return on invested capital. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 96–99 (2001).
45. 516 F.3d at 57.
46. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Private Blight: Urban Renewal and the
Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003) (concluding that the
exercise of eminent domain in “urban renewal programs uprooted hundreds of thousands of
people, disrupted fragile urban neighborhoods and helped entrench racial segregation in the
inner city”).
47. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein,
44 TULSA L. REV. 751 (2009); Vicki L. Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991). See also
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 289–324 (1995)
(contending that the ability to leave a jurisdiction is generally sufficient to safeguard property
rights without judicial oversight, but agreeing that judicial intervention is warranted when
the assets at issue are immobile).
48. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 230.
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costs could be considerable and act as a disincentive to relocate. More
importantly, whatever the merit of exit strategies in theory, they do
not pertain to immobile assets such as land and utilities.49 As the
authors recognize, foot voting simply cannot be employed to halt the
exercise of eminent domain or the imposition of severe regulations
on fixed assets.50 Railroads were particular victims of this tendency
in the late nineteenth century as states piled onerous taxes and strict
rate controls on the industry. Only federal judicial intervention provided a modicum of relief. In a pioneering 1888 opinion Justice Brewer
enjoined enforcement of a state-imposed railroad rate schedule and
stressed the limitations of the exit option as a means to safeguard
railroads from confiscatory regulations. He rejected the state’s argument that if a carrier did not find the state’s rate remunerative it
could leave the business.51 Likewise, in most situations landowners
cannot realistically escape eminent domain or severe regulation by
threatening to leave the jurisdiction. We are also left with the question, addressed in part below, as to why federalism justifies deference
to state and local government only with respect to property rights.
Why not to other constitutional rights? Should we rely on federalism
to safeguard freedom of speech or the Fourth Amendment guarantee
against unreasonable searches of private property?
Therefore, any reliance on the political process to safeguard property interests requires significant qualification. First, the political
system is not likely to afford much solace to individual owners, such
as the Kelo complainants, facing the loss of their land by eminent
domain. The same holds true with respect to land use regulations.52
Neither political officials nor judges unduly fret when land use controls impose severe economic hurt on particular owners. An anemic
49. Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1992); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 54–66 (2011).
For a thoughtful discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of foot voting, see SOMIN, supra
note 29, at 119–54.
50. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 230.
51. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 F. 866, 880 (Cir. Ct. S.D. Iowa 1888) (Brewer, J.)
(“Whatever of force there may be in such arguments, as applied to mere personal property
capable of removal and use elsewhere, or in other business, it is wholly without force as
against railroad corporations, so large a proportion of whose investment is in the soil and
fixtures appertaining thereto, which cannot be removed.”).
52. The authors appear content with a weak regulatory takings doctrine, in line with their
general confidence in government. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 251–56.
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regulatory takings doctrine does little to promote governmental forbearance and allows officials wide discretion to impose regulations.53
Second, to the extent that the political system does provide a check
on the exercise on eminent domain, the outcome is highly likely to
be skewed in favor of those with political influence. Political clout is
not shared evenly across society as a whole. Eminent domain is commonly directed against racial minorities or the politically weak.54
The political process therefore may afford some protection to the
politically well-connected, who may even benefit from the exercise
of eminent domain,55 but it is hardly a panacea for abuse. Third,
democratic governments, both here and in Europe, are highly responsive to seemingly endless demands for enhanced entitlements,
subsidies, and bailouts. These can only be funded—to the extent
that they are paid for at all and do not simply add to the deficit—by
placing the burden on property owners.56 The redistributive nature
of these measures poses a threat to the place of property in the polity.
In other words, a broad if vague public sentiment supportive of private property may not translate into much help in concrete cases.
Moreover, I remain mystified as to why property owners are relegated to the political process while so many others’ claims of right receive greater judicial solicitude. Nothing in the text of Constitution
or the views of the Framers suggests that there is a dichotomy between the protection afforded property rights and other individual
liberties. Indeed, the Framers believed that personal rights and property were indissolubly linked.57 This attitude generally prevailed
53. STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN
271 (2011) (“A handful of specific government actions limiting the use of property now required compensating its owners, but the vast majority of the regulatory state remained in
place, unhindered by the takings clause or by any of its statutory supplements.”).
54. 545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stressing that the losses resulting from economic development takings “will fall disproportionately on poor communities.
Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and
best social use, but are also the least politically powerful.”).
55. Beneficiaries of eminent domain have included Las Vegas casinos, the New York
Times, and Columbia University. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721
(N.Y. 2010); City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1 (Nev.
2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 912 (2004); West 41st St. Realty v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp.,
744 N.Y.S. 2d 121 (1st Dept. App. Div. 2002).
56. NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST 288 (2011) (“Private property
rights are repeatedly violated by governments that seem to have an insatiable appetite for
taxing our incomes and our wealth and wasting a large portion of the proceeds.”).
57. JAMES W. ELY JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (3d ed. 2008). See also Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic
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throughout the nineteenth century. “It should never be forgotten,”
Justice Stephen J. Field observed in 1890, “that protection to property and to persons cannot be separated. Where property is insecure,
the rights of persons are unsafe.”58 The Progressive movement of the
early twentieth century, however, launched a large-scale assault on
the notion of individual rights, and especially on constitutionalized
property.59 A high regard for private property was increasingly abandoned in favor of a statist ideology. The Progressives laid the intellectual groundwork for a jurisprudence that largely stripped property
of constitutional protection.60 This agenda was brought to fruition
by the New Deal Supreme Court, which separated property rights
from individual freedom and instituted a double standard of judicial
review. To rank rights into categories and assign property to a lesser
category worthy of only minimal solicitude was an expression of judicial activism, reflecting New Deal political priorities.61 The result,
of course, has been to enlarge legislative control over property and
explains the reluctance of many courts to police eminent domain or
to enforce the Contract Clause.
This is not to denigrate the significance of public sentiment in
shaping a political climate favorable to property rights.62 I agree
that courts cannot be expected to do it all. Judge Learned Hand
warned a generation ago about undue reliance on judges to preserve
our rights: “I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much
upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes,
believe me, false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women;
when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it.”63
Rights and Personal Liberty, 2003–2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 (“Economic rights, property
rights, and personal rights have been joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.”).
58. Stephen J. Field, “The Centenary of the Supreme Court,” February 4, 1890, reprinted
in 134 U.S. 729, 745.
59. James W. Ely, Jr., The Progressive Era Assault on Individualism and Property Rights,
29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 255 (2012). Indeed, Progressives were hostile to judicial review and demonstrated little interest in any claims of individual right. For example, Edward S. Corwin
declared in 1920 that “the cause of freedom of speech and press is largely in the custody of
legislative majorities and of juries, which . . . is just where the framers of the Constitution intended it to be.” Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment:
A Résumé, 30 YALE L.J. 48, 55 (1920).
60. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 111–37 (2006).
61. ELY, supra note 57, at 139–41.
62. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 324 (“The United States has had a capitalist economy based
on private property primarily because Americans prefer it to the alternatives.”).
63. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189–90 (3d ed. 1960).
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At the same time, there is little justification for courts to evade their
responsibility to enforce the property clauses of the Constitution.
Court decisions can help to mold public attitudes. The most significant impact of Kelo may well be heightened public awareness of the
need to guard property rights, reflected in an outpouring of state
constitutional amendments and statutory provisions designed to
curb the use of eminent domain. I realize that the efficacy of such
measure varies widely. Nonetheless, to my mind, the restoration of
the rights of property owners to public and academic dialogue is a
welcome development.
Lastly let us consider this question: why should we care about
whether government shows forbearance toward private property? In
an especially interesting paragraph, Merrill and Smith briefly explore the connection between democracy and property, positing that
property rights are more secure under democratic government than
under authoritarian governments. They observe: “There seems to be
a loose associational relationship between widespread property ownership and political democracy, in that widespread property ownership supports democracy, and democracy helps support widespread
ownership of property.”64 It appears to me that this is a nod toward
the Lockean emphasis on the rights of property owners as a bulwark
of liberty. Is Locke correct? Are secure property rights a prerequisite
for democratic government? Undoubtedly the absence of protected
rights to property facilitates arbitrary government. As early as 1722
one English commentator aptly noted: “The only despotick Governments now in the World, are those where the whole Property is in the
Prince.”65 Indeed, there are few examples, either historical or contemporary, of free societies that do not respect the rights of property
owners. In contrast, totalitarian governments in the twentieth century without exception either abolished property or severely curtailed private ownership to serve the dictates of the state.66 Private
64. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 1, at 230–31.
65. CATO’S LETTERS NO. 84 (John Trenchard, July 7, 1722).
66. See ANDREW BARNES, OWNING RUSSIA: THE STRUGGLE OVER FACTORIES, FARMS AND
POWER 27–31 (2006) (discussing sweeping nationalization and collectivization of property in
Russia in the 1930s, and concluding that “[t]he Stalinist system of ownership and control of
property was thus remarkably extensive and coherent.”); GOTZ ALY, HITLER’S BENEFICIARIES:
PLUNDER, RACIAL WAR, AND THE NAZI WELFARE STATE 16 (2005) (finding that “a source of the
Nazi Party popularity was its liberal borrowing from the intellectual tradition of the socialist
left”); ANDREW BARKAI, NAZI ECONOMICS: IDEOLOGY, THEORY, AND POLICY 3 (1990) (“It is quite
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property may not guarantee political liberty, but its absence likely
dooms free government.67 Echoing many commentators from the past,
Justice Anthony Kennedy declared in 2010: “The Takings Clause is
an essential part of the constitutional structure, for it protects private property from expropriation without just compensation; and
the right to own and hold property is necessary to the exercise and
preservation of freedom.”68 Whether Kennedy’s jurisprudence has
always exemplified this sentiment is an issue beyond the scope of this
essay, but his comment underscores the deep roots linking property
and liberty.
In short, I agree with the authors’ conclusion that private property has proven resilient over time, demonstrating an ability to adapt
to societal changes and technological innovation.69 I cannot, however,
share their confidence that, absent more vigorous judicial oversight,
the political system can realistically constrain government from interfering with the rights of individual property owners. Only judicial
supervision can halt abusive tactics by governmental agencies, such
as threatening individual homeowners with ruinous fines if they dare
to challenge an edict.70 There is simply no excuse for judicial abdication concerning the constitutional protection of property rights.

clear that there was no free market economy in Germany throughout those years, even in
comparison with other advanced industrial countries, none of which had operated under conditions of ‘pure competition’ since the beginning of the century. The scope and depth of state
intervention in Nazi Germany had no peacetime precedent or parallel in any capitalist country, Fascist Italy included.”).
67. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 281 (1999) (“The right to property in and of
itself does not guarantee civil rights and liberties. But historically speaking, it has been the
single most effective device for ensuring both, because it creates an autonomous sphere in
which, by mutual consent, neither the state nor society can encroach: by drawing a line between the public and the private, it makes the owner co-sovereign, as it were.”). See also D.
Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36, 69 (2009) (“It is difficult
to see how other freedoms to speech, religion, or association could be secure in a society without the institution of private property.”).
68. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 733
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552
(1972) (Stewart, J.) (“In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right
to liberty and the personal right to property. Neither could have meaning without the other.”).
69. BANNER, supra note 53, at 3 (“[O]ur ideas about property have always been contested
and have always been in flux.”).
70. Sackett v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). See Jeremy A. Rabkin, Against
the EPA, Absurdity Is No Defense, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 43–45 (2014).

INDIVIDUAL RELIANCE AND GOVERNMENT
FORBEARANCE: A TALE OF FIVE CASES

LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER*
INTRODUCTION
The topic for this panel of the conference is government forbearance:
when government must—or should—refrain from changing previously
existing individual entitlements.
There are many reasons why one might argue that government
should forbear. It could be argued, for instance, that government
should forbear because of the need to encourage individual investment, something that might erode if there is no certainty in property
entitlements. Or it might be argued that government should forbear
because continually changing rules can cause individual frustration
and social instability. Or it could be argued that government should
forbear because property is earned, or a necessary and natural entitlement, or is justified by some other theory of property rights.
In this Essay, I will focus on one particular forbearance argument:
that government should forbear because of an individual’s justified
reliance on previously existing legal entitlements. This argument is
not rooted in consequentialist theory; it is not rooted in the argument that government should forbear because—if it does not—
certain negative consequences will follow. Rather, it is the common
and intuitively powerful argument that government should forbear
in certain situations because the individual deserves to be protected
against change in the rules of the game. To put it in common legal
form, the individual has a contract or property right that can be asserted against government. Individuals, in these situations, are believed to have a right to rely on the legal status quo.
The idea that there are situations in which individuals can rely
on the existing rules of the game—and resist their change—is not
a novel one in law. There are many situations in which this phenomenon is recognized by law. For instance, if the government enters into
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Cornell
Law School.
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an express contract with a supplier, the terms of that contract generally cannot be unilaterally changed by government without consequence.1 From another direction, we are familiar with the idea that
property rights are created by the established rules of the legal game.
The proposition that property includes the “‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law’”2
is a very familiar one. And changes in these rights, through government action, can lead to a justified claim of unlawful deprivation.3
Such ideas mask difficulties, however. The universe of express
contracts with government might be limited because of the necessity of government consent; however, the universe of background
laws on which an individual might rely is not. The idea of reliance
on existing rules or legal understandings opens a Pandora’s box of
possibilities. Statutes, regulations, ordinances—enacted by federal,
state, and local governments—all articulate rules of existing law.
Indeed, virtually any individual act or omission that we can imagine is dealt with somehow by the legal status quo: it is either expressly or impliedly permitted or prohibited. Does this mean that
an individual can rely on any proposition that is expressed or implied by law, with the possibly justified cry of “foul” if that power or
immunity is eliminated?
To put it another way, from the universe of possibilities, when can
an individual estop government—because of his or her reliance—
from changing the rules of the game?
To explore this question, we will consider six settings, represented
by six famous cases in this area of law. In each case, claims of justified reliance on previously existing law were made—with demands
for payment of damages as a consequence for change. These cases
are rooted in two different legal theories that are rarely juxtaposed:
reliance and forbearance rooted in contract, and reliance and forbearance rooted in property rights in land. My goal is to see what this
1. See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (“When the United States enters
into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to private individuals.”); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 369 (1943)
(“‘The United States does business on business terms.’”) (quoting United States v. Nat’l Exch.
Bank of Balt., 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926)).
2. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (quoting Bd. of Regents
of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
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comparison illuminates, in the way of underlying ideas of reliance
and forbearance, and to sketch some ideas as food for further thought.
I. CLAIMED RELIANCE SETTINGS: “CONTRACTS WITH GOVERNMENT”
A. Fletcher and the Express Government Contract
We will begin with an old chestnut, the case of Fletcher v. Peck.4
Fletcher dealt with a change of heart by the Georgia legislature in
the conveyance of land. In 1795, the legislature conveyed particular
land to private parties. Subsequently, it passed an act which annulled the law under which the conveyances had been made.5 The
reason asserted for the rescission of the grants was that members
of the legislature who had approved the sale had operated with
corrupt and illicit motives.6
The question before the United States Supreme Court was whether
“the State itself [could] . . . vacate a contract thus formed,” and be
“absolved from those rules of property which are common to all the
citizens of the United States.”7 Citing the federal Contract Clause,
the Court held that it could not. “Conveyances have been made,”
Justice Marshall wrote, “[and] those conveyances have vested legal
estate . . . .”8 “When . . . a law is in its nature a contract, [and] when
absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law
cannot devest those rights . . . .”9 Legislative power must have limits;
and “where are they to be found if the property of an individual,
fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation?”10
This rings true. Surely, if there is ever a situation in which an
individual might be able to estop government change in his entitlements, it is when those entitlements are claimed under an express
contract. If the government has expressly agreed to perform in a
particular way, with this particular individual, and the individual
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
See id. at 127, 132.
See id. at 129–30.
Id. at 130, 134.
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id.
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has relied upon that promise, government must be accountable if it
later—unilaterally—changes the rules of the game.
Consider, for instance, the government procurement contract. If
the government agrees to purchase a number of ships from a military contractor, and the contractor builds the ships, the government
will be liable for damages (under ordinary contract principles) if it
later simply refuses payment or delivery. In such a case, the government is acting like any private party in the procurement of goods.
Accordingly, the law—and common sense—holds government to the
responsibilities that any private party in a similar situation would
incur. As was stated in a recent case, “ordinary government contracts are typically governed by the rules applicable to contracts
between private parties.”11 Indeed, any other rule would “produce
the untoward result of compromising the Government’s practical
capacity to make [such] contracts.”12
What about the age-old idea that one legislature cannot bind the
legislative authority of its successors? Could a later repudiation of
an express contract by government be authorized by this rule? To
put it abstractly, how are the obligations of contract incurred by
government, and the need to protect the sovereign powers of government, reconciled?
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the “reserved powers” doctrine, which addresses this question.
Under this doctrine, certain substantive powers of sovereignty cannot be given up by government, through contact or otherwise. One
example is the exercise of the police power;13 another is the power
of eminent domain.14 However, sovereign powers protected by this
doctrine are limited. Beyond those powers, government is not absolved of damage claims when an individual has express contract
rights to government performance, and government has failed to
perform as promised. In such cases, the individual is entitled to rely
on the government’s promises, and sue for breach of contract if the
11. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 914 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 884 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 913 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This [rule] . . .
is unsurprising, for in practical terms it ensures that government is able to obtain needed
goods and services from parties who might otherwise, quite rightly, be unwilling to undertake the risk of government contracting.”).
13. See Stone v. Miss., 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879).
14. See W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531–32 (1848).
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government defaults. As explained by the Court, government has
the capacity “to [bind] . . . future [legislatures] . . . by creating
vested rights.”15
So far, then, the rules are clear. Express contracts made with
government, and property acquired under them, support individual
reliance and require government forbearance. The question which
remains is this: do these conclusions extend beyond this context?
B. Charles River Bridge and Winstar: The Question of
Implied Terms
An express contract between an individual and government, which
is complete as it stands and is accepted as operative “fact” by both
parties, is—in a sense—the easy case for individual reliance and
government forbearance. What about a contract which is express in
some ways, but with open or possibly implied terms in others? Can
an individual claim an enforceable reliance interest in this case?
The seminal case of this kind is Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge,16 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1837. In
1785, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a law that empowered
a private company to erect a bridge over the Charles River, and to
collect tolls from those who traversed it. The bridge was built and
for more than fifty years tolls were collected. In 1828, a later session of the legislature passed an act which authorized the building
of a competing, publicly owned bridge very near to the other. This
public bridge was built, and travelers paid nothing for passage.17
The owners of the Charles River Bridge brought suit, claiming
that the chartering and construction of the second bridge impaired
their contractual rights with the State of Massachusetts. They
claimed that the first legislative act “necessarily implied, that the
[L]egislature would not authorize another bridge, and especially, a
free one, by the side of [theirs] . . . , whereby the franchise granted
to [them] . . . should be rendered of no value . . . .”18 They argued
15.
16.
17.
18.

See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 876 (plurality opinion).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
See id. at 536–38.
Id. at 539.
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that their charter was—in fact—a contract with the State, and that
the later act impaired the obligation of this contract.19
The Court first remarked that the language of the contract must
govern—the contract must “be interpreted by its own terms.”20 In
addition, contractual obligations must be interpreted in light of the
truism that “the object and end of all government is to promote the
happiness and prosperity of the community.”21 This power should
not “be presumed to [have been] surrender[ed]” if that surrender
does not appear in explicit terms.22 “While the rights of private parties are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also
[has] . . . rights, and that the happiness and well-being of every citizen
depends on their . . . preservation.”23 In this case, the Court observed,
the protection sought was not stated in the contract. As a result, there
was no justified reliance by Charles River Bridge on the pre-existing
status quo, and no justified claim for government forbearance.24
Justice Story dissented. “Is the charter to receive a strict or liberal
construction? Are any implications to be made beyond the express
terms?”25 “No one doubts,” he wrote, “that the charter is a contract
and a grant . . . ,” and that “this franchise is . . . fixed, determinate
property.”26 “I put it to the common sense of every man . . . [. If] the
legislature had said to the proprietors: you shall build the bridge;
you shall bear the burdens; . . . and yet . . . we reserve to ourselves
the . . . power and authority to erect other bridges . . . [and] destroy
your profits, . . . is there a man living, of ordinary discretion and prudence, who would have accepted such . . . terms?”27 “The prohibition
arises by natural, if not necessary, implication.”28
Justice Story’s argument was rejected, however, and the doctrine
espoused by the majority in Charles River Bridge has become known
as the “unmistakability doctrine,” or the idea that no sovereign power
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See id.
See id. at 544.
See id. at 547.
See id.
Id. at 548.
See id. at 549–53.
Id. at 588 (Story, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588, 638 (Story, J., dissenting).
Id. at 615 (Story, J., dissenting).
Id. at 616–17 (Story, J., dissenting).
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of government will be deemed surrendered unless done so in unmistakable terms.29 After Charles River Bridge, the unmistakability doctrine became a staple of Supreme Court jurisprudence, limiting the
ability of individuals to rely on claims of implied terms in otherwise
express government contracts. For individuals claiming a contractual right to the maintenance of existing law—something that is rarely
provided by explicit agreement with government—the unmistakability doctrine presents a very serious, or near-fatal, impediment.
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court refused to
apply this doctrine, in a widely publicized case. United States v.
Winstar Corporation30 dealt with government-facilitated takeovers
of failing “thrifts” (savings and loan institutions) by healthy banks
in the 1980s. The combination of high interest rates and inflation in
the United States in the late 1970s and into the 1980s caused a rising
tide of thrift failures.31 If an institution failed, the Federal savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”) was required to indemnify depositors for losses incurred as the result of the failure of
these federally insured institutions. In an attempt to forestall further losses, Congress tried a deregulatory scheme that weakened
thrifts’ capital reserve requirements. Also adopted were generous
accounting principles for thrifts, for purposes of determining their
compliance with capital reserve requirements.32
Failures of thrifts continued, however, and the FSLIC was faced
with deposit insurance liabilities that exceeded the amount of its insurance fund. By 1988, the FSLIC was insolvent by over $50 billion.33
“Realizing that FSLIC lacked the funds to liquidate all of the failing thrifts, the [federal] Bank Board chose to avoid the insurance
liability by encouraging healthy thrifts and outside investors to take
over ailing institutions in a series of ‘supervisory mergers.’”34 Because such transactions were not intrinsically attractive to healthy
institutions, “the principal inducement for these supervisory mergers
29. See, e.g., Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52
(1986) (“‘Sovereign power . . . governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and
will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.’”) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
30. 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
31. See id. at 845 (opinion of Souter, J.).
32. See id. at 845–46 (opinion of Souter, J.).
33. See id. at 846–47 (opinion of Souter, J.).
34. Id. at 847 (opinion of Souter, J.).

148

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:141

was an understanding that the acquisitions would be subject to . . .
particular accounting treatment that would help the acquiring institutions meet their reserve capital requirements imposed by federal regulations.”35
Ultimately, this regulatory response was also unsuccessful in
stemming the crisis in the thrift industry. In a change of direction,
Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”) in 1989. This law made substantial changes in the regulation of thrifts, including the imposition of
new—and more stringent—capital reserve and accounting requirements. Once this law was passed, many institutions—including
institutions that had acquired failed thrifts—were immediately rendered noncompliant, and subject to seizure by federal regulators.36
Believing that the Bank Board and FSLIC has promised them the
continuation of the prior capital and accounting rules, three merged
institutions filed suit against the United States, seeking money damages on contractual and constitutional theories.37
Before the United States Supreme Court, the first question was
whether the FSLIC had made express contracts with the plaintiff
banks, including a promise that the banks could continue the use
of the challenged practices if the law changed. Justice Souter,
writing for the plurality, treated this question as a matter of interpretation of the individual merger agreements negotiated by the
banks and government regulators. The government denied that the
agreements contained such terms and argued that the statements
in the documents that referred to generous reserve and accounting
rules were simply statements of then-existing policy.38
The plurality rejected this interpretation. For instance, discussing the merger documents for one bank, the plurality observed:
Although one can imagine cases in which the potential gain might
induce a party to assume a substantial risk that the gain might be
wiped out by a change in the law, it would have been irrational
in this case for [the cooperating bank] . . . to stake its very existence upon continuation of current policies without seeking to
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 848 (opinion of Souter, J.). See also id. at 850–56 (opinion of Souter, J.).
See id. at 857–58 (opinion of Souter, J.).
See id. at 858 (opinion of Souter, J.).
See id. at 862 (plurality opinion).
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embody those policies in some sort of contractual commitment.
This conclusion is obvious from both the dollar amounts at stake
and the regulators’ proven propensity to make changes in the
relevant requirements. . . . Under these circumstances, we have
no doubt that the parties intended to settle regulatory treatment
of these transactions as a condition of their agreement.39

A finding that the parties’ agreement should be interpreted to
assign the risk of regulatory change to the government, however,
did not dispatch all questions that the case presented. In particular,
even if such a finding would be binding on a private party under
general contract principles, it was not at all clear—as a matter of
law—that it could be binding on government. In short, there was
the problem of the unmistakability doctrine and its application to
this case.
The plurality, after a lengthy discussion of the doctrine and its policies, rejected its application. That doctrine, the plurality held, is
rooted in the concern that a “contractual obligation [not] . . . block
the exercise of a sovereign power of the Government.”40 That concern was—in turn—not involved in this case, because the plaintiffs
sought only “insur[ance] . . . against . . . losses, arising from future
regulatory change”; they did not seek “to bind . . . Congress from
enacting [new] regulatory measures.”41
The plurality acknowledged that “while agreements to insure
private parties against the costs of subsequent regulatory change
do not directly impede the exercise of sovereign power, they may
indirectly deter needed government regulation” by increasing the
cost of its enforcement.42 However, the plurality finessed this issue
on the ground that “Congress itself expressed a willingness to bear
the costs at issue . . . when it authorized the FSLIC to ‘guarantee
[acquiring thrifts] against loss’ that might occur as a result of a
supervisory merger.”43 Applying the unmistakability doctrine in this
case would also have harmful practical consequences, undermining
the reputation of the government as a reliable contracting party.44
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 863–64 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 879 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 887 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 883 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f)(2) (1988 ed.) (repealed 1989)).
See id. at 883 (plurality opinion).
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If one is honest, neither asserted reason for the non-application
of the unmistakability doctrine in this case is particularly convincing. The distinction between payment of damages and regulatory
power is artificial at best; presumably, in most if not all cases of
this type, the plaintiffs will be suing for damages. If critical terms
can be implied in such cases, because of the remedy sought, the
principle that such terms must be explicitly stated in contracts of
this type will have little practical application. As for the argument
that application of the will impair the government’s ability to contract with individual parties in a reliable or meaningful way, we
must remember that we are dealing with the “unmistakability”—
not the “prohibitory”—doctrine. The issue is not whether a government can insure a contracting partner against change; it is whether
such insurance must be done in unequivocal terms—a point on
which the dissenting justices forcefully elaborated.45
So what accounts for the result in the Winstar case? The roots, I
would argue, can be found in the fact that the “supervisory merger”
deals that government pushed in this case were so clearly and
unabashedly pursued for the government’s own financial benefit.
Government agencies induced healthy banks to take over ailing
thrifts in order to avoid FSLIC deposit insurance liability. In addition, Congress was aware—when debating FIRREA—that it would
have the substantial effect of releasing the government from its
contractual obligations.46 As Justice Souter stated, “[t]he statute not
only had the purpose of eliminating the very accounting gimmicks
that acquiring thrifts had been promised, but the specific object of
abrogating enough of the acquisition contracts as to make that consequence of the legislation a focal point” in its passage.47
Reconciling Charles River Bridge and Winstar appears to be difficult, as an initial matter. In a broad-brush way, the cases are very
similar. In both, there were express contracts between government
and private business interests. In both, the contracts lacked express,
unmistakable language that protected the private parties from later,
adverse government action. In both cases, it can be said that the
protection that the private parties sought was something that could
reasonably be presumed, as a practical and commercial necessity,
45. See, e.g., id. at 929–30 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 900 (opinion of Souter, J.).
47. Id. (opinion of Souter, J.) (footnote omitted).
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for any private party entering such contracts. Yet, when the bottom
line was reached, the Court was willing to supply this protection in
Winstar, and in Charles River Bridge it was not.
What distinguishes these cases, in my view, is the taint of selfdealing. The take-away—as Charles River Bridge enduringly
illustrates—is that courts are reluctant to imply substantial, protective terms in government contracts. This is true even when the
contract without those terms can be seen as an improbably foolish
bargain. However, this interpretive approach might succumb to
another more generous account in cases of government’s blatant
and acknowledged self-dealing. In Winstar, government induced
reliance not only for an articulated public purpose—and the kind of
general public benefit that government actions presuppose—but
also to implement an explicit and calculated strategy to save itself
billions of dollars that it would otherwise have owed. The later
legislative change was also, explicitly, tailored to that end. Granted
the line between general protection of the public fisc and the sharpness of government self-dealing might not always be clear. But in
the latter case, the disputed protection against government action
might well be implied. And forbearance on the part of government—
from changing the rules of the game vis-à-vis those parties—might
well be required.
C. “Deregulatory Takings”: The Case of the Implied Contract
For many years, state and federal governments heavily regulated
certain industries. Interstate trucking, air transport, telecommunications, electric and gas utility companies, and others were subject
to strict government rulemaking controls and government controls
on new entry. The private businesses that flourished under these
regimes were, essentially, government-protected and governmentregulated monopolies.
These industries, in turn, invested on the basis of business and
earnings that were generated by their status. They invested in specialized and durable assets that seemed necessary, or at least justified, under the regulated-monopoly regime. For example, utility
companies operated under a model of self-sufficiency; they assumed
the need to produce their own power, and invested in excess power
capacity for periods of unusually high demand. Costs incurred under
this regime were charged to their “captive” clientele.
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In the 1990s, political winds shifted. As one author expressed it,
“Americans . . . turned their backs on one of the New Deal’s most
important legacies by deregulating nearly every market to which
regulation ha[d] been applied.”48 Industries which had previously
enjoyed regulated-monopoly status suddenly found themselves competing with new entrants and new models for service. In the utilities market, for instance, previously regulated monopolies suddenly
found the models of “self-sufficiency” and “captive customers” obsolete. Electricity could now be freely purchased from low-cost
sources, rendering the model of higher-cost, “self-sufficient” sources
obsolete. In addition, customers suddenly had a choice among competing telecommunications, electric, and gas providers. Firms that
had been regulated monopolies suddenly found themselves with
what they called “stranded costs”—costs incurred in monopolystatus investment that were now difficult or impossible to recover
in a market-based environment.49
The nature and extent of so-called stranded costs varied greatly
from industry to industry.50 Some industries, such as airlines,
experienced a boom in business as the result of deregulation and
few assets in those segments were stranded.51 However, other
industries—such as the electric utility industry—cited large losses,
and claimed foul.52 The core of their claims was reliance: that they
had relied on their regulatory monopoly status, and government
had—unfairly—changed the rules of the game. They sought billions
of dollars in compensatory damages.53
There might have been a political argument for some of these
claims; indeed, one study points out that regulated utilities persuaded regulatory and state legislative bodies to provide more than
$100 billion in relief (with the costs, in most cases, passed on to
48. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108
YALE L.J. 801, 801 (1999).
49. See, e.g., Ass’n of Pub. Agency Customers, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 126 F.3d
1158, 1180 (9th Cir. 1997).
50. See Hovenkamp, supra note 48, at 803–04.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., id. at 804; Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Regulatory
Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1457–60 (2000); J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).
53. See Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 52, at 1458–59.
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consumers as “transition costs”).54 Whatever the political outcomes
at the time, what is more interesting for our purposes is the legal
argument that was made by these industries. The assertion was
that deregulation violated the government’s “regulatory contract”
with these firms, and that compensation was required on that basis.
They—and their advocates—argued that they had a tacit or implied
understanding with government: that they would invest their resources in the running of the regulated/monopolistic enterprise, and
the state would guarantee a particular rate of return. By engaging
in deregulation, the state reneged on its side of the bargain. This
deprived the firms of their “investment-backed expectations”—and
was a taking of property without compensation.55
In other words, the firms were entitled to rely on a continuance
of the legal status quo.
In light of our prior investigations and derived principles, is this
a case in which the costs of the regulatory change should fall on the
individual firms, or on government? Is this a case in which individual reliance was justified, and government forbearance required?
This case is clearly the weakest so far examined. To impose a
duty of forbearance (or the payment of costs) on government, in this
case, one must infer not only particular contract terms, dealing with
risks of regulatory change, but also the existence of the contract
itself. As commentators have observed, there is little legal support
for viewing the relation between private firms and the regulatory
agencies that govern them as establishing enforceable, contractual
relations.56 If there is some justified individual reliance in these
cases, it is rooted in something far more insubstantial and uncertain than an explicit, executed contract.
In addition, even if the regulatory relation could be deemed a
“contract” of sorts, there is nothing in that relation that would
provide the desired contract term, i.e., the shifting of the costs of
regulatory change from the firms to the public. Nothing in the history of regulatory dealing can be cited in these cases for such an
“implied contract term.” Arguments rooted in claims for general
54. See id. at 1458–59 (discussing studies).
55. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 52, at 213–72.
56. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 52, at 1463; William J. Baumol &
Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1045–46 (1997).
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economic protection, or in the idea that a prudent investor would
insist upon such terms, have not (as discussed above) been successful in the courts. Nor does public policy somehow demand such a
result. No sharp self-dealing by government is present in this case,
as it was in Winstar; and there are cogent arguments that regulated
firms were well aware of the risks of regulatory change that they
ran if the political winds shifted. There is, in short, little legal reason to rescue these industries from the risks that they chose—as
many choose—as entrepreneurs, little legal ground for claiming
individual reliance or requiring government forbearance.
***
In summary, the existence of a “contract” with government is one
way to conceptualize when an individual is entitled to rely on an existing legal state of affairs, and government is—therefore—required
to forbear. However, the idea of a “contract” with government as
answering the question is superficial. The case might be a situation
in which a government agent has signed an agreement with a
private party, with express terms covering the issue of future legal
change; but in most cases in which this theory is asserted, the facts
will not be so simple.
In all of the other—more difficult—cases, our intuition and the
cases above suggest the following principles:
(1) For individual reliance to be justified, there must be more than
the simple existence of law. There must be some kind of personal
transaction between the individual and government to set the stage
for a reliance claim.

This principle can be illustrated by a simple example. Let us say,
for instance, that an individual wishes to open a bar in a college
town. He heavily invests in the enterprise, in reliance on a state law
that establishes a legal drinking age of 18. If the state thereafter
increases the drinking age to 21, the individual—I believe we would
all agree—has no legal claim to redress, even if his business is
severely impacted by the change. The mere existence of a law that
is addressed to the general public—without more—is not enough to
create justified individual reliance, or to require government indemnification if the law is changed. Rather the individual most have
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some personal, negotiated relationship with government to present
a colorable reliance claim.
This principle is illustrated by the cases that we have examined.
In Fletcher, there were express, negotiated understandings between
individuals and government, governing the conduct of the parties.
In Fletcher this understanding was the consummated sale of government land, and in Charles River Bridge it was the construction
of a bridge in response to explicit, particular state authorization to
do so. This principle was also met in Winstar: the federal government entered into negotiations, and executed agreements, with
solvent banks to take over ailing thrifts. Its presence is far more
tenuous, if it is present at all, in the regulated utilities cases. In
those cases, government regulated certain industries, providing a
legal environment for private operation; however, the degree to which
there were particular, negotiated transactions or agreements between private firms and the regulating governments is much less
clear. As a result, our intuition—and legal precedent—signal that
this situation presents a weaker case.
This brings us to the second principle:
(2) A rule that law cannot change would present a serious problem in a dynamic society, in which changes in knowledge and the
occurrence of exigencies continually challenge existing law. As a
result, claims of reliance on previous law, and for indemnification
for its change, must be cautiously granted.
For individual reliance to be justified, there must be some kind
of explicit understanding between the individual and government
that the risk of change is something that the public (government)
has undertaken. Absent evidence of government exploitation or
overreaching, “implicit” or “implied” understandings of this sort
will not be recognized.

In our case of the disappointed bar-owning businessman, there
was no explicit commitment by government to him that the law
would not change, or that he would be indemnified if it did. Nor was
there any exploitation or overreaching by government that would
justify the rare conclusion that a bargain of this type should be
implied. Government did not induce this investor to act in order to
further government’s own, particular, self-interested strategy; its
benefit, if any, was only of a kind that all law-abiding activities of
all citizens might produce. The benefit that government sought to
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achieve, from the initial drinking-age law or its successor, was simply the kind of generalized public benefit that has no particular relationship to a particular individual or previous transaction. As a
consequence, both our intuition and the law would deny a claim to
justified reliance and indemnification in this case.
This principle is, again, illustrated by our cases. In Fletcher, the
government transferred title to particular parcels of land to particular individuals; completed land sales, without reservations or contingencies, are express agreements that all parties are entitled to
believe will not be revoked. However, in Charles River Bridge and
the “regulated utilities” cases, there were no such explicit understandings, or assumption of the risk of change, by government; and
that absence was fatal to those individual reliance claims. Although
the situation was similar in Winstar, the fact of government doubledealing tipped the balance in that case. The government’s calculated
inducement of the healthy banks’ takeovers of the ailing thrifts, together with the government’s acknowledged desire to avoid its own
crushing financial liability through this stratagem, justified findings of implied reliance and an obligation to indemnify in this case.
II. CLAIMED RELIANCE SETTINGS: THE REGULATION OF LAND
The case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,57 decided by
the United States Supreme Court in 1992, presents classic claims
of individual reliance and required government forbearance in
the context of property rights in land. In the late 1970s, Lucas began residential-development activities on the Isle of Palms near
Charleston, South Carolina.58 In 1986, he purchased two lots for
development. At the time of their purchase, these lots were within
an area generally covered by the Coastal Zone Management Act,59
which was enacted by South Carolina some years before. This Act
required owners of coastal land that was part of a “critical area”
under the Act to obtain a permit prior to development. At the time
of their purchase, Lucas’s plots were not deemed to be “critical
areas,” and—as a result—development was unrestricted.60
57.
58.
59.
60.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See id. at 1008.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 et. seq. (1987).
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008.

2014] INDIVIDUAL RELIANCE & GOVERNMENT FORBEARANCE

157

Two years after the lots’ purchase, South Carolina enacted a new
law to more closely regulate shoreline activity. This law, the Beachfront Management Act,61 was intended to protect the beach/sand
dune coastal system from unwise development that could jeopardize
the stability of the beach/dune system, accelerate erosion, and endanger adjacent property. Under the regulations issued pursuant
to the Act, development of Lucas’s two parcels was prohibited.62
Lucas challenged this situation in court, arguing that it effected a
“taking” of his property without just compensation.63
Lucas was not, obviously, deprived of the title to his land; rather,
his claim was that he—as the title holder—had a prior right to
build on his land, and that this right was, itself, the property that
was taken. In the words of Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion for the Court, “Lucas did not take issue with the validity of
the [Beachfront Management] Act as a lawful exercise of South
Carolina’s police power, but contended that the Act’s complete extinguishment of his property’s value entitled him to compensation
regardless of whether the legislature had acted in furtherance of
legitimate . . . objectives.”64 In other words, Lucas did not argue that
the South Carolina authorities could not—as a matter of general
law—do what they did; rather he argued that they could not do it
to him, because of the destruction that the legal change caused to
his legitimate, investment-backed expectations.65 In our terms, he
argued that he was entitled to rely on the prior legal status quo;
and that a change in the law, detrimental to him, required the payment of damages (or government forbearance).
The Supreme Court held that Lucas should prevail, provided
that the new restrictions were “not part of his title to begin with”66
(something that was clear from the facts, and confirmed on remand).
On what basis did the Court make this decision?
The theoretical basis for the Court’s decision is—quite frankly—
obscure. The majority began by observing that the question was
whether the government went “too far” in its redefinition of the
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 et. seq. (Supp. 1988).
62. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008–09.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
64. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
65. See id. at 1008–10.
66. See id. at 1027.
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landowner’s previously existing interests.67 This seems to be a comparison of what the claimant began with, and what the claimant
has left. The Court stated that when a regulation “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land,” it is, by definition, “too
far” and compensation must be paid.68
This does not, of course, of itself explain why this result should
obtain. The majority acknowledged this, stating that “[w]e have
never set forth the justification for this rule.”69 Justice Scalia then
proceeded to speculate what those reasons might be. “Perhaps it is
simply . . . that a total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.”70
In any event, in such a case, “it is less realistic to indulge in our usual
assumption that the legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits
and burdens of economic life.’”71 In addition, the danger that such
cases present—that government will be paralyzed if compensation
is required for “every such change in the general law”—is minimal
if confined to cases such as this. That concern “does not apply to the
relatively rare situations where the government has deprived the
landowner of all economically beneficial uses.”72
The rationale, therefore, seems to be an idea of compensatory justice. If we take from you, you deserve compensation. But this does
not answer the real, underlying question. Why have we “taken”
from you? What did you have, that has now been taken?
The majority’s approach assumes that there was some kind of
“thing” or “entitlement” of which Lucas was deprived. Lucas still
owned the land, so the title to the land could not be it. The only
other possibility is that he had a legal right to the previously existing legal status quo.
The easy answer is, “of course he did”—that right being a kind of
“property.” One could simply say—as the Court has seemed to
imply, at various times—that there is a right to use land, of some
uncertain and unexplained origin.73 However, there has to be more.
67. See id. at 1014–15.
68. See id. at 1015.
69. Id. at 1017.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
72. Id. at 1018.
73. See, e.g., id. at 1016, 1027–31 (right to “essential use” of land); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 496 (1987) (right to “economically viable use”).
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Right to use how? In what way? For what? There has to be more
than the answer that “there was an entitlement” held by Lucas to
use his land in contravention of now existing law “because there
was an entitlement.”
To the extent that the Court’s majority articulates an underlying
theory, it seems to be one of reliance. For instance, the majority
places great weight on whether the owner should have known of the
restrictions as “part of his title to begin with.”74 “Any limitation so
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation),
but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership.”75 Although an owner of personal property
“ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might . . .
render his property economically worthless,” the same is not true of
the owner of land.76 Such an outcome would violate the “historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause,” and the owner’s “investmentbacked expectations.”77
Reliance, as we have seen in the discussion above, is not a freefloating concept. There is reliance that is justified, and reliance that
is not. To be justified, in this context, there must be more than the
simple existence of law, around which the individual planned—there
must be some kind of personal, individual/government transaction.
When juxtaposed next to our prior cases, above, the flimsiness of
a reliance claim in Lucas’s case is striking. There was no personal,
negotiated relationship between Lucas and the government of any
kind; the law—which grounded his reliance claim—presented, at
most, a particular legal environment for his private operation. His
case even more starkly fails the second reliance condition that we
derived above—that there must be some kind of explicit understanding between the individual and government that the risk of
change is something that the public (government) has undertaken.
Lucas’s claim involves no communication about government’s undertaking the risk of change of any sort, and there is no (alternative)
evidence of government exploitation or overreaching. When compared to the cases that we have previously considered, it is most akin
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
Id. at 1029.
See id. at 1027–28.
See id. at 1028, 1019 n.8.
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to the disappointed bar owner who invested, and then was disappointed when a general change in the law impacted his investment.
There is one additional possibility that needs to be explored. Is
Lucas entitled to different treatment from other citizen investors,
because it was in land that he invested?
When one views the whole of the legal landscape, this certainly
seems to be a prominent feature of what one sees. Changes in law
affect investments of all kinds and can dramatically reduce their
value. Stocks, farming enterprises, the production of industrial chemicals, the value of airplane companies, the value of machinery, and
investments of every kind and description are affected—day in and
day out—by changes in laws of general application. Conceivably all
of these changes could be challenged by takings claims. However,
land-based claims clearly dominate the takings landscape. And with
few exceptions,78 we do not find the kind of solicitude for other claims
that we find for land-based claims in the nation’s courts.
As a formal matter, however, the Supreme Court has never drawn
a distinction between land-based claims and others.79 All that we
hear are the majority’s musings in Lucas, to the effect that owners
of personal property should be aware of the risk of financial wipeout, while owners of land (for some reason) should not.80 Whatever
the reasons one might advance for such bias, in that case they remain unexplored and unexplained. When one considers the blood,
sweat, and tears of ownership and financial risk, the reasons for a
radical difference in treatment—as far as the reliance theory goes—
are far from obvious.
The bottom line is that reliance alone cannot really provide ground
for Lucas’s claim or provide the theory for the Court’s decision. It is
handy to say that “he relied on it, therefore he deserves it.” But on
closer analysis, the theory crumbles. Unless we adopt the bold and
sweeping assertion that there is a compact or agreement between
government and all landowners that the latter shall never (without
compensation) be deprived of all of the developmental use of their
land, there is nothing to distinguish Lucas’s reliance from that of
anyone else on what are laws of general application. And that bold
78. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524
U.S. 156 (1998).
79. Hints about a distinction between land-based claims and other claims are rare. See,
e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28; E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 554–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28, and note 76, supra.
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assertion—even if made—is not a practical one. For instance, as the
Court has implicitly found, it is completely financially impracticable
for the government to pay “development prices” to all of the owners
of the nation’s millions of acres of preserved—indeed, critically
preserved—wetlands.81
If individual reliance is not—in fact—what drives Lucas and other
land-regulation cases, what does? Because of the Court’s continual
reliance on misplaced reliance theories, this question is not easy to
answer. Maybe it is the need to encourage investment in particular
cases. Maybe it is the need to balance the loss of one individual
against the losses of another. Maybe it is the need to achieve justice
through the evaluation of competing individual and public interests.
Explicit engagement of such questions will be difficult, no doubt.
But it would yield more substance and insight than the unthinking
use of an empty theory of reliance.
CONCLUSION
The problems posed by reliance and changes in law are not trivial;
rather, they are ubiquitous. Any recognized configuration of rights,
which property initially confers, is at most a snapshot of the way
that conflicting individual and collective interests are resolved at
that moment.82 The honoring of individual reliance claims—rooted
in the prior legal status quo—attempts to freeze the process of legal
change, at the cost of government indemnification.
As the result of the fundamental struggle that the individual claims
and government defenses in this area represent, the circumstances
under which individual claims of this type will be honored are limited. For individual claims to be honored, there must be more than
reliance on the simple existence of law. There must be some kind of
personal transaction between the government and the individual.
In addition, for individual reliance to be justified, there must be
some kind of explicit understanding between the individual and
government that the risk of change is something that the public
(government) has undertaken. Absent these restraints, “reliance”
is unlimited, and creates more problems than it answers.
81. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (Lucas claim for preserved
wetlands sidestepped, on the ground that the parcels in question had “upland” portions).
82. Laura S. Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum, 91
TEX. L. REV. 2015, 2035 (2013).

THE 2013 TAKINGS TRIPLETS:
FROM EXACTIONS TO FLOODING TO RAISIN
SEIZURES—IMPLICATIONS FOR LITIGATORS

JAMES S. BURLING*
INTRODUCTION
The 2013 takings triplets of Koontz, Horne, and Arkansas Game
and Fish Commission from the United States Supreme Court augur
well for the future of property rights.1 While there was nothing
particularly revolutionary in any of the three decisions, a loss in any
of these cases could have spelled some serious backsliding for the
progress made in the past quarter-century by property rights advocates. Moreover, these decisions helped dissipate some of the pervasive property law pessimism that followed from the Court’s Kelo
decision in 2006.2
Property rights cases have had a long history of incremental twosteps-forward followed by one-step-back progress. First English’s
doctrinal clarification of the concept of temporary takings was undercut by the extreme equivocation of Tahoe-Sierra.3 The cautious
optimism engendered by twenty years of growing respect for property rights at the state and federal level was cast into doubt with
Tahoe-Sierra and then cut short by the Court’s retreat into the past
with Kelo.4 In fact, entering into the 2013 Term, a dozen years had
* Director of Litigation, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA. For more information, see http://www.pacificlegal.org. Foundation attorneys represented Coy Koontz, Jr. before
the United States Supreme Court.
1. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Horne v. Dep’t of
Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013); Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
2. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a dose of such pessimism, see
Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad Judgment, 38 URB. LAW.
201 (2006).
3. Compare First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of L.A., 482
U.S. 304 (1987) (temporary taking compensation due for period of time that a regulation that
constitutes a taking remains in place) with Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (finding no temporary taking when land use moratoria are only
“temporary” and where property will, eventually, regain its value).
4. While Kelo arguably followed precedents set in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(employing a standard of great deference to hold a taking of private property for private redevelopers a “public use”) and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
(same), the property rights bar had some hope that a judicial reawakening was in the offing.
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elapsed since the Court had handed down a mostly clear-cut property rights victory in Palazzolo, but even that decision was compromised internally by competing concurrences.5
So, property rights advocates had some trepidation when the Court
agreed to take three property rights cases for its 2013 Term. A loss
in Koontz could have eviscerated the Nollan nexus requirement and
the Dolan rough proportionality and burden-of-proof holdings for
property-based unconstitutional conditions. A loss in Arkansas Game
& Fish Commission could have spelled the end of all temporary takings, and left government agencies everywhere license to wreck havoc
on real property so long as the wrecking did not last too long. And
a loss in Horne could have augured further incomprehensible procedural barriers for litigants attempting to bring takings claims in
various courts. As is now well-known, these setbacks did not occur.
But what did these cases actually mean for the ability of property
owners and government regulators to litigate cases dealing with
property rights? That is the concern of this essay. But first a synopsis of the state of the law as we entered into the 2013 Term of the
Supreme Court is in order.
I. THE STATE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS AND
EXACTIONS BEFORE 2013
A. Partial, Physical, and Total Takings
In what is now considered the seminal partial regulatory takings
case, the Court in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of
For example, in Michigan, the state supreme court had overturned a controversial decision
in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (holding
the condemnation of a working-class neighborhood to make way for a private owned General
Motors plant was a “public use”) in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004) (overturning Poletown).
5. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). Compare 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (suggesting that the regulatory state at the time of purchase could be relevant
to a landowner’s “investment-backed expectations” in a Penn Central analysis) with 533 U.S.
at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the regulations at time of acquisition have “no
bearing” on whether there has been a taking). See also Sackett v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 132 S.
Ct. 1367 (2012) (finding wetlands compliance order judicially reviewable). While the landowner won in Sackett, it was on grounds of administrative law and due process and it was not
a case advancing fundamental issues of property rights law.
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New York held that three factors are particularly relevant to determining whether there has been a regulatory taking: the investmentbacked expectations of the landowner, the economic impact of the
regulation, and the character of the regulation.6 This test applies
when there has been less than a “total” taking of the use and value
of the property, in which case Lucas applies.
In contrast to the equivocal nature of the Penn Central test, the
Court has adopted two “categorical” rules-cases in which a taking will
always be found. In 1978, the Court decided in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.7 that a physical invasion, no matter how
slight, was a taking. Here, the Court held that there was a taking
when the invasion was only by some wires and a small cable box.
Any infringement on the right to exclude was seen to be a taking.8
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,9 the Court held that
a regulation that prohibited all use and value of the property was a
total taking. The Court found that use of the property for residential
development did not constitute a nuisance and was not proscribed
by “background principles” of property law. Over time, however, the
efficacy of this test has proved elusive because there are few circumstances where a regulation actually destroys all use and value.
Moreover, some courts have held that even if use is destroyed, there
is no taking so long as there is residual value.10
B. Procedural Hurdles to Bringing Takings Cases
Property rights are not like other constitutionally protected rights.
Whether they deserve less constitutional protection or whether they
6. 438 U.S. 104, 126 (1978). The meaning (or meaninglessness) of these “factors” has been
widely debated. To some they are a pastiche of subjective and objective factors, which are not particularly well-suited to determining whether the government has actually taken private property. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118
PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). To others, the factors are a good start. See, e.g., Kavanau
v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997) (adopting a ten-factor test).
7. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
8. A similar result was reached in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)
(taking of dredged channel that the Corps of Engineers demanded to be opened to the public).
9. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
10. See, e.g., James S. Burling, Can Property Value Avert a Regulatory Taking When
Economically Beneficial Use Has Been Destroyed?, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 451 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002); James S. Burling, Use
Versus Value in the Wake of Tahoe-Sierra, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: THE IMPACT
OF TAHOE-SIERRA 99 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2003).
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really are a “poor relation” to other rights,11 one thing is certain: the
door to the federal courthouse is a lot harder to push through for
property rights than other kinds of rights. In Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,12
the Court held that a regulatory takings claim seeking damages could
be brought in federal court if (1) administrative procedures below
have been completed, and (2) the plaintiff has first utilized available
state procedures. The first prong makes sense in that it could be
premature to bring any kind of taking claim unless it is known what
actually can and cannot be done with a parcel of property.13 But the
second prong has proven to be far more problematic.14 This is especially so in light of the decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and
County of San Francisco,15 in which the Court held that if a litigant
can first litigate a federal regulatory takings claim in state court, he
must do so—even if this means the doctrine of res judicata will prevent the owner from ever litigating a federal takings claim in federal court.16
One hurdle that seems to have been removed is the so-called
“notice rule,” wherein a landowner who acquired property on notice
of the existence of a regulatory scheme is otherwise precluded from
11. While the Court found restrictions on “economic” rights to be deserving of less scrutiny
for purposes of due process in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), the Court also suggested in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994), that
property rights were not a “poor relation” of other rights.
12. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
13. But there are limits. As the Court explained in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 622 (2001), “[r]ipeness doctrine does not require a landowner to submit applications for
their own sake. Petitioner is required to explore development opportunities on his upland
parcel only if there is uncertainty as to the land’s permitted use.”
14. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, “[Un]Equal Justice Under the Law”: The Invidiously Disparate
Treatment of American Property Owners in Takings Cases, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 (2007);
J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County’s Troubling State Procedures Rule: How
the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the
Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209 (2003).
15. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
16. J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave: The Story of San
Remo Hotel—The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a
Rule Intended to Ripen Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247 (2006).
There may be exceptions to this prudential rule—such as when a local or state government
first removes a claim from state to federal court and then argues that the claim must be
dismissed because it is in the wrong court. See, e.g., Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d
533 (4th Cir. 2013) (refusing to dismiss takings claims after removal to federal court).
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challenging the application of the scheme. A number of claims foundered upon this doctrine until the Court decided Palazzolo, which
held fairly explicitly that a purchaser of property subject to a regulation is not precluded from challenging the application of that
regulation as a taking. “Future generations, too, have a right to
challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”17
Despite this rather emphatic holding, its force is somewhat mitigated by the dueling concurrences and the predilection of some
courts to distinguish the case into meaninglessness.18
C. The Doctrine Unconstitutional Conditions and Property Rights
With the rise of the power of local governments to zone and regulate the use of private property in the wake of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,19 governments have not been reluctant to use
that power to exact concessions from landowners who seek permits.
Pragmatic landowners will weigh the costs of delay and attorneys
and usually decide to accede to the demands, regardless of how unjustified they might be. Nevertheless, some landowners will object
out of principle. Examples of such landowners include the Nollans,
Mrs. Dolan, and Coy Koontz, Sr. and his son, Coy Koontz, Jr.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission20 involved a demand
that the Nollans dedicate to the public one-third of their beachfront
land in exchange for a permit to replace a one-story bungalow with
a two-story home. The Coastal Commission granted the permit with
the condition attached, but the Nollans never accepted the permit.
The Court held that a government may impose a condition upon the
granting of a development permit if that condition ameliorates a
direct negative impact caused by the development when that impact
could justify the outright denial of the permit.21
17. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
18. See supra note 5 (discussing Palazzolo concurrences in context of Penn Central analysis).
See also Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Palazzolo
on basis of manner of acquisition of property—which was not at all relevant to the basis of the
Supreme Court’s decision).
19. 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (upholding area-wide zoning).
20. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
21. Id. at 836–37.
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Although the Court [in Nollan] does a poor job of defining the
parameters of the test, suggesting that it simply requires a correspondence between the government’s purposes and its means,
its reasoning and holding clearly show that the raw nexus test
requires (1) a legitimate state interest or purpose; (2) a connection between that interest and the land use exaction chosen to
address it; and (3) a minimal connection between the impacts of
the proposed development and the land use exaction.22

In Dolan v. City of Tigard,23 the City imposed two conditions in
exchange for a permit to expand a plumbing store: dedicate riparian
property to public access, and build a bicycle trail across the property. The Court held that the City had the burden of showing not
only that there was a nexus between the conditions and impacts
caused by the development, but also that the City must show the
exactions to be “roughly proportional” to the impact.24
In response to the dissent’s criticizing the decision for “abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality,”25 the Court
noted that it was not imposing this burden in the context of ordinary
land use legislative zoning.26 This statement has led to assertions
that the “rough proportionality” standards of Dolan do not apply
when exactions are imposed through a legislative act, such as affordable housing ordinances that require developers to set aside a
set percentage of new units for below-market sale to lower-income
people, or pay an in-lieu fee to a local housing authority instead.27
The Court in Lingle v. Chevron reiterated that Nollan and Dolan
were special takings cases that followed from the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.28 The Court also noted that where a regulation fails to substantially advance a legitimate governmental
interest, it may violate the Due Process Clause, but not necessarily
22. J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal
Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 373, 378 (2002).
23. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
24. Id. at 391.
25. Id. 512 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 391 n.8 (majority opinion).
27. See James S. Burling & Graham Owen, The Implications of Lingle on Inclusionary
Zoning and Other Legislative and Monetary Exactions, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397 (2009), reprinted in 2010 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 631 (Patricia F. Salkin ed., 2010).
28. 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005).
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the Takings Clause.29 Thus, because the “substantially advance” test
is not the rationale of Nollan or Dolan, the vitality of those cases
was not disturbed.
D. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District:
The Latest Take on Regulatory Exactions
1. Nineteen Years of Litigation Preceded the Supreme
Court Decision
In 1972 Coy Koontz, Sr., purchased 14.9 acres of property near
the intersection of two major roads near Orlando, Florida.30 In 1984
the state adopted a comprehensive wetlands management scheme.31
In 1994, Coy Koontz applied to develop 3.7 acres of his property.32
The water management district determined that the property was
in a “Riparian Habitat Protection Zone” and the development of the
3.7 acres would require mitigation.33
Although Coy Koontz agreed to impose a conservation easement
upon his remaining 11 acres, the St. Johns River Water Management District demanded more.34 Because 11 acres did not fulfill the
District’s one- to ten-acre mitigation formula, it demanded that Koontz
either reduce his development to one acre or that he accede to a condition to spend up to $150,000 to improve the wetlands functions on
district-owned property five to seven miles away from the project
site.35 Koontz refused and the District denied the permit.36
29. Id.
30. 1 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (2013).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1224 (Fla. 2012). During
the course of litigation, the District ultimately conceded that only 0.8 acres of the development
area contained wetlands. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 5–8, Koontz v. St. Johns Water
Mgmt. Dist., 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. Nov. 12, 2009) (No. SC09-713), 2009 WL 4227381, at *5–8.
Moreover, the land contained no significant habitat. St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz,
5 So. 3d 8, 9 (Fla. App. 2009) (“The site’s usefulness as an animal habitat has been severely
reduced.”); Joint Appendix, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 8: BDA 2001 Wetlands Evaluation Report at
68 (Aug. 28, 2002), Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 2012 WL 7853775 (U.S.
2012) (No. 11-1447).
34. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592–93.
35. Id. at 2593.
36. Id.
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Koontz filed suit toward the end of 1994. Ultimately, the trial
court found that the conditions failed under Nollan and Dolan and
ordered the District to give Koontz a permit and awarded $327,500
in damages under Florida Statutes § 373.617.37 In 1998 the court of
appeals found the rejection of the application was final agency action and the case was ripe.38 The Florida Supreme Court reversed
on two grounds. First, because Koontz never took the permit, the
conditions had never, in fact, been imposed. And, second, it held that
the holdings of Nollan and Dolan do not apply to the imposition of
monetary exactions.39
2. The Supreme Court Reverses the Florida Supreme Court’s
Holding That Exactions May Be Challenged Only When a
Permit Is Accepted
The United States Supreme Court granted Koontz’s petition for
writ of certiorari and reversed. The Court held, per all nine Justices,
that the tests of Nollan and Dolan apply not only in circumstances
where a permit is granted with conditions, but also in those circumstances where a permit is denied because an owner refuses to accede
to the permit conditions. “[R]egardless of whether the government
ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting a constitutional right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding
benefits from those who exercise them.”40 The Court continued to
37. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2002 WL 34724740, at *10
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002) (finding District failed to justify exaction under Nollan and Dolan);
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2006 WL 6912444, at *2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2006) (awarding damages); St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d
8, 17 (Fla. App. 2009) (noting of award of $376,154 including interest).
38. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 720 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. App. 1998)
(“There is no requirement that an owner turned down in his effort to develop his property
must continue to submit offers until the governing body finally approves one before he can go
to court. If the governing body finally turns down an application and the owner does not desire
to make any further concessions in order to possibly obtain an approval, the issue is ripe.”).
39. 77 So. 3d 1220, 1230 (Fla. 2012) (“[T]he Nollan/Dolan rule with regard to ‘essential
nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ is applicable only where the condition/exaction sought by
the government involves a dedication of or over the owners’s interest in real property in
exchange for permit approval; and only when the regulatory agency actually issues the permit sought. . . .”).
40. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.
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explain that the rationale behind the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine is consistent with the application here:
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to
have property taken without just compensation. As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede
a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally
cognizable injury.41

Justice Kagan and three other Justices agreed with this basic
principle: “The NollanDolan standard applies not only when the
government approves a development permit conditioned on the
owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a condition
subsequent), but also when the government denies a permit until the
owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition precedent).”42
The dissent, however, questioned whether under the facts of this
case the permit had been denied because Koontz failed to accept the
conditions or whether Koontz just halted ongoing negotiations.
3. The Supreme Court Finds That the Holdings of Nollan and
Dolan Apply to Monetary Exactions
A five-Justice majority further held that monetary exactions
should receive the same scrutiny given to exactions of land under
Nollan and Dolan. The Court reasoned that Nollan and Dolan are
special applications of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Since government cannot simply demand a payment of money (outside the taxing power) it cannot demand the same money simply
because it has the leverage of its permitting authority. But, recognizing that develooutpment can have negative external consequences,
it is appropriate for government to demand ameliorating conditions—
so long as they meet the appropriate tests. The Court held that this
case is unlike other circumstances where government may demand
41. Id. at 2596.
42. Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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money. Instead, here, “the monetary obligation burdened petitioner’s
ownership of a specific parcel of land.”43
In response to suggestions from the District and the dissent that
this case should be viewed as an alleged regulatory taking under the
rubric of Penn Central, the Court responded that
petitioner does not ask us to hold that the government can commit a regulatory taking by directing someone to spend money. As
a result, we need not apply Penn Central’s “essentially ad hoc,
factual inquir[y],” . . . at all, much less extend that “already difficult and uncertain rule” to the “vast category of cases” in which
someone believes that a regulation is too costly.44

The Court saw no need to explicate the distinction between taxes
and exactions—finding it clear enough here and really a problem
more in theory than reality: “[I]t suffices to say that despite having
long recognized that ‘the power of taxation should not be confused
with the power of eminent domain,’ . . . we have had little trouble
distinguishing between the two.”45
E. Vexing Questions About Exactions That Survive Koontz
1. Do Nollan and Dolan Apply to Legislatively
Imposed Exactions?
In Dolan the Court tried to allay fears of government advocates and
the dissent that all manner of property regulation would be subject
to the heightened scrutiny of “rough proportionality” by distinguishing zoning regulations, noting:
First, they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an
adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a
building permit on an individual parcel. Second, the conditions
imposed were not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might
make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions
of the property to the city.46
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 2599 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2600 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2602 (citation omitted).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994).
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To property rights advocates this passage has always been considered simply a means of distinguishing the particular facts in Dolan
from general area-wide zoning schemes. But those with a more progovernment perspective have argued that this passage means first,
that only individualized adjudicative decisions are subject to Dolan
and, second, that Dolan applies only when the demanded exaction
is land, as opposed to money.47 In Koontz the Court made explicit
that both Nollan and Dolan apply to circumstances beyond the dedication of real property exactions. But it did not have occasion to
opine on whether Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz should apply to
legislative exactions.
This is an issue on which state courts are in disagreement. Some
state courts, like California, have held that a legislatively imposed
exaction, an in-lieu fee for public art, should be exempt from Dolan’s
rough proportionality standard.48 Others have subjected legislatively
imposed fees to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan, holding, for example, that “the character of the [condition] remains the
type that is subject to the analysis in Dolan whether it is legislatively required or a case-specific formulation. The nature, not the
source, of the imposition is what matters.”49
As a practical matter the legislative-adjudicative distinction is a
distinction that lacks precision because it can become notoriously difficult at the local planning level to objectively tell one from the other:
In reality, the discretionary powers of municipal authorities exist
along a continuum and seldom fall into the neat categories of a
fully predetermined legislative exaction or a completely discretionary administrative determination as to the appropriate exaction.50

Suffice it to say that Koontz leaves this question open. However,
considering that the exaction in Koontz—a ten-to-one mitigation
47. For a discussion of this argument in the context of subsidized housing ordinances, see
Burling & Owen, supra note 27.
48. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 299 (1996) (reasoning that the arts fee was no different than other aesthetic regulations
like paint color and landscaping).
49. J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas Cty., 887 P.2d 360, 365 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). For a more
extended discussion of this issue, see Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the
Legislative/Adjudicative Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487 (2006) and Burling & Owen, supra note 27.
50. Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 266 (2000).
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measure—was pursuant to a broadly applicable regulatory fiat (that
is, akin to a legislative act), there is little support in Koontz for the
continuing vitality of the legislative exception. In fact, because the
particular exactions in Nollan and Dolan were likewise pursuant to
broadly applicable legislative acts, the derivation of this exception
from the language in Dolan must be inherently suspect. If the rationale for the exception, as described in Ehrlich, stems from the inherently coercive nature of adjudicative permitting schemes,51 then
a serious analysis is warranted on the degree to which legislative
acts demanding tribute from the small minority of landowners who
might wish to develop their property contain an element of coercion.
One aspect of this debate must be acceded to by all sides in the
debate: there is a clear conflict on this issue in the lower courts as
well as in the academy and sooner or later the Supreme Court will
need to take this up. The Court once came close, in the denial of a
petition for writ of certiorari in Parking Association of Georgia v.
City of Atlanta, where Justices Thomas and O’Connor questioned in
dissent why it should matter what the governmental source of the
exaction may be.52 Until the Court takes this issue up, property
owners will continue to argue against the exception, and government lawyers will seek to apply it.
2. After Koontz, Is Nollan Satisfied If an Exaction Advances a
Legitimate Public Purpose?
Actually, this a trick question because Nollan has never been
satisfied if an exaction merely satisfies a legitimate public purpose.
Readers may recall that for a time the Court had held that a regulation effects a regulatory taking if it “fails to advance a legitimate
public purpose” or if it destroys “economically viable use.”53 And, for
a while, the holding in Nollan was sometimes justified under the
rubric that an exaction that failed the Nollan nexus test was a regulatory taking because it failed to advance a legitimate government
interest. But in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,54 the Court reversed
itself and held that while a regulation that fails to substantially
51.
52.
53.
54.

Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438–39.
515 U.S. 1116, 1116–18 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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advance a legitimate government interest might violate the Due
Process Clause, it did not necessarily violate the Takings Clause.
But the Court also took pains in Lingle to note that this did not
affect its holding in Nollan. In other words, the Court wrote, Nollan
is still good law because it is an instantiation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.55 In Koontz the Court reiterated that the
holding in Nollan derives from the Takings Clause because the unconstitutional condition “burden[s] the right not to have property
taken without just compensation.”56 There you have it. Nollan is a
regulatory takings case not because an exaction fails to substantially advance a legitimate public purpose (although it might not)
but because a property owner cannot be forced to give up the right
to receive just compensation for a taking as the price to pay for a
government benefit or permit.
Moreover, the Nollan nexus test was never satisfied merely because an exaction simply happened to advance a legitimate governmental interest. Clearly, the beach easement in Nollan advanced
the public purpose of creating more public beach. The problem was
that the demand for more public beach was completely unhinged
from any negative impact caused by the development of the Nollans’
home. So the bottom line is that it is completely insufficient to a
Nollan analysis whether an exaction happens to result in some public good or effects a public purpose. Koontz didn’t change this—but
it did solidify the force of Nollan that some saw having been limited
after Lingle.
3. Must the Impact to Be Ameliorated Constitute a
Public Nuisance?
No. Nollan held that an exaction or condition could be imposed in
lieu of denying a permit if the exaction was related to the reason for
denying the permit. But it also noted that the rule applied only where
a permit denial would not by itself constitute a taking:
The Commission argues that among these permissible purposes
are protecting the public’s ability to see the beach, assisting the
public in overcoming the “psychological barrier” to using the beach
55. Id. at 548.
56. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (2013).
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created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on
the public beaches. We assume, without deciding, that this is so—
in which case the Commission unquestionably would be able to
deny the Nollans their permit outright if their new house (alone,
or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in conjunction
with other construction) would substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with the
Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking.57

In other words, if a permit denial were to constitute a taking under
Penn Central, then an exaction in lieu of that denial would not be
justified under the Nollan rule because if the permit could not be
lawfully denied, then the government has no business demanding
an exaction for granting the permit.
Importantly, the external harms allegedly caused by the development in Nollan (the “psychological barrier” and beach congestion)
were not clearly nuisances. The government can regulate all sorts
of land uses that fall short of being nuisances—sometimes to prevent a harm and sometimes to create a public good. Indeed, in Lucas
the Court noted that when it comes to permitting actions, there is
little principled distinction between land use requirements that
provide a public benefit and those that prevent a public harm.58 But
the Court also noted in Lucas that if a regulation was truly nuisancepreventing, with nuisance being defined by the “background principles” of a state’s law of property, then the denial of the noxious use
could not constitute a taking of the property, no matter how much
use and value may be lost.59
Thus, a regulation prohibiting a genuine “background principle”
nuisance is not a taking. A government agency may, however, substitute the prohibition of a nuisance for a conditioned permit. Thus,
for example, a government could prevent the construction of a dam
that might flood a neighbor’s property (to use an example given in
Lucas) and not be liable for a taking. But it also could, in theory,
57. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1987) (footnote omitted).
58. Or as the Court put it, only a “stupid staff” would not be able to conjure up a harmpreventing rationale for a regulation. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025
n.12 (1992).
59. Id. at 1029 (“Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”).
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approve the dam so long as the nuisance flooding was ameliorated—
perhaps by paying damages to the affected neighbors agreeable to
being paid. Thus, while the harm to be prevented by a development
permit denial could be, but need not be, a nuisance-like activity, the
requirements of Nollan apply to any condition imposed as a substitution for an otherwise lawful permit denial.
4. Are Nollan, Dolan, and Now Koontz Really Just Variations
of the Same Test?
No. In properly understanding and applying the tests, it is important to understand that Nollan and Dolan apply different tests
to the imposition of exactions. Nollan requires that there be a connection, or nexus, between the impact of the development that could
justify a permit denial and the exaction. In Dolan the nexus was
established: expanding a plumbing store and creating more impervious surface could increase traffic and could increase the potential
of downstream flooding. Assuming (and the Court did not decide)
that those impacts could justify a denial of Mrs. Dolan’s permit,
then a measure to ameliorate traffic (the bicycle path) and a measure to ameliorate the flooding potential (dedication of land next to
the creek) could easily satisfy the nexus test in Nollan. But this
could quickly become absurd, as Dolan began to demonstrate.60 As
John Muir once observed: “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the Universe.”61 Or as
the trial court noted in Koontz: “When a butterfly flutters its wings
in one part of the world, it can eventually cause a hurricane in another.”62 But Nollan must be more than an intellectual parlor game.
Otherwise, a government agency could soon demand all manner of
public benefit dedications so long as there was some remote connection to an adverse impact from the project. That is why the Court
in Dolan imposed the additional test that the exaction-imposing
entity must prove that the condition is roughly proportional to the
denial-justifying impact of the project. Koontz did not change this.
60. Or as Justice Scalia observed: “There are a lot of bike paths around Washington, and
I’ve never seen people carrying shopping bags on their bikes.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 27, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (No. 93-518), 1994 WL 664939.
61. JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (Sierra Club Books 1988) (1911).
62. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., No. CI-94-5673, 2002 WL 34724740, at *1
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2002) (citing to Edward Lorenz’s Chaos Theory).
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5. When Should an Exaction Be Challenged?
One of the procedural conundrums raised by the Koontz state
supreme court decision involves timing. When should an exaction be
challenged? Coy Koontz, Sr., filed his challenge after his permit was
denied. During the course of the litigation, the District has taken
great pains to point out that Koontz was never legally obligated to
fulfill the conditions. While the Florida Supreme Court found this
dispositive, the United States Supreme Court held that Koontz could
challenge the condition when he could show (and the trial court held)
that the permit was denied because he refused to accede to one of
the conditions.
If the decision had gone the other way, this could have been the
death knell for many challenges. That is because in some states, once
a permit is accepted with conditions and a permittee takes the benefit
of the permit, the permittee is estopped from challenging the conditions. For example, in Pfeiffer v. City of La Mesa,63 a California Court
of Appeals held that a permit condition could not be challenged once
the permittee accepted the permit and began to accept its benefits.64
Other states have declined to follow this rule.65
In Florida, the state supreme court’s decision in Koontz created
substantial uncertainty as to whether a permittee could ever challenge a permit condition if a condition could not be challenged when
a permit is denied but also could not be challenged if the permit is
granted under a rule similar to California’s. In fact, Coy Koontz unsuccessfully sought a rehearing of the state supreme court’s decision
for clarification on this very point.66 With Koontz holding that a condition may be challenged when a permit is denied because an applicant has refused to accept the condition, a challenge may proceed.
However, in those jurisdictions holding that the ability to challenge
a condition may be waived upon the acceptance of a permit, Koontz
63. 137 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1977).
64. As a result of the Pfeiffer decision, the state legislature adopted a statute creating a
limited exception to Pfeiffer. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66000–66009 (West 2013). Incidentally,
in Nollan, the Nollans came close to accepting the permit with attached conditions but refused
the permit at the last minute, once they realized they could obtain pro-bono representation
in a challenge to the condition. That enabled them to avoid the Pfeiffer rule.
65. See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates L.P., 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
66. Motion for Rehearing, St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220
(Fla. 2011), reh’g denied, No. SC09-713, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 1 (Jan. 4, 2012) (on file with Pacific
Legal Foundation).
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doesn’t change things. It is imperative that litigants seeking to challenge a permit condition learn first what effect the acceptance of a
permit with conditions has on the ability to challenge the conditions
in a particular jurisdiction.
6. Will Koontz Result in Local Governments Refusing to
Negotiate Permit Conditions for Fear of a Lawsuit?
No. While this fear was expressed in Justice Kagan’s dissent,67
this seems overblown. Recall that the trial and appellate courts
found that the permit had been denied because Koontz refused to
accede to the permit condition and the case was therefore ripe.68 In
other words, there was nothing left to negotiate; Koontz was given
a take it or leave it offer and he left it on the table. The negotiations
were over. More importantly, a local government can easily couch
its negotiations expressly in terms of “ideas to be explored,” “nonbinding suggestions,” and the like. Only an incredibly “stupid staff”
would set out a list of permit conditions and say “take it or leave it.”
And in denying a permit, the local government could say, “we’re
denying the permit because of the adverse impact caused by the
project, and not because the applicant refuses to accede to certain
suggested ameliorating conditions.”
More importantly, because we must presume that local agencies
act in good faith and are usually not averse to all development, and
because local agencies have an incentive to work with local landowners in order to see that good projects are built, they also have
every incentive to try to get some ameliorating exactions as part of
the package. And landowners will not blithely let a permit be denied
if they can instead accept harm-ameliorating conditions combined
with a permit approval. In other words, both sides will continue to
negotiate just as they have since 1987 when Nollan was decided.69
67. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2610 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
68. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
69. Development agreements have become a very common land use approval vehicle since
Nollan. See, e.g., David L. Callies & Julie A. Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development
Conditions and the Development Agreement Solution: Bargaining for Public Facilities After
Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663 (2001); John J. Delaney, Development
Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to “Let’s Make a Deal!”, 25 URB. LAW. 49 (1993);
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & Scott A. Edelstein, Development Agreement Practice in California and
Other States, 22 STETSON L. REV. 761 (1993).
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The give (by landowners) and take (by government officials) will continue. In short, for better or worse, rumors of the demise of government as usual following Nollan, then Dolan, and now Koontz have
been greatly exaggerated.
7. Does Koontz Open Up the Floodgates to Litigation
Challenging User Fees and Taxes?
No. With respect to fees, the Court put it best:
It is beyond dispute that “[t]axes and user fees . . . are not
‘takings.’” We said as much in County of Mobile v. Kimball . . . ,
and our cases have been clear on that point ever since. This case
therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose
property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that
may impose financial burdens on property owners.70

Under the law of most states, fees must be related to the costs of
administering the program for which fees are charged and that fact
is not affected one way or the other by Koontz. Koontz is about exactions imposed to ameliorate harms that can justify a permit denial;
it is not about normal permitting fees. If a landowner objects to a
fee, there are existing avenues to call the fees into question; Koontz
is just not one of the avenues.
As the Court put it in Koontz, this will not change:
Finally, we disagree with the dissent’s forecast that our decision
will work a revolution in land use law by depriving local governments of the ability to charge reasonable permitting fees. Numerous courts—including courts in many of our Nation’s most
populous States—have confronted constitutional challenges to
monetary exactions over the last two decades and applied the
standard from Nollan and Dolan or something like it.71

F. Physical Invasions After Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States
In Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States,72 the Corps
of Engineers, to please farmers upstream from a dam, changed the
70. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 2602 (citations omitted).
72. 133 S. Ct. 511 (2013).
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timing of its water releases for six years. This caused regular flooding of state property well into the growing season, causing the saturation and eventual destruction of 18-million board feet of timber
that belonged to the State of Arkansas. The Court of Federal Claims
awarded $5.7 million in damages, but the Federal Circuit reversed.73
The United States denied its liability saying that it had stopped
the flooding after seven years and did not intend for the damage to
occur in the first place. The United States argued that it could not be
liable for a temporary flooding based on language in a 1924 Supreme
Court case, Sanguinetti v. United States.74 Sanguinetti held that “in
order to create an enforceable liability against the government, it is
at least necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land. . . .”75
From this, the United States argued that to be compensable, such
takings must be permanent.
A unanimous Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice
Ginsburg, disagreed and held that in a temporary physical invasion
taking like this, there was no requirement that the flooding be
permanent for liability to arise.76
The Court also gave short shrift to the reappearance of an argument that has appeared in virtually every takings case decided in the
past quarter-century—that a finding of government liability will cause
an end to government as we know it. The Court was not impressed:
Time and again in Takings Clause cases, the Court has heard
the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation claim would
unduly impede the government’s ability to act in the public
interest. . . . We have rejected this argument when deployed to
urge blanket exemptions from the Fifth Amendment’s instruction.
While we recognize the importance of the public interests the
Government advances in this case, we do not see them as categorically different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings
Clause cases. The sky did not fall after Causby, and today’s modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability.77

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 516–18.
264 U.S. 146 (1924).
133 S. Ct. at 520 (quoting Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924)).
133 S. Ct. at 520–21.
Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
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Coming in a unanimous decision written by a “liberal” Justice, this
portends well for advocates of property rights in that they may no
longer have to work as hard to allay fears that justice for one landowner will be perceived as creating hardship for all.
The Court, however, also injected some uncertainty into what was
a settled principle in physical invasion type cases—that government
is per se liable for a taking when it physically intrudes on private
property. In determining whether there is liability, the Court opined
that factors relevant to the takings analysis might include “foreseeability,” “intent” and, in a departure from every prior physical
invasion case, the Court speculated in dicta that the Penn Central
factors could be “relevant to the takings inquiry”:
We rule today, simply and only, that government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from
Takings Clause inspection. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, our
decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the
existence vel non of a compensable taking.
Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the
invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action. . . . So, too, are the character of the land at issue
and the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations”
regarding the land’s use.78

It is too soon to tell what the lower courts will make of this conflation of the Penn Central regulatory takings factors with the per
se rules of physical invasions—concepts the Court previously told us
were separate and divisible.79 So far, at least in this case, the court
of appeals has not taken the conflation beyond traditional flooding
liability cases, ruling on remand that “intent” to flood was unnecessary for liability, only that the flooding be foreseeable, a concept

78. Id. at 522 (citations omitted).
79. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)
(“This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one
hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat
cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a ‘regulatory taking’. . . .”).
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quite common in government flood liability cases.80 Indeed, this
holding is quite consistent with the law of other states that have
cautioned against impressing the law of takings with tort doctrines
such as intent.81
G. Are the Dancing Raisins Ripe?
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,82 a raisin-grower objected
to the statutory marketing order requirement that he give a substantial percentage of his crop to the government in order to sell the
remainder.83 After failing to comply, Horne was assessed with fines
of over $650,000 by an administrative law judge.84 After administrative proceedings, dealing in part on the precise application of the
statute to their activities, Horne sued in federal district court, arguing that the statute did not apply to him and that if it did it would
effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.85 The Ninth
Circuit held, relying on takings ripeness doctrines, that the takings
claim should have been filed in the Court of Federal Claims where
relief was available under the Tucker Act.86
While much of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision turned
on arcane statutory questions involving the distinction between
raisin “handlers” and raisin “producers,” the Court ultimately held
that despite Williamson County, the marketing order’s statutory
scheme allowed the district court to hear the takings claim and thus
the case had been properly filed in district court. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether there was a taking.
While the facts of this case are numbingly unique, we can take away
the lesson that Williamson County is not an absolute barrier.

80. “In order for a taking to occur, it is not necessary that the government intend to invade the property owner’s rights, as long as the invasion that occurred was ‘the foreseeable
or predictable result’ of the government’s actions.” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United
States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
81. See, e.g., Arvo Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20
HASTINGS L.J. 431, 435–38 (1969).
82. 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013).
83. Id. at 2056.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2059.
86. Id. at 2060.
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CONCLUSION
Koontz did not effect a revolution in the law; it simply regularized
the procedure and scope of the rules in Nollan and Dolan. But if
Koontz had lost his case, then in time Nollan and Dolan would have
been eviscerated as meaningful checks against unjustified demands
in the permitting process; likewise, for Arkansas Game and Fish and
Horne. None of these cases marked much of a change in the status
quo. However, if the Court had adopted the federal government’s
crabbed interpretation of temporary physical invasions in Arkansas
Game and Fish, then landowners would have ended up in a significantly worse place than they had been before these cases were decided. And even more landowners would have found themselves
trapped in the ripeness quagmire of Williamson County if the Ninth
Circuit’s raisin ruling remained.
All governments now must do what some have been doing for a
long time: follow the rules when a permit is denied and not treat
monetary exactions as a means of evasion, compensate people for
damages caused by foreseeable government flooding, and let the
courts hear allegations of regulatory takings.
Koontz is particularly instructive. It is not too much to ask to
require government agencies to prove the necessity and scope of conditions that are imposed as part of the development process. Landowners are not ATM machines or magic lamps to be rubbed by local
planners. Many communities have many wishes for new and better
public infrastructure. But these wishes must be fulfilled by the
taxpayers, not just those who happen to be standing in line at the
permit office.
There are still questions yet to be resolved when it comes to the
application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, but, in
order to fulfill the guarantees in the Constitution against unfair
treatment of landowners by opportunistic government agencies,
those questions should largely be answered in a way that requires
these agencies to justify what they take in exchange for permits—
and to justify those demands in a manner that comports with
Nollan, Dolan, and now Koontz. In other words, the constitutional
way of doing things.
And we have not seen the last litigation over government liability
for government-caused flood damages. While the government should
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not be liable for every flood, there are many instances where flooding is the foreseeable consequence of government actions that move
water from one (usually more populated) place to another (usually
less populated) place.
Finally, the Williamson County ripeness doctrine remains a vexing
barrier to justice in the federal courts for many litigants. Horne didn’t
put an end to Williamson County, but it did not expand its scope.
The demise of that unfortunate doctrine must await another day.

NATIONALIZATION AND NECESSITY: TAKINGS AND A
DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC EMERGENCY

NESTOR M. DAVIDSON*
Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout
our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private
companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no
exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently,
shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure
would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the
obligation to pay just compensation should be recognized as a natural extension of the doctrine of emergency in takings. Public officials
must be able to respond quickly to serious economic threats, no less
than when facing the kinds of imminent physical or public health
crises—such as wildfires and contagion—that have been a staple of
traditional takings jurisprudence. Far from an affront to the rule of
law, this reflection of necessity through an extension of emergency
doctrine would reaffirm the flexibility inherent in property law in
times of crisis.
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of Thursday, September 4, 2008, with the global
economy teetering on the edge of collapse, Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson came to the Oval Office to brief President Bush on the challenges facing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two troubled private companies at the heart of the U.S. mortgage finance system. “For the
good of the country,” Paulson would later write in his memoir of the
crisis, “I had proposed that we seize control of the companies,” and
that the Administration do so swiftly, without warning. As Paulson
said to the President that morning, the “first sound they’ll hear is
* Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Fordham University School of Law.
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their heads hitting the floor.”1 The next day, Paulson summoned top
executives from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to the White House and
dropped the ax, nationalizing companies that held over $5 trillion
worth of mortgage-related assets.2
Although there was a widely held, if erroneous, belief at the time
that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were governmental entities, the
companies in fact were publicly traded, with hundreds of millions of
privately held shares outstanding on the eve of their takeover. Given
this, the privatization of these companies may have seemed a remarkable intervention in the market and a sui generis infringement on
the property rights of shareholders and other economic stakeholders
in these companies. But these were by no means the only instances
of the government taking control of significant private enterprises
during the recent economic crisis (or, for that matter, in past economic crises). The technical mechanisms varied in each instance,
but the practical results were the same for General Motors (“GM”),
the American International Group (“AIG”), and other companies
nationalized during the chaotic early days of the Great Recession.3
Shareholders and others who claim an economic stake in these
firms have recently filed several suits raising, among other claims,
Takings Clause challenges to the takeovers.4 These claims squarely
raise the question whether public officials have the authority and
necessary latitude to respond to overriding threats to the national
economy without compensating those whose economic interests have
been harmed as a consequence.5 These cases thus have the potential
1. HENRY PAULSON, ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1 (2010).
2. I use the term nationalization intentionally to describe instances of the government—
and it is usually the federal government—taking control of private enterprises, recognizing
that the term has traditionally carried negative connotations. Doing so, however, recognizes
the reality of this particular economic intervention in our constitutional discourse.
3. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009).
4. See infra Part II. Shareholders who held Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock at the time
of their nationalization are seeking just compensation on the order of $41 billion. See Complaint
at 63, Wash. Fed. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00385-MMS (Fed. Cl. June 10, 2013) [hereinafter
Complaint, Washington Federal]. Similarly, one of AIG’s largest shareholders—and former
CEO—is asserting takings claims through both direct and shareholder derivative claims on behalf of the company, seeking just compensation across these claims of at least $55 billion. See
Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, recons. denied, 107 Fed. Cl. 374 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
5. It can be argued that the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fell into a different category because they were originally congressionally chartered (hence the descriptor

2014]

NATIONALIZATION AND NECESSITY

189

to shape the policy landscape for future economic crises, as well as
important aspects of our understanding of takings law.
This Essay’s core claim is that the nationalization of private enterprises whose failure would pose particularly significant systemic risks
can be justified in times of economic crisis without a mandate to provide the owners of those firms just compensation.6 Overriding necessity has always placed an important limitation on the absolutism of
common-law property rights, and there is likewise a well-established
doctrine of emergency in the constitutional law of property. This strain
in the jurisprudence has traditionally been invoked in contexts such
as disasters and public health crises, giving public officials the ability
to create firebreaks in the face of wildfires or stop the spread of contagion without compensating those whose property interests are harmed
as a result.7
Although the constitutional doctrine of emergency in takings law
has not historically included economic exigencies, its logic of imminent necessity clearly applies to firms whose failure pose systemic
risks in our increasingly interconnected economy. The underlying
rationale has always been that officials must be free to act quickly
and decisively to forestall great harm and that property injured as
a consequence is a reasonable burden for owners to bear. The same
can be said for nationalization as it has been practiced in times of economic crisis. “Too big to fail” does not always mean too important to
require compensation for those harmed when the failure of such firms
is prevented, but under the right circumstances, that is precisely the
constitutional latitude that public officials require.
“government-sponsored enterprise,” or GSE). However, these particular GSEs had clearly been
privatized (even if they remained heavily regulated).
6. Nationalization potentially implicates other constitutional provisions, most notably
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, as well as statutory and regulatory issues,
many of which have been raised in the recently filed cases.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 58–67. There are two related doctrines that have
some relevance to the constitutional landscape of takings and nationalization. The first is the
version of the emergency doctrine in constitutional property that has arisen in the military
context. See infra note 61. The second is a contested doctrine of incompatible economic imperatives exemplified by the cedar rust tree destruction blessed by the Supreme Court in Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). See infra text accompanying notes 82–83. For reasons elaborated below, this Essay does not rely primarily on either of these traditions to craft a doctrine of economic emergency in takings, although each sheds some light on the boundaries of
necessity in constitutional property.
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An extension of the emergency doctrine to such economic actors
hardly means that all property rights are casually defeasible in times
of crisis, as some critics of nationalization suggest.8 Nor would it undermine the rule of law to acknowledge that the nature of the harms
at issue in emergencies can evolve. But it does mean that the legal
boundaries of property in crisis are—and should be—more flexible
than such critiques suggest.
Let me address two conceptual objections at the outset about the
nature of the doctrinal claims at issue, as an initial instinct may be
that there is no actual takings issue in nationalization. Consistent
with our general historical approach, every instance of nationalization
in the most recent economic crisis was accompanied by the investment of significant public resources in companies that were understood at the time to be failing. And, in each instance, the relevant
firm at least nominally authorized the takeover.9
This might suggest categorically that no takings liability could
attach, but these conditions do not necessarily obviate that potential
for takings liability. This is because shareholders would not necessarily have fared as poorly as they did had these companies gone
through bankruptcy proceedings (or had the firms somehow found
buyers), and also because the public investments seem not to have
actually compensated shareholders. Moreover, shareholders are vigorously contesting the voluntary nature of the takeovers, and board
consent is not necessarily a bar to shareholder claims.10
There is more to be said about these and related doctrinal issues,
but given that takings challenges to nationalization are quite active
and likely to be a factor in any future crisis, I am advancing a less
technical, more foundational argument in this Essay.11 Property is a
constitutive project that, despite the claims of some theorists for universal norms, develops over time through the accretion of legal and
8. See infra text accompanying notes 85–89.
9. See infra note 30.
10. See infra text accompanying note 57.
11. The technical merits of the takings claims that have been raised recently are important,
and I will review them briefly in Part II. But this Essay will not attempt to weigh definitively
the many substantive and procedural nuances these claims raise, many of which require substantial additional factual development to resolve. Moreover, even if the specific suits now
pending from the wave of nationalization during the Great Recession do not succeed, the issues
they raise are live, and likely to recur in future economic crises, so understanding the dimensions of takings liability in nationalization is important regardless.
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cultural responses to particular challenges. Nationalization raises not
only important questions about the intersection of corporate law and
constitutional property, but also provides a telling window through
which to observe the boundary between individual rights and community obligation instantiated in that evolving property law.
I. NATIONALIZATION IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC CRISIS
Financial crises are a seemingly inevitable feature of our economic
system and have recurred with distressing regularity throughout
American history. Amidst the tremendous variety of public policy
responses throughout those cycles, one regulatory tool that public
officials have repeatedly deployed has been the takeover of private
companies, particularly where the potential collapse of those companies has posed larger economic threats.
In the Great Depression, for example, the Federal Reconstruction
Finance Corporation took ownership interests in thousands of banks
to prevent their failure.12 The Resolution Trust Corporation similarly
took over and restructured the assets of many failing thrifts during
the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s.
Nationalization was a particularly prominent—if narrowly focused—tool during the recent Great Recession.13 As to Fannie Mae
12. See Steve Lohr, U.S. Not Always Averse to Nationalization, Despite Its Free-Market
Image, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/business/worldbusiness
/13iht-nationalize.4.16915416.html (noting that the Resolution Finance Corporation made
investments in banks in the 1930s equivalent to between $400 and $500 billion in current
dollars). One of the more direct precursors of nationalization during the recent Great Recession
was the takeover of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust. In 1984, the bank was one
of the ten largest in the country, and the federal government, fearing that a failure would cause
a financial panic, took an eighty percent ownership stake, which was held until the bank was
sold a decade later to Bank of America. Id.
13. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling
Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1299–300 (2011) (noting that the federal government became the controlling shareholder in companies such as GMAC and owned as much as 34% of
outstanding Citigroup common stock); see also Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in
Nation’s Largest Banks—Recipients Include Citi, Bank of America, Goldman; Government
Pressures All to Accept Money as Part of Broadened Rescue Effort, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008,
at A1 (discussing federal bank investments); Damian Paletta, Lingling Wei & Ruth Simon,
IndyMac Reopens, Halts Foreclosures on Its Loans, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2008, at C1 (describing
the takeover of IndyMac). All told, the companies that the federal government nationalized had
a collective economic footprint in the trillions of dollars—yes, with a t—and hundreds of millions
of publicly traded shares. That said, nationalization was a relatively small part of a set of much

192

PROPERTY RIGHTS CONFERENCE JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:187

and Freddie Mac, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
(“HERA”),14 authorized the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)
to place the companies in conservatorship.15 Facing mounting evidence of potential threat to the national economy from the instability
of the housing enterprises, FHFA acted on this authority in September
2008, placing both companies in conservatorship.16
AIG followed a slightly different pattern, although the end result
was similarly federal control. At the moment the economic crisis
was reaching its most precarious point, AIG stood at the center of
a significant system of risk associated with housing finance.17 AIG
had sold a high volume of credit default swaps, a form of insurance
used by investors in collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) such as
mortgage-backed securities.18 However, the housing crisis caused
counterparties to start to make claims and collateral calls against this
insurance, causing a liquidity crisis for the company. In September
2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York agreed to provide AIG
with a two-year revolving line of credit of up to $85 billion, and obtained control of the company in exchange.
GM was a third variation on nationalization arising from Great
Recession, albeit one that has not generated shareholder takings
litigation primarily because it resulted in bankruptcy. Although still
broader interventions early in the crisis that primarily consisted of subsidies to shore up various
market sectors without any material change in ownership structure.
14. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2008)).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012).
16. The technical means through which the companies were nationalized involved votes
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Boards of Directors to consent to the conservatorships, one
of the grounds provided under § 4617, although there were arguably other grounds under the
statute available for an involuntary imposition. The conservatorship came as part of a broadbased assumption of the GSEs’ risks and the taking of equity by the federal government in
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Specifically, Treasury received $1 billion in senior preferred
stock and warrants to obtain 79.9 percent ownership of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s common
stock. In exchange, Treasury provided the companies with a line of credit (originally up to $100
billion, later increased) and began purchasing Fannie and Freddie–issued securities to forestall a collapse in the pricing of such securities. See Cynthia M. Hajost, From Oversight to
Conservatorship: What Does the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 Hold For GSEs
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 3, 7 (2008).
17. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 946 (2009);
see generally MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE AIG STORY (2013).
18. Credit default swaps are contracts that provide, in exchange for ongoing payments by
counterparty, “that the party writing the CDS is obligated to pay the counterparty the par
value of the debt instrument in the event the instrument defaults.” Starr Int’l Co. v. United
States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 55, recons. denied, 107 Fed. Cl. 374 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
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the world’s largest automaker at the time, by the peak of the crisis
in 2008 GM faced serious liquidity challenges from a combination of
the general economic slowdown and a rise in fuel costs.19 From late
2008 through the spring of 2009, the federal government provided
GM with a series of loans in what would eventually become a $50
billion rescue plan.20 Through a structured bankruptcy, the federal
government eventually came to hold a nearly 60 percent stake in
the company.21
Common to each of these instances of nationalization—and many
other examples in the past—is that the company involved posed systemic economic risk, which is to say that if they were to fail, the consequences would likely have induced larger market failures. The demise
of any firm costs jobs, risks undermining confidence in some sector
of the economy, or otherwise redounds beyond the boundaries of the
company at issue. But in the modern economy, certain firms raise the
risk of particularly acute spillover effects. Scholars have debated the
bounds of what constitutes an institution that is, in the words of the
Treasury Department, “systemically important,”22 but the primary
focus in the context of nationalization has been on threats of rapidly
escalating market failures of great significance.23
For financial firms, this can relate to liquidity for related firms and
collateral cascades with counterparties.24 For non-financial firms,
19. See generally STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION’S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY (2010).
20. See Brent J. Horton, The TARP Bailout of GM: A Legal, Historical, and Literary
Critique, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 217, 275 (2010).
21. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST.
J. (June 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124385428627671889.html.
22. In the early days after the crisis, the Treasury Department focused in particular on firms
“whose combination of size, leverage, and interconnectedness could pose a threat to financial
stability if [they] failed.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM—A
NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 21 (2009), available
at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf. See also Maziar Peihani,
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs): An Analysis of Current Regulatory
Development, 29 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 129, 131–32 (2013) (arguing for a definition of systemic
risk at the institutional level that focuses on the size of an institution, its interconnectedness,
its complexity, and the concentration or dominance of a given firm in a market).
23. See generally Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2011). Adam Levitin argues
that systemic risk cannot be understood solely in terms of the economic impact of a given
firm’s failure, but rather must be approached as a question of the limits of socially acceptable
harm. See Adam Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011).
24. Edward Morrison, for example, notes three sources of systemic risk for financial firms.
First, when a firm stops payment on its debt and similar obligations, there can be a cascading
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the size of an enterprise can embed its influence not only on investors
and creditors, but also on employees, franchisees, suppliers, and other
economic actors in the orbit of that firm. These significant macroscale spillover effects may impact financial markets, as with AIG,
or housing markets, as with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or even
broad consumer and labor markets, as with GM.25 In each arena, the
failure of a subset of truly significant and interconnected economic
entities can have macroeconomic consequences that are every bit as
tangibly harmful as the physical and public health threats encompassed in traditional emergency doctrine.
The critical defining characteristic of systemic risk in this context
is not simply external harm rippling out from collapse—that is necessary, but hardly sufficient—but rather that a particular firm’s
failure is likely to cascade and threaten large sectors of the economy, if not the economy in toto. Financial markets and the firms
that operate in them are increasingly entwined, a phenomenon that
the financial reporter Andrew Sorkin describes as the “new ultrainterconnectedness.”26 Just as ordinary nuisance involves harm to
the use and enjoyment of one owner’s property arising from activities
on another owner’s property—spillovers that cross physical property
lines—so too can economic contagion leap from firm to firm, and market to market almost instantaneously. By whatever definition is used
to identify such firms, it seems clear that each of the major companies
nationalized in the most recent crisis qualifies.
Given this risk, it is hardly surprising that another common element of each instance of nationalization in the recent crisis was that
effect throughout markets that depend on steady payment streams, including derivative and
insurance markets. Second, the threat of liquidation incentivizes contractual counterparties
to terminate existing contracts. Finally, a failing financial institution will cause counterparties that have hedge risks through liquid securities to liquidate that margin, which will
reduce the value of that collateral for all market participants. See Edward R. Morrison, Is the
Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress of Systemically Important
Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 451–52 (2009).
25. The reaction to the failure of Lehman Brothers exemplifies the risks involved. When
Lehman filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped
more than 500 points, wiping out roughly $700 billion in value from a broad range of investment portfolios. The Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy involved “8,000 subsidiaries and affiliates,
$600 billion in assets and liabilities and more than 100,000 creditors.” Peihani, supra note 22,
at 130.
26. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 5 (2009).
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federal control came with significant public subsidies.27 These included, most prominently, direct subsidies, lines of credit and other
financing, assumptions of liability, debt guarantees and similar loan
backstops.28 This might seem to take nationalization immediately
out of the realm of takings and into the realm of “givings.”29 But there
is a difference between a grant of public funds to an entity, even a subsidy that carries significant strings, and one that accompanies the
transfer of functional or actual ownership or control, even if the ultimate net financial result for the entity involved is positive (or even significantly positive). Moreover, a government takeover can result in a
significant or even complete elimination of the economic value of preexisting ownership rights in the entity, despite the subsidy. Indeed,
it is arguable that in many instances public funds provided to failing
companies during the Great Recession did not compensate those with
ownership interests prior to the takeover but rather were used to keep
the entities operating and prioritize the claims of other stakeholders.
The Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG nationalizations, moreover, each resulted from an agreement with, or at least acquiescence
by, the company’s Board of Directors.30 Shareholders challenging these
takeovers have made the obvious counterarguments about duress,
asserting in essence that any acquiescence was illusory, and it is not
implausible that the courts will credit these arguments.
Finally, with some notable exceptions—Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in particular—nationalization in times of economic crisis tends
to be short-lived and targeted at immediate market-failure cascades, rather than some long-term governmental self-interest.31 The
27. In the case of GM, for example, the total public investment reached roughly $50 billion.
See Horton, supra note 20, at 275. AIG’s line of credit eventually reached over $182 billion.
Pam Selvarajah, The AIG Bailout and AIG’s Prospects for Repaying Government Loans, 29
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 363, 365 (2010).
28. See Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1359, 1358–65 (2011); see generally Levitin, supra note 23.
29. Cf. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
30. See Winston Sale, Effect of the Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on
Affordable Housing, 18-SPG J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 287, 299 (2009);
Sjostrom, supra note 17, at 976–77. In the GM case, again, the Board of Directors approved the
financing structure that placed the federal government effectively in control of the company.
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Lays Down Terms for Auto Bailout, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/business/30auto.html?pagewanted=all.
31. Another historical example of nationalization of a significant failing company that can
be put in the long-term column of the ledger is Amtrak, which was created under the Rail
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prevailing ethos behind this short-term orientation was expressed
by then–Treasury Secretary Paulson early in the crisis, when he
said that “[g]overnment owning a stake in any private U.S. company
is objectionable to most Americans—me included.”32 Accordingly, the
federal government entirely divested its ownership stake in AIG by
December 2010 (making a profit of slightly under $23 billion).33 GM
was similarly reprivatized by December 2012.34 The fact that governmental control was temporary does not necessarily change the takings calculus at the time of each takeover35 but does shape how one
might evaluate the purpose and legitimacy of the intervention.
All of this underscores a pattern of nationalization in which state
intervention is focused on the potential macroeconomic consequences
of the failure to act in times of crisis, with a primary purpose to reinforce faltering markets and limit the large-scale consequences of
the potential collapse of firms that are particularly important from a
systemic-risk perspective. The question remains, however, whether
this type of intervention requires compensation for those whose
Passenger Service Act of 1970. See Laurence E. Tobey, Costs, Benefits, and the Future of
Amtrak, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 245, 253 (1987). The statute led to the public ownership of much of
the nation’s private intercity passenger rail service. Id. at 255. By contrast, although the
Consolidated Railway Corporation, or Conrail, was created in the early 1970s to nationalize
certain freight lines of six bankrupt carriers, it was privatized in 1987 and its assets are now
owned by CSX Transportation and Norfolk Southern Railway. See Agis Salpukas, Conrail
Chugs Off into the Sunset; CSX and Norfolk Southern Take Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/01/business/conrail-chugs-off-into-the-sunset-csx-and-norfolk
-southern-take-over.html.
32. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.
on Actions To Protect the U.S. Economy (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1205.aspx.
33. See Jeffrey Sparshott & Erik Holm, End of a Bailout: U.S. Sells Last AIG Shares,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 11:08 AM), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424127887323339704578172960483282372.
34. Steven Rattner, The Liberation of General Motors, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG
(Dec. 19, 2012, 7:41 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/the-liberation-of
-general-motors/.
35. There is a basic doctrinal divide in the law of takings when it comes to temporary
takings. For traditional exercises of the power of eminent domain, temporary takings generally
require compensation and the primary question is valuation. For regulatory takings, however,
the question of the duration of a governmental action is itself an aspect of the predicate question
of whether a taking has occurred. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002). As will be discussed below, the appropriate way to think
about nationalization in the recent crisis is as potential regulatory takings, so the temporal
dimension can be important in evaluating the expectations of those who ownership interest
in entities has been harmed by nationalization.
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property rights are harmed in the name of larger public benefits—the
quintessential question at the heart of every takings claim. Understanding that the answer, in general, should be “no” requires an exploration of the particular takings claims at issue in nationalization.
II. POTENTIAL TAKINGS LIABILITY IN NATIONALIZATION
As I noted at the outset, this wave of nationalization has recently
begun generating significant litigation raising takings challenges on
behalf of shareholders and the companies themselves, through derivative suits. The theory of economic emergency that this Essay
advances does not ultimately turn on whether the current claims
necessarily succeed, given that the issue of economic nationalization
will continue to recur, just as economic crises continue inevitably to
recur. But it is useful, nonetheless, to outline the basic nature of the
claims at issue and acknowledge that, despite their early stages, it
is quite plausible that one or more could succeed.
A. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
In June 2013, a group of individual and institutional Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac shareholders filed a class-action suit, alleging that
the federal government’s conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac constituted an illegal exaction and/or taking of their property
without just compensation.36 The complaint, which seeks roughly
$41 billion in compensation, raises two primary claims. The first is
that the conservatorships were illegally imposed under the terms of
HERA.37 The second, broader set of charges argue that the conservatorship was designed to channel funds from Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac to other companies (providing the government with a
vehicle to purchase troubled mortgage debt), and ultimately back to
the Treasury.38
36. Complaint, Washington Federal, supra note 4, at 50.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 4617. Specifically, they allege that the conservatorship was imposed not in
response to concerns about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s financial condition, but rather
because of concerns about the broader health of the financial system. They further allege that
the consent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Boards under § 4617 was coerced. These claims
go to the threshold question of the authority of the government to act and the validity of the
action, not whether the conservatorship constituted a taking of the plaintiffs’ property without
just compensation.
38. Complaint, Washington Federal, supra note 4, at 56.
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Specifically, the shareholders assert that they were harmed by
FHFA’s order to the companies to cease paying dividends (other than
to the Treasury), the subsequent delisting of the companies’ common
and preferred shares from the New York Stock Exchange in June
2010, and by agreements to sweep net profits from the governmentsponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) for the Treasury when they returned
to economic stability.39 The complaint states that the government’s
imposition and subsequent administration of conservatorships (where
the government purchased roughly 80% of the companies’ stock) rendered the common and preferred shares of the companies virtually
worthless.
The plaintiffs further assert that Treasury did not seek or obtain
the companies’ consent to sign stock agreements, and, in drafting the
stock agreements, the Treasury did not take into consideration factors
required by the companies’ charters. Though HERA contemplated
conservatorships to return Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their previous financial health, the shareholders argue that the takeovers
went beyond helping the companies and were instead designed to
promote overall growth of the economy by providing increased liquidity to the mortgage market.40 According to the plaintiffs, none of the
conditions required by statute to impose conservatorships existed
because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were adequately capitalized
at the time of the conservatorships.41
B. American International Group
On November 21, 2011, Starr International Company, Inc., one of
AIG’s largest shareholders (headed by Maurice “Hank” Greenberg,
the former chairman of AIG in the years before the economic crisis),
filed suit challenging the federal takeover. Starr argued that the government illegitimately forced AIG to issue over 562 million shares for
39. Id.
40. Id. at 55.
41. Id. Not all of the challenges to the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac conservatorships and
the issuance of the net worth sweep are framed as takings claims. Shareholders are also raising
issues such as breach of contract and violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. See, e.g.,
Cane v. FHFA, No. 1:13-cv-01184 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013); Dennis v. FHFA, No. 1:13-cv-01208
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2013); Am. European Ins. Co. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, No. 1:13-cv-01169
(D.D.C. July 30, 2013); Cacciapelle v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, No. 1:13-cv-01149 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2013); Liao v. Lew, No. 1:13-cv-01094 (D.D.C. July 16, 2013); Fairholme Funds, Inc.
v. FHFA, No. 1:13-cv-01053 (D.D.C. July 10, 2013); Perry Capital, LLC v. Lew, No. 1:13-cv-01025
(D.D.C. July 7, 2013).
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which the government paid only $500,000,42 and that the government
then forced the company to purchase over $62 billion worth of CDO
assets from AIG counterparties, which, Starr alleged, led to the direct
taking of cash collateral from AIG.43 Starr’s direct takings claims are
based on the argument that the dilution of shares by the government
undermined both the economic value and the voting power of Starr’s
holdings.44 Amid anger from Congress and voters who expressed disbelief that AIG would sue the same entity that rescued it from financial collapse, AIG decided not to join the Starr lawsuit.
C. Assessing the Viability of These Claims
Were there no plausible takings claims in arising from the practice
of nationalization, then it might be unnecessary to evaluate rationales
for justifying the practice, although the issue of economic nationalization is likely to recur in future crises. Certainly, if the government
directly seized control of the companies at issue, as it has done at
times in the past,45 or similarly directly expropriated the shares of
the owners of those companies, it seems hard to argue that there
would be no threshold issue of takings liability. In those cases, the
government could certainly be challenged on the scope of its authority to act,46 on whether such action met the public use test, or even
on the measure of just compensation.47 But there would be little doubt
42. In June, 2009, AIG undertook a reverse stock split that reduced its outstanding shares
from 3 billion to 150 million, which allowed the conversion of the government’s preferred to common stock in January 2011. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 58 (Fed. Cl. 2012).
43. Id. at 59. In June 2013, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that Starr’s shareholder
derivative claims were barred by application of the business judgment rule because AIG’s Board
had considered and rejected them. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 459, 471 (Fed.
Cl. 2013).
44. Id. at 482.
45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 615–28 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (recounting history of industrial seizures).
46. It is well settled, although not without controversy, that the federal government has
the power of eminent domain. See generally William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent
Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738 (2013). Nationalization—whether through direct eminent
domain, or more often through other means, as was universally the case during the Great
Recession—does not rely on some reserve of federal power implied in other sources but instead
on specific grants of authority by Congress. As noted, the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG litigation all assert statutory arguments challenging the basic validity of the federal government’s
authority to act.
47. Even with direct expropriation, compensation to shareholders and other stakeholders
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that a taking would have occurred and the questions raised in this
Essay squarely presented.
Nationalization as it unfolded in the Great Recession, however,
presents more of a doctrinal puzzle. The preferred tool to take over
companies during the Great Recession, as noted, was through board
consent. Shareholders are thus arguing that governmental control
had the effect of diluting the value and voting rights of extant shares,
which is essentially a regulatory takings claim.48 As such, the claims
might be resolved under the familiar ad-hoc framework the Supreme
Court laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City49
or through the total-deprivation-of-economic-value analysis the
Supreme Court set out in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.50
As to Lucas, it is conceivable that a shareholder could prevail on
the argument that the relevant intervention had the direct effect of
destroying the value of their shares. The Court in Lucas suggested
that personal property—particularly in regulated industries—falls
outside the categorical rule that applies to land,51 but lower courts
have been mixed on this question.52 Were a court to apply Lucas—and
not find a background principle of state property law applicable to
forego compensation—then the primary question would be a factual
one of whether there was a total deprivation.
Under Penn Central, by contrast, the inquiry would likely focus
primarily on the reasonable expectations of owners in light of the
with property interests at issue might be nominal, depending on whether the shares or other
property rights actually had any value in the context of a failing company.
48. Claims that are being made on behalf of the nationalized firms themselves that their
property was siphoned off for public purposes while the government was in control might be
seen as closer to a direct taking.
49. 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (“In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries [for
regulatory takings], the Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular
significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are,
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.” (internal
citations omitted)).
50. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
51. Id. at 1027–28 (noting that “in the case of personal property, by reason of the State’s
traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [an owner] ought to be aware of
the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at
least if the property’s only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale)”).
52. See Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227 (2004) (discussing lower
court decisions that have rejected the Lucas distinction between real and personal property
for purposes of applying a per se test).
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relevant type of firm and the nature of economic ownership in large,
publicly traded companies.53 Certainly, most shareholders should
expect that regulation can change the economic landscape in which
companies operate, even for companies that are not as heavily regulated as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been (or banks and similar financial institutions generally are).54 But it is a closer question
with respect to an actual government takeover, even under the extraordinary circumstances of an economic crisis that are present when
companies face not only failure, but failure that threatens wider economic harm. It is reasonable for shareholders to expect that the government will not directly appropriate their ownership stake for its
own purposes, and that would seem to apply to the collateral consequences of public investments to rescue firms whose failure threatens
significant, imminent macroeconomic harm.55
In the background for shareholder claims is the possibility of bankruptcy, even for companies that had not actually failed at the time of
nationalization.56 If shareholders would have been wiped out in the
absence of public intervention, it is hard to see how they should be
able to recover in a takings claim. But it is not entirely clear that
such demise was inevitable or that shareholders would necessarily
have been lost all economic value even in a collapse. Even if a company is likely to end up in bankruptcy, it is not necessarily the case
that all shareholder value would be subordinate to claims of creditors.
Where there is insufficient residual value, shareholders are unlikely
to retain any value in bankruptcy. In some ways, this is a question
of the certainty of the impending demise. A short-term crisis is not
the same thing as an actual collapse and an early intervention may
53. Questions under the Penn Central analysis regarding economic impact, as with the
issue of total deprivation or not, require factual development that remains contested in those
suits that have actually been filed.
54. Cf. Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers of Banks and
Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367, 373–74 (1990) (discussing the role of expectation in heavily
regulated financial industries). The federal government has raised a version of this argument
in the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suits. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 30, Wash.
Fed. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00385-MMS (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2013) (analogizing Fannie and
Freddie to banks subject to resolution authority).
55. A non-trivial argument can be made that for many shareholders, any loss from the
nationalization of one firm may be compensated implicitly in offsetting gains to the larger
economy. That is because shareholders, as a general matter, should not bear firm-specific risk
given how easy diversification is to achieve and the fact that no premium should be paid for
bearing overly concentrated investments.
56. Cf. Morrison, supra note 24.
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have left shareholders in a worse position than it might have seemed
at the time.
Moreover, as noted, there is a serious question of whether the acquiescence of boards of directors to a takeover renders any takings
challenges by shareholders moot. Shareholders are contesting the
voluntary nature of those approvals, but even if that argument fails,
it does not necessarily follow that such board action precludes claims
by those harmed by an agreement between the board (on behalf of the
corporate entity) and the government. A claim based on collateral
damage to shareholders would not be outside the mainstream of takings claims in other contexts.57
In sum, there is a plausible argument that at least some of the
claims currently being asserted in challenging nationalization in the
Great Recession are viable as a threshold matter under the Takings
Clause, and the suits are proceeding apace. Even if not all of the
claims being raised succeed, the issue of takings liability will inevitably shadow future economic crises. How, then, to understand the
fundamental nature of what the government does in this situation—
as an aberration or as an extension of the fabric of takings doctrine?
It is to that question we now turn.
III. A DOCTRINE OF ECONOMIC EMERGENCY
Shifting our focus, then, nationalization—even without compensating shareholders—for firms whose failure would significantly threaten
our interconnected economy can be justified for the same reasons that
certain acute emergencies have historically fallen outside the scope
of the Takings Clause. I recognize that such an exercise in analogical
reasoning requires significant caveats, which I will explore below. But
the parallels between traditional overriding necessity and the kind
of emergency presented by the potential failure of firms that pose particularly significant systemic risks in the midst of economic crisis are
surprisingly apt.
A. From Physical Threats to Systemic Economic Risk
In the law of takings, there is a well-recognized tradition of constitutional latitude granted to officials to respond to imminent threats
57. E.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (taking arising from the exercise
of governmental contract right that rendered liens unenforceable).
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to the public through the appropriation or even destruction of private property without compensation.58 As the Supreme Court noted
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, officials have long had
the authority to harm or even destroy “‘real and personal property,
in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire’ or to
forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others.”59
This constitutional doctrine of emergency parallels a tort doctrine of
public necessity that provides a limited, but clear, exemption from
liability to avert imminent harm.60
There are two primary areas where constitutional immunity for
emergency has traditionally arisen. The first has involved military
necessity, primarily in times of war.61 Cases have arisen, for example,
involving the destruction of privately owned assets—bridges and
refineries, for example62—tracing all the way back to claims made
58. There is a related, although not entirely parallel, doctrine of private necessity that provides a privilege against trespass. One primary difference between public necessity and private necessity is that in the latter context, although a private actor is not liable for the act of
trespass, the actor is generally liable for any harm that results from the privileged entry. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965). For private necessity, courts tend to require
that an action be taken to preserve life or property. Moreover, any individual who invokes the
defense must be reasonable in their actions and cannot exploit the privilege beyond what is
required under the circumstances. Generally, then, courts will look for evidence indicating a
strong relationship between the action taken and the harm averted, and the stronger the relationship, the more likely the doctrine of private necessity will be found to apply to the situation.
59. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992) (quoting Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18
(1880)).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (“One is privileged to enter land in the
possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster.”); id. § 262 (“One is privileged to commit an act
which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is or is reasonably
believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public disaster.”). Public officials have
historically faced both tort suits and constitutional actions, hence the intertwined nature of
the takings emergency jurisprudence and the tort doctrine of public necessity.
61. During World War I, for example, the federal government temporarily nationalized
critical infrastructure, such as railroads and telegraphs (and including even the Smith & Wesson
Company). Again in World War II, the federal government nationalized transportation and
energy companies important to the war effort. Perhaps the apogee of the rationale—and functionally likely the reason it is no longer deployed with any regularity—involved the events that
gave rise to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In this case, not often
discussed by property theorists, although exceedingly familiar to scholars of the separation
of powers as the Steel Seizure case, the Supreme Court rejected President Truman’s attempt
to nationalize the steel industry during the Korean War pursuant to nothing more than an
Executive Order.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (holding that destruction of oil facilities in the Philippines during battle in World War II did not constitute
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during the American Revolution.63 In this context, emergency doctrine has been drawn somewhat narrowly, perhaps recognizing the
potentially all-encompassing nature of military need. There are also
national security considerations at play that make the tradition of
military necessity a somewhat uncomfortable basis to find grounding
for a doctrine of economic emergency in takings.
However, a second, more immediately relevant, context in which
state action in times of crisis is excused from takings liability involves steps taken to prevent disasters in the face of imminent physical threats such as spreading wildfires, flooding, and contagious
disease.64 To pick one of any number of historical examples by way
of illustration, in American Print Works v. Lawrence, the Mayor of
New York City and two Alderman were found not liable in trespass,
and no takings were held to have occurred, following their decision
to use gun powder to blow up the buildings at 44 and 46 Exchange
Place—and in the process destroy “800 cases prints; 70,000 pieces
prints; 50 cases drillings; 1000 pieces drillings, and a large quantity
of prints, drillings, and other dry goods, wares, and merchandizes of
great value, to wit, of the value of two hundred thousand dollars.”65
The officials made the decision to destroy the storehouse in the face
of what was then “one of the most extensive fires ever known in this
country, and property, both real and personal, to the value of many
millions of dollars was destroyed, much the larger portion being
a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment); Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 297 (1909) (finding no recovery for owners of a factory destroyed by soldiers fighting in
Cuba to prevent the spread of disease); United States v. Pac. R.R, 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887)
(recognizing “the exemption of government from liability for private property injured or
destroyed during war, by the operations of armies in the field, or by measures necessary for
their safety and efficiency” in a case involving federal government destruction of private
property during the Civil War).
63. See Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 1 L.Ed. 174 (Pa. 1788) (holding that
there was no recovery for destruction of property where the British were on the verge of taking Philadelphia).
64. See John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property
Rights, 83 N.D. L. REV. 651, 719, 728 (2007); see also Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The
Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. REV. 127, 131 (2013). There is a similar doctrine
of immunity from compensation for property harmed in the course of police actions (in the
sense of law enforcement, not in sense of the general police power). See Derek T. Muller, “As
Much upon Tradition as upon Principle”: A Critique of the Privilege of Necessity Destruction
Under the Fifth Amendment, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 481, 497 (2006).
65. 21 N.J.L. 248 (1847).
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consumed by the flames.”66 Similar cases have been a staple of takings
(and tort) jurisprudence since the time of the Founding—and before.67
The logic of uncompensated taking in the emergency context seems
to rest on a number of foundations. First, in many instances the property at issue would have been destroyed regardless of the actions of
public officials, so if, for example, a house is destroyed to stop a wildfire that would have destroyed that house regardless, the owner can
hardly complain.68 But not all instances of emergency action fall into
this category. An alternative explanation might be that invoking necessity in situations of crisis represents a particularly acute collective
action problem that justifies swift action even without compensation.69
There is much to this, but a final rationale, and the one that seems
most clearly to explain the doctrine, is that vulnerability to this kind
of exigency is inherent in the obligations of ownership and membership in a community.70
66. Id. at 261 (Randolph, J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Field v. City of Des Moines, 39 Iowa 575 (1874). Bowditch v. City of Boston,
101 U.S. 16 (1880), is probably the best know of these early emergency cases, by virtue of Justice
Scalia’s invocation of the case in Lucas. See supra text accompanying note 59. The facts of
Bowditch echo so many of the urban firebreak cases in the crowded cities of the nineteenth
century. In the face of “great fire [that] occurred in the city of Boston on the night of the 9th
and 10th of November, 1872,” fire engineers decided to demolish a building that was in the path
of the fire; the building was blown up (destroying “fixtures, merchandise, and tools belonging
to [the plaintiff] . . . of the value of $60,000” as well as the value of the plaintiff’s leasehold
estate), which “stopped the progress of the fire.” Id.
68. As applied to economic emergencies, the analogy could be that if a company is nationalized but would have gone under in the absence of public intervention, that is no different from
a house being destroyed that would have been burnt regardless. However, as noted, it can be
quite contestable whether a company would have failed and even if so, whether shareholders
would necessarily have lost the share value or control rights they did.
69. Richard Epstein has argued that common-law necessity doctrine can be justified as
a limited intrusion on otherwise absolute property rights where transaction costs prevent gains
from trade. Richard Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2,7 (1990)
(“Under certain localized circumstances, however, conferring . . . absolute rights to exclude
does not advance competition in ordinary markets, but rather it creates bilateral monopoly,
holdout problems, and transaction-cost obstacles of one sort or another. At common law it is
just these various situations in which there is a systematic, intuitive willingness to back off the
comprehensive ideal of property in favor of a system that is a little bit frayed at the edges.”).
If one translates that logic from common-law judges to other legal actors, and from private to
public actors, the basic rationale remains. This rationale can then translate fairly directly to
the emergency exception for just compensation.
70. Cf. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles—
Part II—Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 55, 85–93 (1990).
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This emergency exception has not generally been applied to the
kinds of “grave threats,” to quote the Court in Lucas, that arise out
of economic crises, but the logic of doing so is compelling. As the above
discussion of systemic risk illustrates, there are certain firms whose
potential demise threatens not only localized economic harm, but a
kind of ripple effect that can injure broad swaths of the economy, and
in some cases the economy as a whole. The increasingly interconnected
nature of economic activity places certain firms at a nexus point where
the consequences of failure can induce economic panic and damage
every bit as fast-moving as a wildfire. Public officials have many policy
tools available when such an economic wildfire starts, including, of
course, doing nothing and letting markets react, which is what happens when most firms fail. But creating financial firebreaks through
nationalization is a response that echoes a long tradition of legitimate
necessity in constitutional property, whatever one might think of the
merits or wisdom of any given choice to apply the policy.71
The merits of drawing on a well-established doctrinal tradition, in
the best (constitutional) common-law tradition, is that this kind of
analogical exercise can suggest several important limiting principles
to cabin an exercise of authority legitimately open to concern about
abuse. The analogy thus suggests, as an important constraint, that
any doctrine of economic emergency would require a genuine threat
(defined here in terms of the harms arising from the systemic risk
posed by the potential failure of a firm) as well as imminence—that
71. To be clear, the gravamen of the argument here is that the traditional jurisprudence
of emergency in the law of takings supplies a foundation for a similar doctrine in the context
of economic crises, but the argument is not that emergency creates executive authority where
there is none. The Supreme Court has been skeptical of invocations of economic emergency since
at least A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935) (“Undoubtedly,
the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of
power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the
argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere
of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional
power.”). Nonetheless, emergency is clearly a legitimate basis for understanding the contours
of constitutional authority that already exists. See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)
(noting that “a public exigency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in land
to a certain extent without compensation” in upholding emergency rent control during World
War I); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“While
emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of
power. . . . The constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the
power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions.”).
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officials must act quickly to forestall that grave harm. Moreover, inherent in all emergency rationales is the constraint that officials must
be acting reasonably in the face of such threats.72
Although military necessity jurisprudence is less directly relevant
than the disaster and public health cases, one distinction the Supreme
Court has drawn in the former context can supply another important
limiting principle for economic emergencies. In cases of military necessity, the Court has long distinguished between immediate threats
and military actions that seem designed to satisfy a public need that
could otherwise be met through the market, such as where property
is “taken for the service of our armies, such as vessels, steam-boats,
and the like, for the transport of troops and munitions of war, or buildings to be used as store-house and places of deposit of war material,
or to house soldiers or take care of the sick, or claims for supplies
seized and appropriated.”73
In other words, if a public actor is appropriating or destroying property to respond to an immediate crisis, that necessity is more likely
to be recognized as an exigency that can obviate compensation, but
if the motivation (or consequence) is to supply the government with
a benefit that the government could have procured, then claims of
necessity will be met with greater skepticism.74 This echoes the general argument that Joseph Sax made that takings liability is appropriate where the government seeks to benefit itself, but there should be
no liability where the government is merely adjusting economic relations.75 Given legitimate concerns about the risk of aggrandizement
72. As the Texas Supreme Court emphasized in a case rejecting the application of the
emergency doctrine in a case under the Texas Constitution,
one who dynamites a house to stop the spread of a conflagration that threatens
a town, or shoots a mad dog in the street, or burns clothing infected with smallpox germs, or, in time of war, destroys property which should not be allowed to
fall into the hands of the enemy, is not liable to the owner, so long as the
emergency is great enough, and he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.
Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 792 (Tex. 1980) (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 24 (4th ed. 1971)) (emphasis added).
73. United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239 (1887).
74. The analysis may not be the same for actions taken by authorities after the initial
takeovers, when the entities involved had been returned to positions of financial stability.
However, the initial compensability of the takeovers is a distinct question from the validity
of subsequent actions once the firms were nationalized.
75. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964) (“[W]hen
economic loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its resource position in
its enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is that result which
is to be characterized as a taking. But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of
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in economic nationalization, this strain of the necessity rationale
can be a vital constraint.76
There are reasonable arguments to be made, of course, against the
analogy between physical and financial threats. Perhaps the most
salient is the question of imminence.77 After all, the GM bankruptcy
process played out over the course of months and even AIG and the
GSEs arguably might have bought some time had other policy interventions been tried. However, the immediacy of the relevant threat
should be measured in terms of public and market reaction to failure to act, rather than the time it takes for a policy to reach fruition.
Properly viewed this way, economic emergencies are not significantly
different for businesses whose failure poses systemic risks than when
a wildfire is raging, even if it may take time for officials to align the
necessary institutions to allow action.78 Markets today can react almost instantaneously to signals from public officials and even the
possibility that certain firms might fail in the absence of public action
can cause significant public harm.79
government acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as a non-compensable
exercise of the police power.”).
76. In the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG suits, one set of arguments that the claimants
are making is that the takeovers in each case were not designed to forestall financial panic or
even stabilize critical aspects of the economy but rather to directly benefit the federal government itself. For example, in the GSE suits, the allegations relating to the sweep of profits to
the federal government are essentially arguments that the conservatorships were thinly disguised ways of pumping money into the federal treasury. See Complaint, Washington Federal,
supra note 4, at 65. Considering the amount of public subsidy—and the genuine uncertainty
about the outcome of the interventions in each case—this argument is hard to credit on its face.
Nationalization that represents a surgical intervention, and particularly one that is temporary,
is better understood as a move (wise or not) to stabilize markets, rather than expropriation to
benefit the government itself. There are legitimate reasons why some members of a polarized
public may question this logic. See Levitin, supra note 23. But I think the better understanding
of the governmental actions at issue—at least in the initial nationalization—is that they were
not aggrandizing.
77. As noted, emergency doctrine generally requires imminent danger and an actual emergency that establishes the necessity. See, e.g., TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 722 F.3d 1375,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (doctrine not appropriate to be invoked when the Forest Service was
undertaking prophylactic, rather than emergency, wildfire prevention).
78. The Great Recession demonstrated, however, that public institutions can sometimes
move extremely quickly in the face of true looming public disaster. In the midst of the recent
crisis, particularly in its early days, federal officials often had to act more like private dealmakers, forcing them, as Steven Davidoff and David Zaring have argued, to “decide quickly,
negotiate hard, consider transaction and other costs to the best they can, and then call it a
day.” Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 3, at 467.
79. Arguments about the comparative significance of the relevant types of threat—that
fire or disease are of a different order of magnitude than economic harm—or even some
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Moreover, the context of economic emergency no doubt presents
significantly greater complexity than a fast-moving fire or a rapidly
spreading disease. An official may be able to watch a fire approaching
and reasonably conclude with relatively little information that the
destruction of property is an appropriate precautionary measure to
lessen the risk of a larger conflagration. An economic crisis sufficiently
grave to threaten larger macroeconomic harm, on the other hand, may
be hard to define. We have suffered many significant downturns, such
as the stock market crash in 1987 crash and the end of the tech bubble, all without significant takeovers. Even if the threshold condition
of a sufficient emergency can be discerned, delineating between appropriate “firebreaks” and other firms that should be left to the market,
regardless of the consequences, is exceedingly difficult.80
For all of these reasons, some takings theorists have been troubled
by the concept of emergency or necessity as a justification for vitiating
a compensation mandate.81 The argument for applying emergency to
economic crisis is admittedly novel, and the Court has been reluctant
to expand immunity from takings liability beyond categories traditionally recognized in common law. But many lower courts understand
formalist taxonomical objection, make little sense. In the kind of shock that the failure of the
most interconnected and economically significant firms might bring, there are very real and
extremely wide-spread harms that result, and such harms can last far longer than the aftermath
of a wildfire.
80. Because nationalization so often involves action at the federal, rather than state (or
local) level, it does present a paradigm of takings that inverts the traditional locus of eminent
domain at the state level. Simply by dint of the docket, most foundational questions of takings
law involve challenges to state and local regulation or eminent domain, and any doctrine
developed in the context of federal law must be sensitive to the consequences for states and
localities. That said, traditional emergency doctrine in takings jurisprudence much more often
involved such state and local entities, so the extension of the doctrine to the economic sphere
would not be entirely orthogonal to past experience. Nonetheless, if an economic emergency
doctrine is grounded in the nature of extraordinary systemic risk, that fact might suggest caution in states and local governments invoking the rationale, given the risks of inconsistency
across states and the limits of a national perspective for such sub-federal governments.
81. See, e.g., John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for
the Takings Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 487 n.94 (1983) (describing the “necessity” and
“emergency” cases as “among the Court’s most troublesome takings precedents because they
lack a basis in principle”). Peter Byrne has noted that emergency and related doctrines have
“stood on the fringes of regulatory takings doctrine because giving them full effect would come
close to abolishing any normative foundation for regulatory takings generally.” J. Peter Byrne,
The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L. REV. 69, 93
(2012). But this anxiety ignores the pedigree of the privilege and the not-insignificant boundaries
that courts have historically placed around the doctrine. Whether that is more or less normatively destabilizing than the many other ambiguities in takings doctrine is hard to say.
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that definitions of harm and public exigencies can evolve over time,
and these complexities are ultimately judicially manageable.
In short, while the traditional law of emergency in takings would
import significant constraints on the invocation of the rationale to
support nationalization of systemically important firms in economic
emergencies, the extension of the doctrine in this way makes eminent
sense. It is important doctrinally to give reasonable latitude to the
judgment of officials in the thick of crisis, even if, in the calm after the
storm, other avenues might seem to have been preferable. All of this,
then, gives us the rough outlines of a doctrine of economic emergency
in takings that bears directly on the practice of nationalization.
B. Economic Externalities and Irreconcilable Choices?
To this point, the argument has sought to ground a takings doctrine
for nationalization that reflects, and extends, traditional emergency
rationales. There is a closely related jurisprudential vein in constitutional property, however, that might supply an even broader doctrinal grounding for nationalization. Public officials are sometimes
faced with the choice of irreconcilable economic conflicts reflecting
the harm that one owner’s property threatens to cause another owner.
In a situation posing this kind of irreconcilable choice, officials may
legitimately choose one set of economic interests over another.
This logic is familiar from the cedar rust tree disease case, Miller
v. Schoene,82 where the Court articulated the dilemma as follows:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have
been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury
to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked. When
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property
in order to save another which, in the judgment of the legislature,
is of greater value to the public.83

82. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
83. Id. at 279.
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This recognition of the harm principal can apply as well to modern
economic harms caused by private entities in companies whose failure
poses systemic risks. Miller was a due process, not a takings case, and
the Court appeared to distance itself from the case in Lucas.84 But the
proposition has not been explicitly disavowed and, even transformed,
can be seen in the Lucas understanding of background principles of
state law as a limitation on per se takings liability.
As with other necessity-based rationales, the Miller doctrine is
not unlimited and must be grounded in the reasonable exercise of
authority, however deferentially construed. The reason for relying
on the emergency doctrine as a basis for justifying nationalization
in times of economic crisis is that a Miller-esque economic nuisance
argument is harder to cabin and harder, perhaps ironically, to operationalize. Relying on the tradition of imminent necessity, rather
than a broader conception of harm and incompatibility, is thus a
sounder foundation for what might be understood as a novel extension of economic authority.
IV. NATIONALIZATION, NECESSITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW
Even if one were to accept the argument that the emergency doctrine should logically be extended to contemporary economic dangers,
one might still object more fundamentally to the idea of invoking crisis
and systemic risk to affect the landscape of takings law, regardless
of the nature of the emergency. Nationalization is a term that for
many people invokes visions of unconstrained dictatorial authority—
think banana republic85—and all the more so if there are grounds
for taking control of companies without compensating those harmed
by that action.
Indeed, some commentators have argued that it is precisely in
times of crisis that protection for property rights—taken somewhat
narrowly to mean constraint on public authority to adjust economic
benefits and burdens—should be at its highest level. Todd Zywicki,
84. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022–23 (1992) (“The
‘harmful or noxious uses’ principle was the Court’s early attempt to describe in theoretical terms
why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation
without incurring an obligation to compensate—a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly
with respect to the full scope of the State’s police power.”).
85. Cf. Ashton B. Inniss, Rethinking Political Risk Insurance: Incentives for Investor Risk
Mitigation, 16 SW. J. INT’L L. 477 (2010).
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for example, argues that the purpose of property rights (and the rule
of law more generally) is to provide “as much stability as possible”
to facilitate the “economic coordination” that economic activity requires, and in emergencies more than ever.86 Zywicki gives the following example:
Consider the milk in your refrigerator or cafeteria. Think of the
chain of coordination required to get it there: Farmers must decide to use their land to graze dairy cows; determine how many
cows to graze; and employ people and use machinery to milk the
cows, pasteurize the milk, and deliver it into the stream of commerce. All the coordination in that relatively simple chain of
production must then align with millions of consumers deciding
whether to buy milk or Coke and ensuring that they can buy
both milk and Cheerio’s. The extent to which these systems are
coordinated is remarkable.87

Zywicki, drawing on Friedrich Hayek, argues that complex economic
activity not only requires this kind of coordination but involves constant informational feedbacks to adjust.88 State intervention to respond to market failures short-circuits this feedback mechanism and
the resulting uncertainty, so the argument goes, undermines incentives for private investment.89
However, these kinds of arguments about the necessity of stability
and the rule of law in constitutional property ignore another side to
the ledger of expectations about property. Zywicki’s milk may require
Herculean market coordination to get from the cow to the consumer’s
cup, but such complex markets are apt not only to be much less efficient in the absence of a baseline of regulatory protection in the
ordinary course,90 but reveal their greatest weaknesses in times of
86. See Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts, and the Rule of Law, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195 (2012).
87. Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 199. Zywicki makes some leaps in causation that are hard to support. For example,
Zywicki argues that the reason credit markets have been slow to return after the crisis is because “political response to the financial crisis (or perhaps more accurately rationalized as a
response to the financial crisis) created a huge amount of instability that makes it hard to price
a loan.” Id. at 198. The real reason banks were slow to extend credit in the aftermath of the
housing crisis, however, is most likely not policy-induced “instability” but much more likely
the very inability of the Hayekian information chain to allow lenders to accurately assess (and
price) risk in the face of market failure.
90. See Joseph W. Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum
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economic crisis. For markets to work, property rights must be appropriately calibrated and all the more so during times of emergency.
Hanoch Dagan has mounted a broader challenge to expropriation
without compensation as an affront to the rule of law that has relevance here as well.91 Dagan asserts that any constitutional doctrine
that offers less than fair market value for takings offends two aspects
of the rule of law. First, drawing on Joseph Raz, Dagan argues that
judicial validation of non-compensatory takings fails to provide the
guidance necessary for people to form clear expectations about how
authorities will exercise their coercive power, which in turn is critical
to the value of autonomy.92 Second, the case-by-case method through
which compensation practices are determined threatens the rule of
law value, Dagan continues, that seeks to constrain the arbitrary
exercise of power.93
These are important concerns—and Dagan acknowledges that
takings without full compensation can be justified on the grounds
of the reciprocal obligations that owners have as members of a community, which I think best explains traditional emergency doctrine
in takings94—but his concern with guidance and arbitrary exercise
of power risks a kind of circularity. In practice, the kinds of standards that tend to dominate takings law actually provide a significant
amount of notice to owners and the broad sweep of litigation on takings tends to generate rule-like categories that are quite intelligible.95
As Joseph Singer has noted, “while the ad hoc test looks vague on
paper, it is highly predictable in practice. The courts entertain a strong
presumption that regulations of property are legitimate if passed by
legislatures to promote public ends.”96 Indeed, Singer rightly notes,
“the Penn Central test is more predictable than a seemingly rigid rule
that would prevent changes in ‘established property rights’ given
Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
139 (2008).
91. See Hanoch Dagan, Expropriatory Compensation, Distributive Justice, and the Rule
of Law, in RETHINKING PUBLIC INTEREST IN EXPROPRIATION LAW (H. Mostert & LCA Verstappen
eds., forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2345115.
92. See id. at 6 (citing Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213, 218 (1979)).
93. Id. at 6–7.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
95. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1369, 1402–05 (2013).
96. Id. at 1405.
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the need to interpret what those rights are before they can be defined
as immune from change without compensation.”97
Moreover, whether the judicial validation of expropriatory practices
that do not provide compensation represent the arbitrary exercise of
power depends heavily on one’s view of the discretion being deployed.
If a policy of intervention to solve a potentially devastating market
collapse—as one example of a reason why compensation might not
be granted—seems like an excuse for officials to advance some more
nefarious goal, then such steps will seem arbitrary regardless of the
legality of the process through which such power has been exercised.
This is partly a cultural question, and it was evident in much of the
popular reaction to nationalization during the Great Recession. Ultimately, though, it requires some external metric of arbitrariness to
say that an exercise of the power to interfere with property rights,
including compensationless expropriation, necessarily violates this
aspect of the rule of law.
It is reasonable to raise questions about the arbitrariness of the
exercise of power the longer the government remains in control of an
entity. Economic nationalization that involves forestalling market failure and restoring the health of a systematically important firm may
take on a different cast—and raise increasing risks—if that control
continues longer than necessary to respond to an emergency. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac remain under conservatorship, while AIG and
GM and others have be re-privatized, and it is not surprising that the
conservatorships have generated ongoing questions about the purpose
and role of federal control.98 This does not change the calculus in
moments of crisis, but is worth reflecting on for the ultimate legitimacy of any instance of nationalization.
In short, while it is fair to argue that extraordinary departures from
what property law demands in the name of emergency may undermine
the rule of law, nationalization—so present throughout our history,
as much as we tend to forget the fact—is not such a departure. The
critical point about the rule of law here is that, as uncomfortable as
this reality might be, a doctrine that acknowledges the kind of limited
intervention represented in our tradition of nationalization would
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Fannie-Freddie Fate Rests in Courts: Shareholder Suits
Challenge U.S.’s Profit-Taking Structure, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://stream
.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-451130/.
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not be outside the bounds of law but deeply consonant with the oldest
pathways of the takings clause.
CONCLUSION
One might question the wisdom or the foresight of any of the instances of nationalization that occurred in responding to the Great
Recession and there is no doubt that, in the heat of the moment, officials likely made mistakes. In the early months of the crisis, a great
deal of debate swirled around which companies should be saved or
left to their fate—why Bear Stearns and not Lehman?—and it was
difficult for officials to anticipate how events would play out given
that all indications pointed toward a rapidly spreading global economic meltdown.
There is a difference, however, between policy concerns about nationalization and constitutional arguments for barring the practice
without compensation, which would likely forestall the practice altogether. How one views the wisdom of nationalization in any given
instance is inherently complicated, and my own perspective is that
this is a valuable policy tool if used carefully, recognizing the risk of
abuse, as with all public authority. But that debate is one that is
better carried out in a political, rather than judicial, arena.
It does no violence to norms of ownership—or the rule of law—to
acknowledge that overriding necessity in times of crisis can be as relevant to economic emergency as it has always been to more prosaic
threats. The doctrine of economic emergency that this Essay has proposed accords with the deepest traditions of our system of property,
and rightly should be so recognized.

JUDICIAL TAKINGS: MUSINGS ON STOP THE BEACH

JAMES E. KRIER*
Judicial takings weren’t much talked about until a few years ago,
when the Stop the Beach case made them suddenly salient.1 The
case arose from a Florida statute, enacted in 1961, that authorizes
public restoration of eroded beaches by adding sand to widen them
seaward. Under the statute, the state has title to any new dry land
resulting from restored beaches, meaning that waterfront owners
whose land had previously extended to the mean high-tide line end
up with public beaches between their land and the water. This, the
owners claimed, resulted in a taking of their property, more particularly their rights under Florida common law to receive accretions to
their frontage on the water, and to have their property remain in contact with the water. The state supreme court disagreed, concluding
that the owners never had the rights they claimed. The owners then
sought (and were granted) review by the Supreme Court, the question now being whether the state supreme court’s decision worked
a judicial taking because it was contrary to Florida common law.
They lost, all of the participating justices concurring in the view
that the Florida court’s decision did not contravene any established
property rights.
So there was no judgment of a judicial taking in Stop the Beach,
nor, indeed, any judgment that “there is such a thing as a judicial
taking,” because only four members of the Court think that.2 The
plurality opinion, written by Justice Scalia as a part of his opinion
for the Court, concludes that the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause
* Earl Warren DeLano Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Tenth Annual Brigham-Kanner
Property Rights Conference, William & Mary Law School, October 17–18, 2013. I thank John
Echeverria for his comments and suggestions, and Tom Merrill for lending me some of his
thoughts on judicial takings.
1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Stop the Beach), 560
U.S. 702 (2010).
2. Id. at 718. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, in which all of the justices
concurred, and the plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito. There were two separate opinions concurring in the judgment but not in the plurality’s
views on judicial takings—one by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Sotomayor, the other by
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Stevens did not participate in the case.
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plainly applies to all the branches of government, not just the executive and legislative. “If a legislature or a court declares that what
was once a private right of ownership no longer exists, it has taken
that property, no less than if the State had physically appropriated
it or destroyed its value by regulation.”3
These views have already provoked a fairly considerable literature.
I don’t claim to have read all the articles, but I have sampled many
and learned a lot. The literature about Stop the Beach is way more
illuminating than the opinions in the case itself, the plurality opinion especially, but like the plurality opinion the literature is provocative. And just as Stop the Beach has moved scholars to muse, so
their musing has led me to do the same. What follows are some riffs
on the case and the scholarship alike, part primer and part critique.
I.
The law of takings distinguishes between (1) explicit takings of
private property under the government’s inherent power of eminent
domain, and (2) implicit takings of private property caused by legislation, administrative regulation, or other governmental actions.
In type 1 cases, the government sues in a condemnation action; in
type 2 cases, the property owner sues in an inverse condemnation
action. There is no issue about a taking in type 1 cases, the very
point of the lawsuit being to force the sale of the property in question (which the government may do, provided the transfer is for a
public use and that just compensation is paid). There is always an
issue about a taking in type 2 cases, where the property owner claims
that the government’s actions amount to a taking, even though the
government insists otherwise.
Judicial takings, if there ever is such a thing, would be takings of
type 2, governed by a cluster of Supreme Court rules conventionally
referred to as the law of “regulatory takings.” The label is inaccurate, because type 2 cases commonly arise in instances where the
consequences of the governmental action in question have no relation whatsoever to any proximate regulatory provision, whether legislative or administrative. It is better to think in terms of explicit
3. Id. at 715.
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and implicit takings, and I take the license to do so at times in the
discussion that follows.
II.
A.
As mentioned above, only a plurality of the Court believes that
there can even be such a thing as a judicial taking. Skeptics suggest
that logically judicial takings can’t really exist. A common version of
the argument based on logic runs as simply as this: Courts lack the
power of eminent domain. Since they are thus incapable of explicitly
taking property, they are also incapable of implicitly taking property.
I find this line of argument unpersuasive. Eminent domain is an
inherent power of government. Nothing in the Constitution confers
it; the Takings Clause operates to limit it. The clause’s constraints
apply to the government generally. No language indicates or even
suggests that courts are excluded from the generalization. Professor
Thompson, after reviewing historical materials regarding the drafting of the Takings Clause, concludes that it occurred to no one to
consider its applicability to the judiciary. “The original understanding of a taking,” he says, “was simply too narrow to raise the issue:
the fifth amendment’s takings provision was addressed not to the
type of indirect, regulatory taking that most judicial property changes
resemble, but to traditional exercises of eminent domain.”4
Such a history hardly puts judicial takings logically out of constitutional bounds. It tells us nothing about what the original understanding might have been had judicial takings been on the table.
But they weren’t; the focus was on explicit exercises of the eminent
domain power (the idea, and thus the law, of implicit takings developed many years later). And I suppose no court had ever entertained
the notion that it could explicitly condemn property, or that it should.
That would have been an audacious challenge to convention shaped
by “traditional exercises of eminent domain,” as Thompson puts it.
So we can say for sure that there was and is no practice of explicit
4. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (1990). Thompson’s
article, though published two decades before the opinions in Stop the Beach, is as valuable
now as it was before.
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condemnation by courts, but that hardly denies the power of courts
to do what traditional practice has left to the other branches.
B.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there clearly is
no power in the courts to engage in explicit condemnation. It would
be an obvious non sequitur to conclude from this that judicial decisions cannot work implicit takings. The logical fault is illustrated by
Professors Dana and Merrill in their indispensable text on the law
of takings.5 They observe, correctly, that condemnation and regulation are substitute means by which governments can control the use
and ownership of property. If condemnation is used, the government
has to pay; if regulation is used, it does not, unless some body of law
says otherwise. The Court’s law of implicit takings says otherwise,
for the obvious reason: if government could choose freely between
condemnation and regulation, it would be inclined to favor regulation in order to evade the obligation to pay compensation.6 To control
against undesirable substitution effects, the Court’s rules of decision
aim to force compensation when regulation “has an impact [on property rights] functionally equivalent to an exercise of eminent domain.”7
But “courts, unlike legislatures and many executive agencies, do not
have the power to take property by eminent domain. Consequently,
the basic logic for the [implicit] takings doctrine . . . does not apply
to courts: It is difficult to say that a court, by changing the law, is
seeking to evade any obligation that it has . . . .”8
The fault in the argument is apparent. Dana and Merrill simply
assume that the power of eminent domain necessarily entails the
power to take by explicit condemnation, which I have suggested is a
contestable proposition. Yet, in my view, it doesn’t matter. Whether
or not courts have the power of eminent domain, governments surely
do, and courts, as the plurality in Stop the Beach correctly observes,
are indisputably a branch of the government. Governments also
5. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS (2002).
6. Id. at 4–5. We can draw an analogy to federal estate and gift taxes. An estate tax must
sensibly be accompanied by a gift tax in order to prevent estate tax avoidance by making inter
vivos gifts.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 229–30.
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have the purse power, and thus the means, unavailable to the judicial branch, to pay compensation for judicial takings.9 And just as
governments should not be able to evade the obligations of the
Takings Clause by substituting regulatory activity for explicit condemnation, they should not be able to evade the obligations by substituting judicial activity for regulatory activity.
III.
Even if there are no logical reasons to fuss about judicial takings,
there are prudential ones. Before we get into these, it is important
to have in mind what judicial takings are about—better, what they
would probably be about should the Stop the Beach plurality someday win another vote.
Judicial takings are solely concerned with court decisions that reallocate existing property rights by changing established property
doctrine.10 Note two points: While statutes and administrative regulations can change doctrine too, thus triggering the Takings Clause,
legislative and executive actions can also work takings in ways that
judicial actions cannot.11 Relatedly, statutes and regulations might
change doctrine and reallocate rights, yet still not amount to takings
under the Supreme Court’s rules. Whether this is true of judicial
decisions as well is a nice question, as we shall see.
At least from the standpoint of the Takings Clause, courts and the
other governmental branches are free to change established property rules so long as there is no alteration in existing property rights.
The Court made this plain long ago: “A person has no property, no
vested interest, in any rule of the common law.”12 An illustration:
Four states (Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island)
still recognize the common law fee tail. They could abolish it, but
only as to fees tail created after the date of the abolition. Retroactive abolition would probably be a taking, because it would wipe out
property rights already created, namely any vested remainders and
9. Actually, courts may have the means to pay, in a way. See infra note 39.
10. See Thompson, supra note 4, at 1450; DANA & MERRILL, supra note 5, at 228–29.
11. The obvious example is explicit condemnation. Another is government enterprises that
interfere with private property (as when a public sewer system causes flooding).
12. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
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reversions.13 Never mind that those rights are worthless or nearly
so, because in fact, though not in law, they are contingent to a fault,
little more than expectancies.
Retroactive abolition of the fee tail might be accomplished by legislation or by independent judicial decision, but there could be a
judicial taking in either case, as Stop the Beach makes clear. The
point is obvious in the case of judicial abolition. As to legislative abolition, a judicial taking looms if a party sues in state court claiming
that the abolition works a taking, and the court upholds the legislation in light of state common law. The party could then seek review
in the Supreme Court or sue in federal district court, claiming a
judicial taking in that the state court changed the state’s established property law doctrine. The federal court would have to determine whether the state common law really is what the state court
said it was. Federal oversight could also result from claims filed by
property owners who were not parties to the initial litigation that
led to judicial takings challenges but sue independently, asserting
in federal court that the judicial decision upholding the retroactive
abolition of the fee tail takes their property rights.
IV.
The path to federal oversight of alleged state takings is complicated by various procedural rules developed by the Court. The details of this part of the story are well treated elsewhere, so I leave
them aside.14 Whatever the path, the end point finds one federal court
or another involved in the interpretation of state property law. So,
critics argue, even if judicial takings are not logically out of bounds,
they are objectionable for prudential reasons: Judicial takings would
flood the federal courts with litigation involving issues beyond their
immediate expertise, intrude unduly on the state’s acknowledged
13. See, e.g., Green v. Edwards, 77 A. 188 (R.I. 1877) (holding that retroactive abolition
of the fee tail is an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law). So
the Court in Munn observed: “Rights of property which have been created by the common law
cannot be taken away without due process.” Munn, 94 U.S. at 134. Today, I presume, these
decisions would talk about takings rather than due process. On judicial takings versus due
process, see Eduardo M. Peñalalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (2012).
14. See D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 903
(2011).
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authority to define property rights, and impose financial obligations
that compromise the prerogative of the states’ political branches
(the judiciary is not such a branch) to manage the expenditure of
public funds.
The weightiness of these concerns is a function of, among other
things, the frequency with which judicial takings would be found to
have occurred, but I don’t see how anyone can provide even a rough
estimate of that. One would need to know, first of all, how often
property owners find occasion to assert in law suits that judicial
decisions “declare that what was once an established right of property no longer exists”15 —more to the point, how often property
owners would find occasion to make such an assertion were a doctrine of judicial takings to become the law of the land. After all, the
doctrine might constrain courts from declaring what they otherwise
would have declared. If the universe of relevant instances proved to
be small, then so would the consequences of the doctrine, at least
insofar as the obligation to pay compensation is concerned.
Second, whatever the size of the universe, the number of instances
in which judicial takings would actually be found is sure to be smaller,
and maybe substantially so, or even overwhelmingly so. But to make
a rough guess about this we need to know exactly what the plurality
opinion means in saying that judicial takings would arise whenever
courts declare that established property rights no longer exist. The
statement might seem clear, but it isn’t, as evidenced by the divergent interpretations of it found in the literature. Below I consider
some ambiguities and what various commentators make of them.
A.
We might suppose that since the courts are just another branch
of government, they should be treated just like the other branches
when it comes to takings. The plurality opinion in Stop the Beach can
be read to stand for this proposition. In its little exegesis on “some
general principles of our takings jurisprudence,” the plurality notes
that “our doctrine of regulatory takings ‘aims to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking [by
condemnation under the power of eminent domain].’”16 For examples,
15. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715.
16. Id. at 713, quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
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the plurality cites several of the Court’s rules: when government
action works a permanent physical occupation of private land, there
is a taking; when government action wipes out all economically beneficial use of private property, there is a taking; when government
action re-characterizes as public property what before was private
property, there is a taking.17
Anyone familiar with takings law knows there is more to it than
this. The plurality’s examples refer to several of the Court’s per se
or categorical takings rules—rules of the form “if X happens, that is
always a taking.” The rules are not quite so hard-edged as the plurality opinion suggests. It notes that temporary physical occupations
are not takings per se but leaves unmentioned that this is also true
of wipeouts of value (the latter of which, moreover, are never takings
if they are the consequence of controlling common law nuisances, and
not per se takings if they wipe out the value of only part of a parcel).18
Putting the common law nuisance exception aside, all of the instances
above—and many others involving government actions that impact
the value or use of private property—might still work takings under
the multi-factor, ad hoc test laid out in the Penn Central case.19 The
probability of a property owner winning a takings claim under that
test, however, is very low. So is the probability of a property owner being able to rely on any of the per se rules, because government agents
have learned to abstain from activities that cause permanent physical occupations and permanent wipeouts of entire parcels.
B.
It seems to follow from the foregoing that if (1) courts are subject
to the same constraints as the other branches, then (2) successful
judicial takings challenges would be rather few and far between. But
point (2) follows only if point (1) holds, and on this the plurality is
17. Id.
18. For most purposes, the Court considers takings challenges by looking at the impact
of a government action on the whole piece of property involved, as opposed to just a part of it.
This is to say that the Court rejects a practice of “conceptual severance.”
19. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U. S. 104, 124–25. Most
simply stated, the multi-factor test considers the diminution in value of property caused by
the government action, the extent to which the action interferes with the owner’s distinct
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. For a fuller
statement and examination of the factors, see DANA & MERRILL, supra note 5, at 131–64.
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unclear and the commentators divided. Professor Somin, for example, agrees with point (2) because he reads the plurality opinion
to say that point (1) does hold. His interpretation relies on Justice
Scalia’s statement that condemnation by eminent domain “is always
a taking, while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be, depending on its nature and extent.”20
The emphasis in that statement is Somin’s. He could as well have
emphasized the last words of the statement—“depending on its nature and extent”—because those words also suggest that the plurality would apply to the judicial branch the rather forgiving body of
rules that the Court applies to the legislative and executive, lock,
stock, and barrel. This includes, Somin infers, the multi-factor test
of Penn Central, which “[c]ourts generally apply . . . in ways that favor
the government.”21
Contrast the view of Professor Echeverria. “It is difficult to know,”
he says, “whether Justice Scalia’s theory of judicial takings is intended to fit into, or instead subvert, established takings doctrine,”22
but he worries that subversion is the aim. His interpretation—just
as reasonable as Somin’s—suggests that Justice Scalia means to
establish a per se rule that “every change in established law is a
taking,”23 and to apply the rule not just to the courts but “to all the
branches” of the government.24 “In any event, the scope of the proposed new judicial takings claim is breathtaking.”25
20. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715; Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the
Problem of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 105 (2011). There are other
statements in the plurality opinion that support Somin’s interpretation. See Stop the Beach,
560 U.S. at 713 (Takings Clause “is concerned simply with the act, and not with the governmental actor”); (“There is no textual justification for saying that [the existence or scope of government power to take property without just compensation] varies according to the branch
of government”); (“Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings effected
by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment”).
21. Somin, supra note 20, at 104.
22. John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary Is Different,
35 VT. L. REV. 475, 479 (2010).
23. Id. at 477.
24. Id. at 481. Professor Echeverria has told me in a recent conversation that he considers
his interpretation in this respect supported by the Court’s subsequent opinion in Arkansas
Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). He reads the case to say that
whereas only permanent physical invasions or occupations are per se takings, direct government seizures or forced transfers of ownership are always takings, regardless of the temporal
duration of the seizure or transfer.
25. Echeverria, supra note 22, at 479.
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So we have two academic experts on takings fairly interpreting
the same opinion and reaching dramatically different conclusions
about what it promises, or threatens, to stand for. Both interpreters
invoke Penn Central. Somin, as we saw, figures the case would play
the same role in judicial takings doctrine that it does in takings by
the other branches. Echeverria worries that the opposite could happen,
noting that the plurality opinion mentions Penn Central nowhere but
in a footnote26—a slight “consistent with Justice Scalia’s abhorrence
for the kind of ad hoc balancing that Penn Central exemplifies.”27
Who has the better of this particular debate I cannot say. Divining the meaning of the plurality opinion is pure guesswork, and I
know nothing of Somin and Echeverria’s records in that regard. I
have to suppose that their contrasting interpretations might be influenced (and appropriately so) by their views about the law of takings generally. Professor Somin is an advocate of “stronger rules for
regulatory takings rules,” with “stronger rules” meaning rules that
protect property owners, and constrain the government, more than
do the present ones. Professor Echeverria probably doesn’t share
that sentiment; his professional career, teaching, and research interests reflect an ongoing commitment to resource conservation and
environmental quality. I find it interesting, though, that someone like
Somin, who wants the plurality opinion to portend much, argues that
it portends little, whereas someone like Echeverria, who wants it to
portend little, argues that it portends much. Or maybe this is exactly
as one would expect.
V.
It should be apparent by now that even very careful readings of
Stop the Beach provide little basis for guessing about the likely impact of the plurality opinion, were it to become the law. So much depends on what the plurality has in mind, and on what (if anything)
26. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 716 n.6.
27. Echeverria, supra note 22, at 481. Nor does the plurality opinion make any mention
of conceptual severance (on which see supra note 18), perhaps another indication that Justice
Scalia and company would just as soon dispense with much of conventional implicit takings
doctrine. Cf. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1374–75 (2d ed. 2010).
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it would have to surrender to garner a fifth vote. The law could end
up being something like what Somin foresees, or what Echeverria
foresees, or somewhere in between, and in any event could be expected to morph over time.
If Somin’s interpretation of Stop the Beach proves to be on the
money, there would be little occasion for drama. We would have a
unified and familiar doctrine of implicit takings law, equally applicable to all branches of the government, the judiciary included. To
be sure, that doctrine makes it very difficult to avoid takings liability when the consequences of government actions are permanent
physical occupations or permanent wipeouts of the value of entire
parcels that can’t be justified on nuisance control grounds. Note,
however, that it is easy to avoid the circumstances that would give
rise to those consequences. The instances triggering the Court’s per
se takings rules arise mostly from accidents or stupidity. Hence most
takings cases would continue to be reviewed, just as most cases are
now, under the Penn Central multi-factor test, which cuts the government a lot of slack.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Echeverria’s worst-case reading
holds. There would be a per se rule applicable to all governmental
branches, across the board: There is a taking when any government
action alters the status quo such “that what was once an established
right of property no longer exists,” period.28 The problem, though, is
that such a rule might well mean less than all it could. There are all
sorts of ways the rule could be narrowed but still stand; and there
are ways to limit the rule’s consequences in any event, even if it
28. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 715. Of course, there could be a per se rule limited just to
the courts; that approach would fall on the spectrum somewhere between the extremes represented by views like Somin’s and views like Echeverria’s. No doubt there are other variations that might occupy the middle ground, but I want to consider only the one that would
confine the per se rule to the courts. It is an especially interesting variation, and my thinking
about it has been provoked by conversations with Tom Merrill about a thought experiment
in his property book, MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 27, at 1373. This is my riff on the experiment, with apologies to Tom if I have missed the point or otherwise mucked things up: Suppose
a state statute would pass muster under the conventional implicit takings rules regarding
physical invasions, wipeouts, and the Penn Central multi-factor test. The statute is challenged
as a taking in state court, which upholds it on the ground that the rights alleged to have been
taken do not exist under state law, whereas actually they do. Would this amount to a judicial
taking, even though the court’s misinterpretation of state law didn’t matter to the correct result?
Might the state court decision simply be ignored, on grounds of harmless error? Cf. Frederic
Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 619 (2012).
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stands in full. What follows are some illustrations of each observation. Many of them have already been discussed at considerable
length elsewhere, so at times I settle for brief mention accompanied
by references that provide an abbreviated guide to some of the relevant literature.
A.
As to narrowing the rule, consider what it might mean to speak
of a “right of property” and what it might mean to say that the right
“no longer exists.” Lawyers, for better or worse, commonly speak of
property as “a bundle of rights”—conventionally the right to exclude,
the right to use, and the right to transfer. The question for present
purposes is whether the “right of property” is to be taken as referring
to any twig within any one of these rights, or to the entirety of any
one of these rights, or to the whole bundle of rights and their twigs.
From the latter rendition—call it “conceptual integration”—it could
follow that government action destroying only one or several of the
twigs or even the rights would not necessarily be a taking under the
per se rule because the bundle itself has not been destroyed but only
depleted; it still exists. My own view, with which there might be wild
disagreement, is that the Court has been ambivalent regarding the
relevant “property right,” sometimes tolerating the destruction of
one particular twig or right (not the whole bundle) and other times
not, especially if the particular right is the right to exclude.
An obvious narrowing technique—one already mentioned in Part
III—is for a court to make any changes in existing law prospective.
As we have seen, there is no entitlement to particular rules of property, and this suggests that prospective changes in the rules would
not be regarded as takings. But a closer look at the matter leads me
to conclude that this technique might not always work. After all,
prospective changes in property rules can constrain and reduce the
value of existing property rights. The advent of zoning illustrates the
point. Nonconforming uses were allowed to continue (subject to various limitations), on the thought that retroactive application of the
new zoning rules to existing uses would result in government liability for takings. Application of the zoning rules to undeveloped land,
on the other hand, was regarded as purely prospective in its effects.
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This is obviously incorrect. Before zoning, owners of undeveloped
land had existing property rights (the right to develop, constrained
only by nuisance law) the value of which was adversely affected by
the new zoning rules, and sometimes very substantially. In Euclid,29
the Court avoided the difficulty by reasoning that the zoning rules
were essentially regulating nuisances, but that was bogus then and
would certainly be considered bogus now, after Lucas and its stress
on common law nuisances.30 In short, prospective zoning was actually
retroactive (the same problem arises today in the context of zoning
amendments), and the same is true of much prospective lawmaking.
To figure out whether and how this point matters turns on the property rights issues discussed at the beginning of this section, and it
is impossible to say how the Court would resolve those issues.
Another narrowing technique is suggested by Professor Barros.31
He argues that any law of judicial takings (actually, the law of implicit takings generally) should apply only to private–public transfers,
and not to private–private transfers.32 After all, the latter do not
destroy private property rights but merely transfer them, whereas
the consequence of public–private transfers is that private property
rights no longer exist, because they have been rendered public property rights.
The literature mentions several other related methods by which to
narrow the per se rule. Consider Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court
in Lucas, in particular his reference to “background principles of the
State’s law of property” that limit the nature of any property owner’s
title from the outset.33 The question in Lucas was whether development activity subject to a regulation enacted by South Carolina could
be viewed as a common law nuisance under state law; if it could,
there would be no liability for a taking. The Court referred the question to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which held that the activity in question was not a nuisance under state common law, and so
29. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
30. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
31. Barros, supra note 14, at 919–32.
32. He notes that his idea “bears a resemblance to Joseph Sax’s distinction between government acting as enterpriser and government acting as mediator between conflicting private
claims.” Id. at 919 n.48, citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36,
62 (1964).
33. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
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there was a taking. Suppose it had held otherwise, not because there
was a precedent holding that the activity in question was a nuisance,
but because there were precedents from which it could fairly be gathered that the activity was covered by the state’s principles regarding
nuisance law. Would that be a “change” in doctrine triggering a judicial taking?34
Nobody knows, but the answer might turn on how deferentially
federal courts would review state court interpretations of state law.
Justice Scalia addresses the matter in a footnote, explaining that
the plurality’s vision of judicial takings “contains within itself a considerable degree of deference to state courts. A property right is not
established if there is doubt about its existence; and when there is
doubt we do not make our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.”35 Professor Fennell notes that a deferential posture would be particularly appropriate given the Court’s
practice of pronounced deference to state governments on the question of what sorts of projects meet the public use requirement of the
Takings Clause.36
B.
The discussion above concerns matters determining the event of
a judicial taking. Even given the event, its consequences, financial
consequences in particular, could perhaps be mitigated in several
ways. Recall that critics of judicial takings object that they would
give rise to financial obligations payable from public funds. This is
34. As Professor Fennell puts the matter, “When we assess whether property law has
‘changed,’ we must make some assumption about whether property law is made up of narrow
doctrinal rules, broad overarching principles, or something in between.” Lee Anne Fennell,
Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 101 n.141 (2012).
35. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 726 n.9.
36. Fennell, supra note 34, at 100. Regarding deference, see also Barros, supra note 14,
at 932–36, noting among other things that the holding in Stop the Beach reflects considerable
deference to the state supreme court’s reading of the law. And indeed it does. The Court relies
on a state supreme court precedent that the state court’s opinion did not itself so much as
mention, which precedent seemed to lead to “counter-intuitive” and “arguably odd” results.
Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 732. In the Court’s view, the question is what the state law is, not
whether the state law is dumb. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the
Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between the IUS Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment,
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2011).
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thought to be inappropriate because it interferes with the exclusive
prerogative of the political branches, the executive and the legislative, to manage the state fisc. I don’t see this argument as a weighty
one, mainly because state courts make all sorts of decisions that call
for public expenditures.37 The plurality opinion dismisses the argument on the ground that the default remedy for takings would be to
reverse an offending judicial decision, not to order that compensation be paid.38 The difficulty here is that a taking might have occurred
in the meanwhile, prior to reversal, and under the Court’s decision
in First English39 compensation would be due for that meanwhile
period. But the plurality opinion makes no mention of First English.
Tom Merrill has suggested to me a related point, the essence of
which is that suits for declaratory judgment could be used to determine whether some challenged government action would work a compensable taking. A judgment in the affirmative would simply give the
government an option to alter or abandon the action in question, or
instead go forward and be liable for compensation. It bears mention
that First English could still come into play, but even then the approach would limit the financial burdens of judicial takings.
A final limiting device mentioned in the literature is statutes of
limitations. Professor Barros argues that the limitations period for
bringing a federal court judicial takings claim “should run from the
time that the state supreme court reaches a binding decision on the
disputed property issue,”40 and that the limitations period should be
the same for property owners who were, and those who were not,
parties to the state court litigation. He notes, however, that the plurality opinion has language suggesting that suits by owners not parties to state litigation would be permitted decades after a state court
decision changing the law.41 This is another instance of the ambiguity that runs through Stop the Beach.
37. A similar sentiment is expressed in Bloom & Serkin, supra note 28, at 589.
38. Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. at 723.
39. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482
U.S. 304 (1987). For discussion of whether First English should apply to judicial takings, see
Fennell, supra note 34, at 111–12. Professor Fennell also discusses instances in which courts
could find funds for takings by, in essence, requiring parties in disputes to pay each other. Id.
at 99, 104, 111–14.
40. Barros, supra note 14, at 951.
41. Id. at 952–53.
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VI.
As we have seen, nothing in Stop the Beach tells us what the
future holds, even if judicial takings become the law of the land. The
consequences could be moderate or extreme or somewhere in the
middle, but the ambiguities in the plurality opinion itself provide no
basis for divining which. Looking elsewhere, however, may provide
at least a clue.
The law of implicit takings developed by the Supreme Court, in my
view, is usefully considered as if it were designed to maintain and
reinforce two important but often conflicting ideological and political
commitments rooted in the Nation’s traditions—one to strong rights
of property, the other to the imperatives of an active and effective
state. The Court honors the first commitment with its per se rules,
which are narrow in their application but nevertheless important for
their rhetoric. For the sake of property rights, the right to exclude is
protected against even the most trivial permanent encroachments.
The Court honors the second commitment with exceptions and ad
hoc rules that weaken the per se rules and provide the government
with enormous leeway to act free of any obligation to pay compensation. For the sake of the state, it tolerates extraordinary impositions
on property values.
To paraphrase Justice Holmes, government could hardly go on if
it had to pay for every change in the law, but, he added, there have
to be limits to that proposition.42 What limits we have at present are
those observed in the Court’s rules on implicit takings. The pattern
we see has been pretty stable for a long time; if it holds, then we can
expect any law of judicial takings that develops to be relatively
inconsequential. But that’s a big “if.”

42. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).

